Elsevier

Forest Policy and Economics

Volume 7, Issue 2, February 2005, Pages 213-226
Forest Policy and Economics

Creating political capital to promote devolution in the forestry sector—a case study of the forest communities in Banyumas district, Central Java, Indonesia

https://doi.org/10.1016/S1389-9341(03)00027-3Get rights and content

Abstract

Devolution has become a major policy trend in the forestry sector of developing countries. Using the case of Banyumas district in Central Java as an example, we examine the challenges of implementing devolution policies at the local level. Applying a theoretical framework based on the concepts of social and political capital, we analyze the strategies used by proponents supporting implementing a community-based forestry system in this district and opponents against it. The proponents include the forest communities, a local non-governmental organization (NGO) and national NGOs. Our analysis showed that they effectively combined their social capital with other resources to create political capital, e.g. by mobilizing the villagers and by lobbying. As a consequence, the central level State Forest Corporation (SFC) approved the implementation of a community-based forest system that met the interests of the local communities. Representatives of the SFC at the district level and members of an illegal logging network opposed this approval and also created political capital to avoid the loss of authority and income opportunities. Assessing the influence of the political frame conditions, we find that the reformation policies implemented after the fall of the Suharto regime increased the possibilities of the proponents to create political capital while depreciating the traditional political capital of the opponents due to, for example, the decline of the military's influence in the political arena.

Introduction

In recent years, devolution of forest management to local communities has become a major policy trend in developing countries. The term devolution is used here to refer to the transfer of responsibility and authority over natural resources from the state to non-governmental bodies at the local level (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 2001, p. 42). Devolution policies aim to address institutional problems that have been identified as major reasons behind the degradation and misuse of forest resources in developing countries, such as state property and centralized management of forest resources, corruption in the forestry administration, lack of effective monitoring, and enforcement and deficient incentives for the local communities (McCarthy, 2000a, Ligon and Narain, 1999, Wibowo and Byron, 1999). Different mechanisms have been identified in the relevant literature on the subject by which devolution can lead to a more sustainable forest management in terms of equity, efficiency and environmental sustainability: the creation of incentives by a fair and democratic distribution of benefits; the creation of accountability; the reduction of transaction costs; the mobilization of local knowledge; the strengthening of local institutions for sustainable resource management; and—in view of a low state capacity—the limitation of the role of the state to the provision of enabling frame conditions and the protection of public interests (compare Ribot, 2002, Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001, Birner and Wittmer, 2000, World Bank, 1997). However, the empirical evidence on the effects of devolution in the forestry sector has been mixed (Banerjee, 1997, Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001, Ribot, 2002), which implies a need for more theoretical and empirical research on devolution.

Focusing on the optimal levels and forms of devolution, normative analyses of devolution can draw on the economic theory of federalism (Braden and Proost, 1997), transaction costs economics (Ostrom et al., 1993, Birner and Wittmer, 2000), property rights and collective action theory (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2001), and theories of democracy (compare Ribot, 2002). Considering the fact that devolution is associated with a considerable shift in political and administrative power, there is also a need to study why and under which conditions local communities will eventually receive more rights to forest resources. As such studies on the political feasibility of devolution are still scarce (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001, pp. 75–76), our paper focuses on these questions, using a case study from Indonesia as an empirical example. As theoretical basis of our analysis, we combine the concept of social capital, which has been widely applied in studies on natural resource management, with the concept of political capital, which is derived from political resource theory (Birner and Wittmer, 2003).

Under Suharto's ‘New Order’ regime from 1966 to 1998, Indonesia's forest management was characterized by centralized management and a strong focus on exploiting the country's forest resources in the pursuit of macro-economic objectives such as obtaining foreign exchange and promoting growth. This policy fitted well into the political strategy of Suharto's regime, which justified its rather authoritarian and centralized way of government by the economic growth it was able to promote. With the onset of the economic crisis, this legitimization eroded and the reform movement increasingly criticized the prevalence of corruption, collusion and nepotism in the ‘New Order’ regime (McCarthy, 2000a). After the fall of Suharto, a far-reaching policy of decentralization and devolution was implemented (Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balancing). The forestry legislation was reformed with the aim to stipulate a larger participation of local communities in forest management (Forestry Law 41/1999, Article 4). The transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, however, was also accompanied by reduced law enforcement which contributed to rapidly increasing deforestation rates. At the national level, the annual deforestation rate during the reform period reached 2.5 million hectares per year as compared to an annual average of 1.6 million hectares prior to the reform period (Kompas, 2002).

In response to this crisis in the forestry sector, the State Forest Corporation (SFC), which is in charge of managing all production forest and most protection forest on Java, issued the policy of community-based forest management (CBFM) (SFC, 2000). According to this policy, forest villagers are entitled to plan CBFM activities together with SFC and other stakeholders and receive a share of the benefits (SFC, 2001). The forest farmer communities in the Banyumas district of Central Java played a pioneering role in implementing this devolution policy. Therefore, we analyzed the political strategies of these communities and their opponents in order to identify factors and conditions that influence the political feasibility of devolution.

The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the conceptual framework; the research area and methods are outlined in Section 3; Section 4 deals with the problems of forest management in Banyumas district and describes the villagers’ struggle for devolution; Section 5 analyzes the struggle of the forest communities to gain more rights to forest resources; Section 6 discusses the findings; and Section 7 draws some conclusions.

Section snippets

The concept of social capital

In the burgeoning literature on social capital, one can distinguish two major perspectives (compare Wall et al., 1998, Birner and Wittmer, 2003): (1) the ‘actor's perspective’ formulated by Bourdieu (1992) in which social capital consists of the resources that individual actors can mobilize due to their belonging to exclusive networks, and (2) the ‘society's perspective’ characterizing the work of Putnam (1993) in which social capital is a public good constituted by the organizations and

Profile of the research area

The Banyumas district is located in the northern part of Central Java Province and characterized by small-scale agriculture. The average farm size is 0.5 ha, and land distribution is unequal. The major crops are paddy, maize and cassava. Most of the rural population lives adjacent to the state forests and relies on farming for their livelihood because alternative income opportunities are limited. The population density is 1415 people/km2, and the population is growing at a rate of 1.06% (

Problems of forest management in Banyumas district

The general problems of increasing deforestation mentioned in Section 1 can also be observed in Banyumas district. The number of forest trees lost due to illegal logging increased nearly fivefold between 1998 and 2000 (Fig. 1), and the resulting financial loss to the East Banyumas SFC amounted to US $14 million in the year 2000 (East Banyumas SFC, 2001b).

As the research showed, it was the combination of the economic crisis and problems of law enforcement arising during the reformation period

Analysis of the policy process

Applying the theoretical framework presented in Section 2, this section analyzes how the proponents and opponents of the devolution process used their social capital to create political capital in order to pursue their goals.

Discussion

The case study shows that devolution cannot be achieved without a strategic effort by the proponents of this policy against those who fear loosing power and income as a result of devolution. By highlighting the strategies proponents and opponents of devolution can use to create political capital, the study makes it possible to derive strategic insights for other communities and NGOs that are involved in comparable devolution processes. However, it is important to take the macro-political frame

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, the study shows that individual cases can provide useful insights in the dynamics of devolution. Even though the reform movement in Indonesia had created favorable frame conditions for devolution at the national level, the implementation of theses policies cannot be taken for granted, especially if regional level agencies are the entities that will lose control over resources. In such a case, initiatives at the local level, supported by actors with powerful relations to the

References (37)

  • A. Casson et al.

    From new order to regional autonomy—shifting dynamics of ‘illegal logging’ in Kalimantan, Indonesia

    World Development

    (2002)
  • E. Ligon et al.

    Government Management of Village Commons

    Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

    (1999)
  • A. Agrawal et al.

    Collective action, property rights and devolution of forest and protected area management

  • Banerjee, A.K., 1997. Decentralization and devolution of forest management in Asia and the Pacific, Asia-Pacific...
  • Banyumas Regional Planning and Development Agency, 2001. Laporan Perkembangan Tahunan Kabupaten Banyumas (in...
  • Banyumas Statistics, 2000. Kabupaten Banyumas dalam Angka Tahun 2000 (in Indonesian). Banyumas Statistics,...
  • R. Birner et al.

    Using social capital to create political capital, how do local communities gain political influence? A theoretical approach and empirical evidence from Thailand

  • Birner, R., Wittmer, H., 2000. Co-management of natural resources: a transaction costs economics approach to determine...
  • J.A. Booth et al.

    Civil society, political capital and democratization in Central Africa

    The Journal of Politics

    (1998)
  • P. Bourdieu

    Ökonomisches Kapital—Kulturelles Kapital—Soziales Kapital

  • Brenner, V., Buergen, R., Kessler, C., Pye, O., Schwarzmeier, R., Sprung, R.D., 1998. Thailand's community forestry...
  • R. Burns

    Introduction to Research Methods

    (2000)
  • J. Coleman

    Social capital in the creation of human capital

    American Journal of Sociology

    (1988)
  • East Banyumas SFC, 2001a. Rekapitulasi Perkembangan Program Perhutanan Sosial (in Indonesian). East Banyumas SFC,...
  • East Banyumas SFC, 2001b. Rekapitulasi Data Pencurian Pohon (in Indonesian). East Banyumas SFC,...
  • FFA, 2000. Laporan Konggres Pertama Setan Balong (in Indonesian)....
  • Ford Foundation Team, 2001. Resume Diskusi Illegal Logging (in Indonesian). In: Awang, S.A., Kurniawan, I., Nuh., I.M.,...
  • Cited by (0)

    1

    Tel.: +49-551-39-3925; fax: +49-551-39-3076.

    View full text