Academic myths of tourism

Highlights

• Defines tourism myths as demonstrably false but widely held, long-standing beliefs.

• Identifies a wide array of myths.

• Classifies them into 6 categories.

• Examines their origins.

• Discusses the implications on and for tourism scholarship.

Abstract

Myths play a critical role in the development of any field of study. They act as the central point for coalition, and differentiate disciplines from each other. The absolute truthfulness of some myths, therefore is less important than their symbolic truth. Other myths, though, can be damaging, promulgating falsehoods and inhibiting the development of a field. This paper examines the roles myths have played in establishing the cult of tourism scholarship. Senior academics were surveyed to identify what they believe to be myths about tourism. Six broad categories of myth emerged: self interest; foundation; reactive stakeholder; convergent; too good not to be true; and myths inherited from other disciplines. Promulgation of these myths has been abetted by methodological inertia.

Introduction

Tribe (2006) asked whether it is possible to find the truth about tourism. Perhaps a more salient question is whether some tourism academics are even interested in the truth, for a growing quantum of published research seems more intent on creating and/or perpetuating a range of myths that have been repeated so often that their assumed truthfulness has become part of the mantra that has shaped the style and direction of tourism scholarship. Indeed, many tourism myths seem to be so well entrenched that they are presented as polemics, where questioning them opens the individual to personal attack. This paper identifies a range of common academic myths about tourism that were identified by senior academics from around the world. It seeks further to identify their origins, understand the role they play and explore why they are so common in academia in general and in tourism studies in particular.

Traditionally, mythology and religion provided the reference points for the human experience and in doing so, defined belongingness to a social group, helped socialize the individual to that group (Bowles, 1989) and provided a sense of identity that distanced new groups from their past associations (Light, 2001, Light, 2007). Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest that in a commercial setting organizational myths reflect rationalized and impersonal prescriptions to behaviours. Moreover, since they are highly institutionalized and beyond the discretion of any individual participant or organization, their legitimacy can be taken for granted. Much the same situation occurs in academia, where myth making reflects shared ideas and institutional characteristics that legitimize certain fields of study (Hansen & Williams, 1999), distance emerging fields from their core disciplines, and establish norms about how to conduct research and what results can be expected (Lance, 2011).

The idea of an ‘academic myth’ has a generally narrow definition. McGee (1985) states they are demonstrably false beliefs that are widely held, long-standing and never subjected to deep inspection, while Frantz (2006) identifies them as wrong ideas widely held by authority figures. Kompier (2006) is much more succinct, classifying them as believed truths. Heydenryck (1993) asserts myths pervade everything, including academia. Indeed, writers from such diverse disciplines as chemistry (Frantz, 2006) biotechnology (Nightingale & Martin, 2004), accounting and finance Alexander and Archer (2000), organizational behavior (Aquinis et al., 2011, Kompier, 2006), business management (Davis, Haltiwanger, & Schuh, 1996), archaeology (Cederlund, 2006, Mercer, 2006), political science (Hansen and Williams, 1999, Heydenryck, 1993), sociology and family studies (Cuskelly, 2009), corporate social responsibility (Doane, 2005), medicine (Vicker, 2008) and others have written about the challenges wrought by academic myths in their respective disciplines.

What constitutes a demonstrably false belief, though, is a matter of interpretation. Some myths are simply factually incorrect, but as Alexander and Archer (2000) point out others may not be false per se, provided they are presented within their proper context. However, false beliefs emerge over time when beliefs are placed in different contexts without appreciating the moderating effect context may have, when the factual basis on which the belief originated becomes so diluted that only a kernel of truth remains or when the fact has become so exaggerated that it is presented as a self-evident, universal truth that is beyond intellectual refutation (Gaines, 2001). Heydenryck (1993: 27) reminds us, “the kernel is hardly the whole corn, and if it is substituted for the whole corn, it will mislead any attempt to understand that whole.” Indeed, Barthes (1984) asserts that myths distort facts rather than make them disappear, and in doing so validate arbitrary assumptions about them. Distortion can be so great that the absolute truthfulness of a myth is often far less important than its symbolic or metaphorical value (Alexander & Archer, 2000).

The origins of academic myths, and the factors that lead to demonstrably false beliefs are diverse. Mercer (2006) argues many myths can be traced to the origins of a discipline, where the work by many early scholars remains dominant, even though their ideas have been confronted by contradictory evidence. Indeed, inertia appears to play a powerful role in entrenching certain ideas as believed truths (Kompier, 2006) to the extent that they become regarded as received doctrines that are taught in undergraduate and postgraduate classes, enforced by gatekeepers, and passed between generations (Lance, 2011). Entrenchment of myths is abetted by the peer review process and doctoral student training (Lance, 2011, Mazanec, 2009; Vandernberg, 2006) where, for example, peer review reinforces certain methodological approaches as the only acceptable way to tackle problems and where doctoral students are often taught there is only one acceptable approach to tackle a problem. The end result is the elimination of originality (Mazanec, 2009).

“Results that are too good not to be true” have also been identified as another source of myths (Davis et al., 1996, Talaulikar and Manyonda, 2011). Flawed methods used to produce the original findings are perpetuated, resulting in further evidence of their truthfulness, or alternately, research that challenges the findings is dismissed. The tendency to believe results that are too good to be true is heightened when the researcher is an advocate of the phenomenon under investigation, resulting in the failure to engage in critical thinking (Gabennesch, 2006, Lett, 1990). Bad research perpetuates these types of myths. Kompier (2006) accuses many researchers of simply being lazy by not critically reading core studies to verify their methodological accuracy. Indeed, Simkin and Roychowdhury (2003) conclude about 80% of authors who cite highly regarded works have never read the original document, while both Kompier (2006) and Todd, Yeo, Li, and Ladle (2007) found a high level of inaccurate interpretation and the selective omission of facts that do not support the author’s thesis, even among those who have ostensibly read the works. One of the anonymous referees also cautioned about cherry picking research to refute widely held claims.

The risk of myth making is accentuated in studies that are conducted under the assumption that there is something out there and then set out to find it (Ernst, 2011, Hill, 2011). This type of research can be described as “self-fulfilling prophecy research” for the intent is to prove something, rather than explore ideas. Studies of this type have been identified in archeology (Mercer, 2006) and research into families of children with disabilities (Cuskelly, 2009) where cultural norms and perceptions incline researchers to ask questions in a particular way to achieve a ‘desired’ result. Pre-determined beliefs will further influence how information is interpreted, with Radford (2010) suggesting very ordinary events can be mistaken for extraordinary ones.

Sheaffer (2008) adds the fallacy of misplaced rationalism, where a great deal of time and effort is devoted to pursuing elaborate, rational explanations for phenomena, without first demonstrating their existence. Over 20 years ago, Lett (1990) reminded us of the principle of falsifiability: for any claim to be true, it must also be falsifiable. That way, if the claim is false, the evidence will prove it false, and if the claim is true, the evidence will not disprove it. Yet, many myths are created because this principle is violated. Researchers ‘prove’ their ideas by selective or misleading data analysis (Davis et al., 1996) and by inferring causality when no such causal relation exists (Sherman, 2009). This observation identifies the epistemological implications that arise through the use of inappropriate methods. Moreover, the style of language used by researchers may also have a role in myth making. The use of positivist language to describe results connotes a finding based on evidence whereas normative language implies how things ought to be and their value in terms of good or bad.

Torcello (2012: 37) reminds us that good scientific research, by necessity, involves skeptical rigor, noting science “is a fundamentally skeptical endeavor involving the testing of hypotheses, coupled with efforts to protect test results from confounding variables, including the researcher’s own biases… science advances through efforts to disprove hypotheses, even when hope has held for their confirmation.” All possible intervening or moderating factors must be eliminated before the results can be attributed to the phenomenon being studied. He indicates that part of the problem may lie in poor basic training of researchers. One of the anonymous referees cautioned that “it may not be wise to speak of a ‘myth’ if there is controversial empirical evidence partially supporting and partially disproving a contention.” This referee also went onto add that some myths may have evolved out of the immature status of research and theory-building on behalf of the researcher.

Finally, the role of other stakeholders cannot be ignored (Kompier, 2006) for they play a key role in myth making directly by funding studies that support their desired myths (Munteanu, Zingg, & Azzi, 2004) or indirectly by spreading myths throughout their stakeholder networks. Doane (2005), for example, discusses how the myth of corporate social responsibility is repeated by industry, even though empirical evidence of businesses behaving in a more socially responsible manner is still limited. Likewise, Short and Toffler (2010) discuss industry’s promulgation of the myth of self-regulation, when in reality it works only when accompanied by a strong regulatory framework.