PaperSharing fractions in cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts
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Understanding supplier motivation to engage in multiparty performance-based contracts: The lens of Expectancy theory
2022, Journal of Purchasing and Supply ManagementA parallel multi-objective scatter search for optimising incentive contract design in projects
2017, European Journal of Operational ResearchCitation Excerpt :These clauses traditionally consist of a cost target (Ct), in combination with an agreed upon sharing of potential cost over- or underruns. The majority of these clauses studied in literature belong to a limited number of archetypes which specify only this target and a cost sharing ratio above and below this target, respectively (Al-Subhi Al-Harbi, 1998; Anvuur & Kumaraswamy, 2010; Arditi & Yasamis, 1998; Bubshait, 2003; Chan, Lam, & Chan, 2012; Chan, Chan, Lam, & Wong, 2010a, 2011a; Chan, Chan, Lam, & Chan, 2011b; Chapman and Ward, 1994; Jaraiedi, Plummer, & Aber, 1995; Lippman et al., 2013; McAfee & McMillan, 1986; Meng & Gallagher, 2012; Mihm, 2010; Perry & Barnes, 2000; Rosandich, 2007; Rose & Manley, 2010, 2011; Rosenfeld & Geltner, 1991; Ryan, Henin, & Gandhi, 1986; Tang, Qiang, Duffield, Young, & Lu, 2008; Turner, 2004). These archetypes can be ranked based on the amount of risk they transfer from the owner to the contractor (Al-Subhi Al-Harbi, 1998) and are commonly denoted as follows: Firm Fixed Price (FFP), Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP), Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) (or Target Cost (TCC)), Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF), Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) and Cost Plus Percentage Fee (CPPF) contracts.
Incentive contract design for projects: The owner's perspective
2016, Omega (United Kingdom)Citation Excerpt :Moreover, the contracts which are discussed can frequently be categorised as one of six basic contract types [87]: firm fixed price (FFP), guaranteed maximum price (GMP), fixed price incentive (FPI) (or target cost (TCC)), cost plus incentive fee (CPIF), cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) and cost plus percentage fee (CPPF) contracts. This set of cost contract types forms a risk-transfer spectrum, where the FFP contract represents the situation where all the risk is carried by the contractor, and the CPPF is the situation where all the risk is carried by the owner [3]. Variations on these archetypes are also often used to manage cost performance in production environments [85].
Using Nash bargaining to design project management contracts under cost uncertainty
2013, International Journal of Production EconomicsOptimal Sharing of Construction Project Outcomes with Downstream Contracting Parties: Principal-Agent Analysis
2024, Journal of Construction Engineering and ManagementFramework for Estimating Quality-Related Incentive and Disincentive in Construction Projects
2023, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management