Can you have your meat and eat it too? Conscientious omnivores, vegetarians, and adherence to diet

Highlights

• The research compared conscientious omnivores (COs) to vegetarians/vegans.

• COs violated their diet more and experienced less guilt when doing so.

• This was mediated by attitudes toward animals and meat among other factors.

• Despite having more choices, it is more difficult for COs to adhere to diet.

Abstract

As criticisms of factory farming continue to mount, an increasing number of individuals have changed their existing dietary practices. Perhaps the two most important food movements reacting against industrial farming are (1) vegetarianism, the avoidance of animal flesh; and (2) conscientious omnivorism (CO), the consumption of meat or fish only when it satisfies certain ethical standards. While the former group has been well-studied in the social science literature, there have been few, if any, studies specifically examining those who identify themselves as ethical meat eaters. The present research sought to determine if one particular diet was more greatly adhered to by its followers. Results revealed that COs were less likely to perceive their diet as something that they absolutely needed to follow, reported violating their diet more, felt less guilty when doing so, believed less in animal rights, were less disgusted by factory-farmed meat, rated its sensory characteristics more favorably, and were lower in ingroup identification than vegetarians. Mediation analysis demonstrated that differences in the amount of violations and guilt associated with these violations could in part be traced to practical and psychological factors, making it more difficult to follow conscientious omnivorism.

Introduction

Criticisms of factory farming have become more pronounced the past decade, as a number of popular press books (e.g., Fast Food Nation, Schlosser, 2001; Eating Animals, Foer, 2009) have described the inhumane treatment of factory-farmed animals and independent reports by the Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production (2008) and the United Nations (2006) have raised other negative consequences of industrialized farming. Individuals sensitive to these concerns have turned to two distinct dietary alternatives. The first, vegetarianism – the avoidance of animal flesh – dates back to ancient Greece. The second, ethical meat eating – the consumption of meat or fish only when it satisfies certain ethical standards – is a recent development. While the psychological aspects of vegetarianism are beginning to be better understood – a recent review (Ruby, 2012) referred to it as a “blossoming” field of inquiry and included 133 citations – research on ethical meat eating is in its infancy and has lagged behind its social significance.

The ethical meat eating movement traces its foundation to Michael Pollan's 2002 New York Times essay “An Animal's Place.” Pollan argued that smaller, humane farms and the meat they produce contribute more to the collective good than the achievement of vegetarian goals would. In the first place, animals are relatively free to do as they please on such farms and to engage in behaviors natural to their species which appear to promote their happiness and well-being. Pollan noted that this “good life” would be impossible if humans forfeited consuming meat. Left to their own devices, animals would lead a far more difficult life seeking prey and ultimately succumbing to predation. Pollan extended his arguments beyond the luxury of happiness, arguing that without humans raising animals on farms for consumption, each species would face extinction, i.e., their survival is dependent on humans raising them for food. He cited animal scientist Steve Davis who claims that vegetarianism would increase the total number of animals killed every year and that the way to save the most animals is by consuming the largest animal that can live on the least intensively cultivated land: grass-fed beef. Pollan also appealed to environmental benefits of eating animals allowed to roam freely. Such animals improve the health of the land and lessen reliance on fossil fuels and chemical fertilizer by decreasing the distance food needs to travel and by increasing manure.

Pollan's argument is significant for several reasons: It is the first to offer an alternative between absolute vegetarianism (likely unappealing to many) and unrepentant omnivorism (condoning the disturbing treatment of animals); it implies that it is the suffering of animals, not the killing of them that should warrant our concern; and it suggests that (from a utilitarian perspective) eating meat produced in certain environments is not only morally defensible but superior to vegetarianism. As such, it offers a way to resolve what has been termed the meat paradox (Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012) – “I eat meat but I don't like inflicting suffering on animals.” Although unable to effectively name it (he suggested humanocarnivore), Pollan recognized that he was proposing a new dietary category.

During the next few years, several philosophers made formal cases extolling the virtues of ethical meat eating. The first of these was Michael Scruton's (2004) essay entitled “The Conscientious Carnivore” [Suggesting that Scruton's (2004) reference to a carnivore was not the most appropriate term because it implied a diet only consisting of meat, Singer and Mason (2006) offered “conscientious omnivores” (COs) to describe individuals who only consume animal flesh that has met certain ethical standards, a term that will be adopted in the present research]. Scruton rejected vegetarian arguments on behalf of the rights of animals thus enabling meat consumption while he simultaneously emphasized human duties to care for animals and prevent them from living tormented lives, thus criticizing unrepentant omnivorism and its condoning of factory farming. Schedler (2005) subsequently argued that relative to universal vegetarianism or eating industrial meat, ethical meat maximizes utility. His case was predicated upon two main propositions: Individuals are morally obligated to adopt any practice that would maximize the likelihood of the greatest satisfaction of desires of animals and humans; and without sacrificing anything of greater moral value, ethical meat eating would most likely reduce animal suffering and increase human and animal pleasure more than universal vegetarianism or present dietary practices. In the last case, it is clear that with its emphasis on maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, utilitarianism would argue against factory farming and the way that it denies animals freedom of movement, the ability to engage in behaviors natural for their species, and lives free of great pain. However, in both classical and Singer's (1993) preference utilitarianism, there is nothing wrong with eating and killing animals as long as the animals are raised humanely, killed painlessly, and replaced by equally happy animals¹ (see Gruen, 2011).

While it is difficult to estimate exactly how many individuals have been influenced by these ideas and adopted a diet in which they exclusively eat ethical meat, to some degree the CO movement is an outgrowth of concerns held by those regularly consuming factory-farmed meat. That is, it is clear that a large number of individuals have similar reservations about farm animal welfare as those fully embracing conscientious omnivorism. Recent U.S. academic research indicates that the vast majority of consumers want farm animals to be well cared for (Grimshaw et al, 2014, Prickett et al, 2007, Rauch, Sharp, 2005), would support laws protecting farm animals from cruelty (Zogby International, 2003) and granting them enough space to behave naturally (Humane Research Council, 2008), and want greater access to such information, with 62% favoring mandatory labeling of eggs produced using cages and 62% supporting labeling of pork produced on farms using gestation crates (Tonsor & Wolf, 2011).

These attitudes about farm animal welfare are reflected in reported intent to purchase ethical meat (Rauch & Sharp, 2005) and when examining macro level data, actual purchasing behavior. For example, according to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) research (Dimitri & Oberholtzer, 2009), the amount of money spent on organic dairy products increased more than seven-fold from 1997 to 2008, increasing from less than $500 million to under $3500 million. Organic² meat is one of the fastest growing sectors in the organic industry, with total retail sales increasing by a factor of 46 between 1997 and 2007. From 2000–2005, organic poultry sales increased on average 39% annually, beef and milk cow sales increased on average 20% annually, and pig and hog sales increased 58%. Although not directly assessing how many individuals identify themselves as being COs, 17% of adults had purchased USDA organic poultry within the three months prior to the study onset and 16% had purchased organic red meat (Mintel Group Ltd, 2013).

Despite its increasing significance, then, it is surprising that so little social science research has examined COs. Several studies have assessed how often individuals consume ethical meat and characteristics predicting such behavior (e.g., De Boer et al, 2009, De Boer et al, 2007), and one small-sample qualitative study examined ethical attitudes about meat purchases among Scottish meat eaters (Schröder & McEachern, 2004), but I am only aware of one study specifically examining those who identify as COs (Rothgerber, 2014a). In this study, COs were compared to vegetarians in their attitudes toward living animals and dead animals served as meat, and in ingroup identification. COs were more likely than meat abstainers to believe that it is the suffering of animals used in food production, not the killing of them, that is problematic. This belief difference was mediated by less perceived animal favorability and less disgust and dislike of factory-farmed meat among COs than meat abstainers.

In addition to displaying attitudinal differences from meat abstainers, COs were also less likely than vegetarians to identify with their dietary group and to consider it an important part of their identity. This suggests that COs are less likely to perceive their diet as having relevance for their sense of self. COs may view certain food products as merely something to avoid whereas vegetarians may more strongly define themselves as individuals who avoid certain food products, deriving a great deal of meaning from this behavior. Subverting this meaning by breaking dietary rules, then, may be particularly disturbing to vegetarians, whose self-concept may be predicated upon conformity to ingroup norms of meat abstinence.

That vegetarians may feel more pressure and may subsequently more faithfully adhere to their dietary convictions seems consistent with critics of conscientious omnivorism, who argue that its proponents do not regularly follow their diet. Animal rights advocate Bruce Friedrich has noted:

What does it say that the leaders of the “ethical meat” charge, like my friends Eric Schlosser and Michael Pollan and even the Niman Ranch farmers, regularly pull money out of their pocket and send it off to factory farms? To me, it says that “ethical carnivores” is a failed idea; even the most prominent advocates don't do it full-time. I have met countless people who were moved by Eric's and Michael's arguments, but none of them now eat exclusively Niman-type meat. They are either vegetarians or they continue to eat at least some factory-farmed animals (Foer, 2009, p. 214).

Catherine Friend, who has written several books outlining the terrible conditions of factory farming and who lives on a farm claiming to raise animals humanely, has even noted in her book Compassionate Carnivore (2009) that she currently eats factory-farmed meat in 25% of her meals. As Stanescu (2013) noted, if someone with her access to “humane” meat still consumes industrial meat one-quarter of the time, it is difficult to imagine other COs (who may also have less knowledge and expertise) doing much better.

There are several reasons why it may be more difficult for COs to faithfully follow their diet than vegetarians. First, initial differences in attitudes toward animals could make COs more likely to consume factory-farmed meat. Because vegetarians evaluate animals more favorably and more strongly endorse animal rights than COs do (Rothgerber, 2014a), they may find it easier to adhere to meat abstention. Violating their diet may lead to more personal distress as vegetarians would recognize they are eating something that they show greater empathy toward, that they believe is more similar to humans, and that is entitled to greater rights than COs believe. COs may find it easier to dismiss such thoughts about the animals involved in their violations of diet and may perceive it as more tolerable if they on occasion consume factory-farmed meat.

There is also the possibility that the CO diet itself may be more difficult to follow for practical reasons. When one eats “humane” meat, there is always the question of how exactly the animal was treated during its lifetime, whether it received a painless and distress-free slaughter, and how the consumer would know. Singer and Mason (2006), for example, report unpleasant conditions that they observed in farms that received organic/certified humane labels, including egg sellers in which the chickens were debeaked, given 1.2 square feet of space per bird, and denied outdoor access. They also describe problematic conditions on Joel Salatin's oft-praised Polyface farm including rabbits being kept in small cages, chickens being kept in crowded wire pens (a practice receiving low marks by an independent agency and referred to as a “confinement system”), animals slaughtered off-site (without knowledge of conditions) because of legal requirements, and on-site slaughter practices including crowding animals and not stunning them before their throats were slit. These difficulties combined with the potentially misleading labeling of food products and the lack of stringent governmental regulations and standards related to such labeling may cause even a well-intentioned consumer to experience frustration and difficulty in eating meat raised according to their own personal standards.

Outside of these practical considerations, there may be less obvious psychological forces at work that make it easier to adhere to a vegetarian diet than to a CO diet. To begin with, there is the possibility that completely giving up meat is a more delineated behavior than selectively avoiding meat, and therefore lends itself better to identity building, as Rothgerber (2014a) demonstrated. Vegetarians also send a clear, unambiguous verbal and visual message to others. Because COs will likely consume meat in front of others, they may well be viewed by others as omnivores and treated as such. Given that their diet may be more difficult to explain (and accommodate) than a vegetarian diet, they may prefer to say nothing about it at all, blending with omnivores; all of this may weaken ingroup identification, and through lowered self-standards and decreased group pressure, adherence to diet.

In addition, the fact that COs still consume animal flesh may disrupt the development of disgust that Rozin, Markwith, and Stoess (1997) have noted creates strong moral opposition to violations of diet. That is, factory-farmed animal products are probably not dissimilar enough from ethical animal products in taste, smell, texture, and appearance to cultivate a disgust specific to factory-farmed foods the way that vegetarians can develop for meat and vegans for all animal products. Indeed, animal welfare can be considered a credence attribute (Grunert, Bredahl, & Brunsø, 2004), meaning that consumers cannot ascertain by themselves the presence of such characteristics even after consumption. That consuming a similar product would inhibit disgust for a taboo product has support from Rothgerber (2014a) who found stronger dislike of the sensory qualities of meat among meat abstainers than COs. It has also received indirect support from Rothgerber (2014b), who found that self-identified vegetarians who nonetheless consumed animal flesh reported being less disgusted by meat. Research in other domains (e.g., romantic relationships) has demonstrated the importance of devaluing alternatives to maintain commitment (e.g., Johnson & Rusbult, 1989), and the same processes may apply here. Because they are cutting back on their meat intake, rather than eliminating it completely, COs may never develop a strong enough aversion to factory farmed animal flesh to overcome temptation to consume it, and may do so when it is the only meat available. In short, while they devalue the potentially inhumane treatment of the animal served as food, this devaluation may never transfer strongly enough to the actual food product itself.

The purpose of the present research was to ascertain how successful COs and meat abstainers were in strictly following their respective diets. From a practical perspective, it is important to know if one diet is easier to adhere to than another. Such information would be useful to individuals before they make decisions about diet choice, and may be beneficial to assist in future efforts devoted to increasing commitment to diet. Theoretically, the study may help examine whether in an effort to eradicate a behavior, it is better to stop engaging in activities close in proximity to the tempting behavior or to continue to persist in them. COs and vegetarians/vegans were measured on factors related to adherence to diet, including the number of diet violations, beliefs about the importance of always following their diet (absolutism), guilt over following their diet, and difficulty in following their diet. They were also assessed on certain measures used in prior research on COs including belief in animal rights, evaluation of meat, and ingroup identification. Because of the practical and psychological factors discussed above, it was expected that COs would report more dietary violations than vegetarians/vegans and less guilt over these violations. The number of reported violations was expected to be most directly related to beliefs about how necessary it is to always follow one's diet. That is, individuals who believe it is okay to sometimes violate their diet will, through these lower standards, likely eat factory-farmed meat more frequently. The extent to which such violations would produce guilt was thought to be partially predicated upon how sympathetic individuals were toward animal rights and how disgusted by factory-farmed meat they were. In addition, how much they perceived it difficult to abstain from factory-farmed meat was expected to mediate their experience of guilt from eating it; to the extent that following a diet free of industrial meat is beyond an individual's perceived control, their feelings of guilt over violations should be mitigated.

In the present study, participants' motivation for following their diet was also measured. Rothgerber (2014a) did not include such a measure, and differences between COs and vegetarians/vegans may have resulted from differences in motivations between the groups. That is, because COs have been neglected in the literature, it is unclear how many individuals adopt conscientious omnivorism primarily from concerns about unhealthy chemicals and hormones added to factory farmed meat as opposed to concerns about the treatment of factory farmed animals. Because diet motivation has been found to predict both perceptions of animals (Rothgerber, 2013, Rothgerber, 2014b) and evaluation of meat (Rothgerber, 2014b, Rozin et al, 1997), diet motivation was entered as a blocking variable to ensure that any effects for diet would not simply result from differences in diet motivation.