Carrots, sticks, and international externalities
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I wish to thank Lucian Bebchuk, Jagdeep Bhandari, Michael Knoll, Thomas Merrill, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Hilary Sigman, and two anonymous referees, as well as seminar participants at Stanford Law School, for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the James H. Zumberge Faculty Research and Innovation Fund.