Elsevier

Energy Policy

Volume 39, Issue 9, September 2011, Pages 4823-4833
Energy Policy

Nuclear power, climate change and energy security: Exploring British public attitudes

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.06.037Get rights and content

Abstract

Public attitudes towards nuclear power in the UK have historically been deeply divided, but as concern about climate change and energy security has exerted an increasing influence on British energy policy, nuclear power has been reframed as a low-carbon technology. Previous research has suggested that a significant proportion of people may ‘reluctantly accept’ nuclear power as a means of addressing the greater threat of climate change. Drawing on the results of a national British survey (n=1822), the current study found that attitudes towards nuclear remain divided, with only a minority expressing unconditional acceptance. In general, people who expressed greater concern about climate change and energy security and possessed higher environmental values were less likely to favour nuclear power. However, when nuclear power was given an explicit ‘reluctant acceptance’ framing – allowing people to express their dislike for nuclear power alongside their conditional support – concerns about climate change and energy security became positive predictors of support for nuclear power. These findings suggest that concern about climate change and energy security will only increase acceptance of nuclear power under limited circumstances—specifically once other (preferred) options have been exhausted.

Highlights

► We report data from 2005 to 2010 of British attitudes towards nuclear power and climate change. ► Changes in attitudes over the time period were relatively modest. ► British population remained relatively divided on nuclear power in 2010. ► Concern about climate change was negatively related to evaluations of nuclear power. ► Different framings of the issue alter the balance of support for nuclear power.

Introduction

Climate change and the task of meeting future energy needs are two intertwined and urgent policy challenges for nations throughout the world, including the UK. As concerns about climate change and energy security have exerted an increasing influence on British energy policy, nuclear power has been reframed as a low-carbon technology. Public attitudes towards nuclear power in the UK have historically been deeply divided, with only a minority expressing unconditional support for replacing or increasing country's existing nuclear capacity. However, previous research has suggested that a significant proportion of people may ‘reluctantly accept’ nuclear power as a means of addressing the greater threat of climate change (Bickerstaff et al., 2008, Pidgeon et al., 2008, Teravainen et al., 2011).

The current research seeks to further explore and refine the idea of ‘reluctant acceptance’ of nuclear power, and has three aims. First, to compare attitudes towards nuclear power in 2005 and 2010, in order to detect any impacts of the ongoing reframing of nuclear power as a low-carbon technology. Second, to explore the extent to which explicitly framing nuclear power as a method of addressing climate change and ‘energy security’ (an under-studied but increasingly visible aspect of energy policy debates) increases its acceptance. And third, to investigate how environmental values, concern about climate change and concern about energy security are related to the acceptance of nuclear power.

The UK currently has the most ambitious decarbonisation targets set by any national government in the world: by 2050, the greenhouse gas emissions of the UK must be reduced by 80% (Committee on Climate Change, 2008, HM Government, 2008). It is essential for industri`alised nations to commit to emissions reductions of this magnitude in order to avoid ‘dangerous’ climate change (Committee on Climate Change, 2009, Lorenzoni et al., 2005, New et al., 2009). However, meeting such tough targets means that the energy mix of the country needs to change drastically over the next four decades.

Old energy infrastructure will have to be replaced by new, low carbon technologies requiring technical innovation and a nationwide programme of installation and maintenance. In 2005, the UK became a net energy importer for the first time in 25 years (Kemp and Wexler, 2010), while North Sea oil and gas production has continued to decline. More than a third of current electricity generation capacity is due to be retired over the next two decades (Department of Trade and Industry, 2007). While in theory the deployment of renewable energy sources and aggressive energy efficiency measures could almost eliminate the need for fossil fuels altogether (see, e.g., Edenhofer et al., 2011, Kemp and Wexler, 2010), in practice there is little evidence of sufficiently ambitious policy making in this direction (Lorenzoni et al., 2008, Anderson et al., 2009, Kemp and Wexler, 2010).

The carbon emissions of burning fossil fuels may be mitigated to some extent by technological developments such as carbon capture and storage (CCS). In fact, as the number of coal-fired power stations is projected to increase in the EU in the next few decades, an assumption built into many projections is that CCS will be needed to bridge the gap between increasing fossil fuel use and decreasing CO2 emissions—despite the fact that CCS technologies have not yet been demonstrated on a meaningful scale (Anderson et al., 2009). But regardless of the extent to which renewable technologies, energy efficiency measures or CCS technologies are able to sufficiently mitigate the emissions of carbon-based methods of providing energy, it is now widely acknowledged that the current level of dependence on fossil fuels will have to be substantially reduced. This is not only because of concerns climate change, but also because it is expected that fossil fuels – in particular oil – will become increasingly difficult to access over the next three decades (International Energy Agency, 2008).

The global nature of energy markets and an increasing reliance on energy imports means that UK energy needs are becoming contingent on international issues outside of its direct control. With global energy consumption predicted to increase substantially in the short to medium term, and serious question marks over the longevity of traditional (fossil-fuel based) energy sources, the notion of ‘energy security’ has become an increasingly important part of energy policy debates in the UK. Although securing energy has always been a central goal for national governments, energy security has become particularly prominent in discussions about energy policy and environmental sustainability in recent years (see, e.g., Hendry, 2010).

However, despite the ubiquity of the term ‘energy security’ in contemporary policy debates about climate change and energy issues, it is unclear exactly what is meant by the term (Chester, 2010). The International Energy Agency has defined it as “the uninterrupted physical availability of energy at a price which is affordable, while respecting environment concerns” (International Energy Agency, 2001), although the term has also been used to refer to increasing reliance on fossil fuel imports, fluctuating energy prices and energy supply, concerns over growing energy consumption and the political instability of oil-exporting nations (amongst other things). In a summary of international public opinion produced by the World Council on Foreign Relations (2009), concern about energy security as a ‘foreign policy’ issue was found to be high in countries across the world, with a significant degree of international support for measures such as energy conservation and investment in renewables to tackle energy security.

While it is not yet clear what the future UK energy mix will look like, the Renewables Obligation (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009a) mandates 15% of electricity to be generated from renewable sources by 2015, and a full 30% by 2020. A recent analysis by the Committee on Climate Change reaffirmed that these targets were feasible (Committee on Climate Change, 2011). However, there is considerable uncertainty about the appropriate mix of low-carbon technologies in the short and medium-term future, and concerns have continued to be raised about under-investment and the reliability of many renewable technologies. The role that nuclear power might play in the future UK energy mix is also highly contested. In 2010, approximately 18% of UK electricity was provided by nuclear power stations (DECC, 2010). However, the planned decommissioning of all ‘Magnox’ and many Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGR) means that, without a new generation of power plants, the contribution of nuclear energy will be reduced to around 5% or 6% of total electricity production.

Arguments emphasising the role of nuclear energy as a response to emerging concerns about climate change can be traced back several decades. A number of pro-nuclear interests began actively advocating this in West Germany long before climate change had even become a major public policy issue (see Weingart et al., 2000). Bickerstaff et al. (2008) observed that from the early 2000s onwards, industry actors, some engineers and scientists, and senior politicians in the UK have increasingly referred to nuclear power as a method of responding to climate change, using its low-carbon credentials to advocate government investment in the sector. The nuclear industry has enthusiastically contributed to the reframing of nuclear power as one element of the response to climate change and has been lobbying for its inclusion in the future low-carbon energy mix (Leake and Box, 2005). In this way the nuclear industry has attempted to position itself as providing a vehicle through which the UK can continue to generate and consume large quantities of power whilst still working towards meeting its carbon reduction targets.

The link between energy security and nuclear power is also not particularly new, in the UK as elsewhere (e.g. see Hecht, 1998). Energy security was part of the justification for the building of the world's very first commercial nuclear reactor at Calder Hall, Cumbria in 1956 (Tweena, 2006) and the decision to greatly expand the UK's Magnox programme following the Suez crisis (Welsh, 2000). A further programme of British nuclear power stations in 1979 again included energy security as a primary motivation. However, while societies have always asked questions about the security of energy supplies (whether this involves collecting firewood or designing a 25 year plan for extracting and piping natural gas), it is only relatively recently that the concept of energy security has played such a prominent role in public policy debates about energy. Spurred on by the parallel debate about climate change, energy security has become an increasingly visible component of the nuclear discourse (Teravainen et al., 2011).

Over the past decade the official position of the UK government on the role of nuclear power in the future energy mix has tended to be cautious. For example, in the key strategic Energy White Paper, the Department of Trade and Industry (2003) declared an intention to shift the UK energy mix towards low-carbon sources, but did not set any specific preferences for the nation's fuel mix. However, government thinking towards the end of the last decade did begin to change. In May 2007 it issued a consultation document on the role of nuclear energy in a low carbon economy, and the following year A White Paper on Nuclear Power (Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, 2008), which provided a clear sign that not only did the government consider nuclear power as part of the future energy mix, but that the case for new nuclear hinged on its role in reducing carbon emissions and securing energy supplies in an increasingly volatile energy market. Recognising that a lack of public support and confidence were likely to become an issue, the UK government also sponsored a much criticised public debate on nuclear power in the summer of 2007.

Around the same time, the nuclear industry began a complex process of registering their interest in developing sites for new nuclear build in England and Wales, and fulfilling the pre-planning application prerequisite of engaging with the public living close to the proposed sites. In 2009, the UK Department for Energy and Climate Change published a list of industry nominated sites for new nuclear build, all but two of which were located adjacent to an existing nuclear facility. The stated policy of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government that took office in May 2010 is to use price mechanisms (e.g., introducing a ‘floor’ price for trading permits to emit carbon on international markets) to encourage and facilitate the building of new nuclear power stations, but not to commit tax-generated revenue to this process. This is a compromise borne out of the competing ideologies of the parties comprising the coalition government. However, as we discuss in detail below, it also reflects the continuing ambivalence of public attitudes towards nuclear power.

It is perhaps more surprising, given the historical opposition of environmental campaign groups to nuclear power, to find similar arguments being made by some members of the environmental movement. The ecologist James Lovelock has publically endorsed nuclear power as a necessary means of combating climate change (Black, 2003). The prominent journalists and environmental activists George Monbiot and Mark Lynas have both advocated limited programmes of new nuclear power stations (Monbiot, 2009, Lynas, 2010). However, the position of influential non-governmental organisations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth has remained one of outright opposition to new nuclear power (see, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 2004, Greenpeace, 2010), supported by projections of the Centre for Alternative Technology that there is no need for nuclear power in a ‘zero-carbon’ Britain (Kemp and Wexler, 2010; see also WWF International, 2011).

Bickerstaff et al. (2008) developed their arguments about the reframing of nuclear power at a time when few formal signals from the government about the future of nuclear were available. Their arguments have proven prescient, as subsequent policy developments show. What, however, is missing in many of the policy discussions is an appreciation of the potential role of public acceptability of nuclear power. This issue is important because in the past 20 years nuclear programmes around the world have stalled as a result of economic difficulties, concerns over waste disposal and major accidents, and above all a hostile public mood towards the technology (Rosa and Clarke, 1999). As Spence and Pidgeon (2009) have pointed out, many current transition proposals involving nuclear (and other innovative low-carbon technologies) make untested assumptions about public acceptability. Public support is likely to be one of the most important factors that will determine future technological pathways that the UK and other societies eventually take in the face of climate change and energy security.

Given the increasing frequency with which arguments about climate change, energy security, and nuclear power are being fused together by the UK government, nuclear industry lobbyists and even some environmental advocates, it is important to consider attitudes towards nuclear power in the context of attitudes towards climate change, energy security and other forms of electricity generation. Currently, very few studies have sought to focus on all of these topics simultaneously (e.g. Pidgeon et al., 2008, Spence et al., 2010a).

Public opinion about climate change has become increasingly well documented (e.g., Eurobarometer, 2006, Eurobarometer, 2007, Eurobarometer, 2008, Leiserowitz et al., 2010, Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006, Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, 2009, Upham et al., 2009). Awareness about climate change is very high, and a number of surveys have shown that the British, European and North American public view climate change negatively and express substantial concern about it. For example, surveys in 2005 (Poortinga et al., 2006) and 2007 (Eurobarometer, 2007) found that around 90% of British citizens were concerned about climate change. However, climate change continues to be a low priority issue for most people when contrasted with other societal issues such as the economy, education, or the threat of terrorism (Upham et al., 2009), and in recent years the level of reported concern about climate change has fallen somewhat, accompanied by an increase in the number of people expressing uncertainty about the reality of anthropogenic influence on the climate (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2010, Leiserowitz et al., 2010, Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, 2009, Pidgeon and Fischhoff, 2011).

In comparison, only a handful of studies on public attitudes to energy security have been conducted. Reiner (2006) reported the findings of a national survey in the UK that asked a variety of questions about the electricity sector and energy policies. The results indicated a high degree of support for government subsidies of renewable energy technologies, but also significant support for attaining ‘energy independence’. Solar and wind power are generally perceived most favourably and coal least favourably in terms of being able to deliver reliable and secure energy. Other renewables (with the exception of biomass) are usually also perceived as more secure than oil, gas and nuclear power, although the precise wording of questions makes direct comparisons difficult.

One of the subsidiary objectives of the current study, therefore, was to construct and explore analytically a reliable scale measuring beliefs about these disparate dimensions to energy security, as the lack of conceptual clarity about energy security has important implications for attempts to link it to nuclear power. Watson and Scott (2009) have argued that although the government and other actors have frequently made the case for new nuclear based on concern about energy security, many policy discussions are conducted without a clear idea of the dimensions of energy security. Correspondingly, it is not entirely clear that nuclear would necessarily enhance energy security—in particular the risks of domestic terrorism or civil unrest (Watson and Scott, 2009).

Regarding energy sources more generally, questions are routinely asked in polls and surveys, and here renewable energy generation is consistently favoured by members of the public (e.g., Greenberg, 2009, McGowan and Sauter, 2005, Pidgeon et al., 2008a; Upham et al., 2009). Typically, upwards of 80% of survey respondents report being ‘very favourable’ towards solar and wind energy the two best-known forms of renewable electricity generation. Fossil fuel-based methods of energy generation tend to be much less positively perceived. Pidgeon et al. (2008) found that only 39% expressed favourability towards oil, and 38% towards coal, with gas faring slightly better at 55% favourability.

The preceding analyses set out the background against which attitudes towards nuclear power must be interpreted: a high level of awareness and concern about climate change; an emerging (although as yet poorly understood) level of concern about energy security; and a clear preference in surveys for the low-carbon qualities of renewable forms of electricity generation over fossil fuel-based sources. We now provide a brief summary of the literature documenting public attitudes towards nuclear power before addressing the concept of reluctant acceptance in more detail, and introducing the aims of the current research.

Attitudes towards nuclear electricity generation have waxed and waned over the half-century that this technology has been in commercial operation. Despite initial enthusiasm in the 1950s and early 60s, the UK public has historically expressed significant levels of opposition to nuclear power, particularly following the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (Dalquist, 2004, Eiser et al., 1990, Nelkin and Pollack, 1981, van der Plight, 1992). Nuclear accidents have, through processes of ‘social amplification’ (Pidgeon et al., 2003), contributed to nuclear power becoming a highly stigmatised energy technology (Flynn, 2003). However, opposition to nuclear power appears to have decreased steadily in the UK since the early 2000s (Knight, 2005, Grove-White et al., 2006, Pidgeon et al., 2008). Research conducted by Ipsos-MORI for the Nuclear Industry Association suggests that since 2004 more people have favourable than unfavourable attitudes towards nuclear energy (Knight, 2009).

In general, though, UK opinion remains divided, and responses are highly dependent on question wording and format. Pidgeon et al. (2008) reported that nuclear power was the least preferred of all energy sources in a national UK survey conducted in 2005. Of 17 recent public opinion polls and studies reviewed by the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST, 2007), 3 showed overall ‘conditional’ support, 8 showed a split in public opinion, and 6 had an overall negative result, driven by a lack of confidence in arrangements for the disposal and storage of waste, concerns about decommissioning and a perceived lack of safety in nuclear power stations, and the availability of better or preferable energy solutions (also Accenture, 2008).

However, in keeping with the policy-level reframing of nuclear power as a source of low-carbon energy, recent UK polls have found that nuclear is typically considered to be an important aspect of the country's future energy mix (Pidgeon et al., 2008). qA series of polls commissioned by the nuclear power provider EDF asked UK respondents whether they agreed with the statement ‘Nuclear power has disadvantages but the county needs it as part of the energy balance with coal, gas and wind power’. The number of people agreeing with this statement has risen gradually from 59% in 2007 to 64% in 2010 (EDF/YouGov, 2010). In addition, a set of studies have sought to identify and describe what appears to be a highly conditional favourability towards nuclear power among the UK public (Bickerstaff et al., 2008, Pidgeon et al., 2008, Spence et al., 2010a). This ‘reluctant acceptance’ discourse (Bickerstaff et al., 2008) stems from public concerns about climate change mitigation and the security of supply of national energy resources, and reflects an ambivalent attitudinal position that identifies nuclear power as a potential method of addressing these twin challenges.

Bickerstaff et al. (2008) presented a mixed-methods analysis of citizen views of climate change and nuclear power, combining data from a nationally representative survey and citizen focus groups both conducted in 2002. At that particular time, the reframing of nuclear power as a solution to climate change had not been widely discussed either in UK energy policy or in the mainstream media. This enabled an analysis of the process by which participants responded to what was, for most, a novel way of framing the case for new nuclear build. Just two of the thirty-two focus group participants wholeheartedly supported the concept of climate change mitigation through new nuclear build as an acceptable and appropriate policy position. The majority of participants decided after a debate that nuclear power was the ‘lesser of two evils’ or ‘a devil's bargain’ that would bring benefits but also potentially serious consequences. These participants generally concluded that there was little or no choice in the matter. Thus, their position of reluctant acceptance was characterised by resignation, discomfort, and frustration that nuclear power was seen to be undesirable but possibly indispensable for the foreseeable future (Bickerstaff et al., 2008 p. 159). Bickerstaff et al. concluded that a policy discourse which framed nuclear power in terms of climate change mitigation would lead people towards adopting a position of reluctance acceptance towards new nuclear power stations.

Teravainen et al. (2011) analysed documents and conducted interviews with stakeholders from Finland, France and the UK, and identified a number of dominant discourse strategies in the nuclear debate. They found that since the late 1990s, energy security and climate change have become important justifications for new nuclear power. In keeping with the findings of Bickerstaff et al. (2008), one of the strategies identified was ‘necessitation’—the idea that tackling climate change and energy security was only possible if nuclear power was included in the energy mix. The ‘relativisation’ of nuclear risks was another important component of the nuclear discourse. Increasingly, European advocates of nuclear power were able to compare the risks of nuclear power favourably to the risks of dangerous climate change, as well as the threat of the ‘lights going out’ due to energy insecurity (Teravainen et al., 2011).

Further evidence of public endorsement of the reluctant acceptance attitudinal position was provided by Venables et al. (2009). People living near two long-established nuclear power stations in England (Bradwell in Essex and Oldbury in Gloucestershire) classified a series of statements about nuclear power into four broad categories: a belief that nuclear power is beneficial and safe; a sense of threat and distrust; a resignation accompanied by the belief that ‘there is no point in worrying’; and finally a set of statements indicating a more ambivalent (reluctant) acceptance of the local power station. Even in such ‘nuclear communities’, traditionally thought of as being very positively oriented towards nuclear power, support is not always unconditional.

Other survey research has also suggested that segments of the UK public are receptive to the framing of nuclear power as a response to concerns over energy security. While Pidgeon et al. (2008) found that nuclear power was the least favoured form of electricity generation (compared to fossil fuels and renewables), favourability rose significantly when nuclear power was presented in the context of energy security, and 65% agreed that nuclear power was needed as part of the UK ‘energy mix’. The study also found that people in general would prefer to attempt to tackle climate change via means other than nuclear power (i.e. through increased use of renewables or lifestyle changes), suggesting that while people may be willing to accept nuclear power if it is seen as a contributor to climate change mitigation or energy security, few would actively choose it over renewable sources of electricity production or energy efficiency.

Spence et al. (2010a) investigated the relationship between environmental and climate concerns and support for various energy options using the same nationally representative dataset as Pidgeon et al. (2008). This analysis found that a high level of concern about climate change was not predictive of support for nuclear power—indeed the reverse was the case, with a significant negative correlation observed between increase in concern about climate change and support for nuclear power. Spence et al. suggested that this finding reflects the philosophy of traditional environmentalist movements in maintaining a clear anti-nuclear stance while also expressing a high degree of concern about climate change. But if individuals predisposed to care about climate change do not support nuclear power, then why should the reframing of nuclear power as a solution to climate change lead to an increase in acceptance? Spence et al. argued that an increased conditional acceptance of nuclear power is contingent on it being explicitly framed as a means of mitigating climate change, and that in keeping with the findings of Bickerstaff et al. (2008) and Pidgeon et al. (2008), most people are unlikely to spontaneously evaluate nuclear power in this way.

Other research has suggested that environmental concern and values relating to ‘interfering with nature’ and ‘morality’ may be of particular importance in determining attitudes to nuclear power (Sjoberg, 2000, Sjoberg, 2004). Individuals with different values appear to attribute different levels of importance or salience to different aspects of nuclear power, in accordance with their prior beliefs (van der Plight, 1992, Eiser et al., 1988, Eiser et al., 1995). However, Whitfield et al. (2009) examined a range of cognitive and cultural factors that underpinned attitudes towards nuclear power and found only an indirect effect of values and general beliefs on attitudes towards nuclear power. The impact of personal values was partially mediated by the perceived risks associated with nuclear power and the level of trust in nuclear organisations.

The current research seeks to build on these findings by exploring the concept of reluctant acceptance in more depth. We consider whether attitudes towards nuclear power in Britain have changed in light of the increasing salience of climate change and energy security in national energy policies in recent years, and in what way environmental values and concern about climate change and energy security are related to attitudes to nuclear power. The study builds upon the 2005 survey of British attitudes towards climate change and nuclear power reported by Pidgeon et al. (2008), by drawing on the results of a nationally representative survey conducted in the first three months of 2010 (Spence et al., 2010b). As the two surveys contained a number of identical questions, we are able to track changes in public attitudes to nuclear power (and other energy technologies) directly over the period 2005–2010. A range of new questions were also included in the 2010 survey in order to explore attitudes to nuclear power in more detail, and in particular the concept of reluctant acceptance of nuclear power, as identified by Bickerstaff et al. (2008).The goal of the current research was therefore to answer three key questions:

  • (1)

    Has the reframing of nuclear power impacted on British public attitudes towards nuclear power—have they changed since 2005?

  • (2)

    To what extent does the explicit reframing of nuclear power as a method of addressing the problems of climate change and energy security lead to greater conditional or reluctant acceptance of nuclear power?

  • (3)

    How is general environmental concern (environmental values, concern about climate change) and concern about energy security related to attitudes towards and acceptance of nuclear power?

Section snippets

Methods

A nationally representative quota sample of the UK population aged 15 years and older (i.e. England, Scotland and Wales; n=1822) were interviewed face-to-face in their own homes by Ipsos-MORI between 5 January and 26th March, 2010. Interviews were conducted at 315 sample points (including Scottish and Welsh oversamples) selected randomly from a stratified sample of output areas sorted by Government Office and council area. Stratified sampling works by sampling subgroups of the population

Concern about climate change, concern about energy security and endorsement of pro-environmental values

The majority (71%) of our survey respondents were either fairly or very concerned about climate change. This figure is lower than comparable findings from our 2005 study (see Pidgeon et al., 2008, Spence et al., 2010b), but is in line with trends noted in other recent surveys in the US and the UK (Leiserowitz et al., 2010, Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, 2009, Eurobarometer, 2009). It suggests that the level of concern about climate change in the UK is still high, with only 8%

General discussion and conclusion

The current research sought to investigate whether – in response to being reframed as a low-carbon energy technology – public attitudes towards nuclear power in the UK have changed since 2005. In particular, we explored the notion of ‘reluctant acceptance’ (Bickerstaff et al., 2008) and its relationship with measures of concern about climate change, environmental values, and concern about energy security. Our results suggest that attitudes towards nuclear power have shifted in a somewhat more

Acknowledgements

This research was supported by a research grant from the Economic and Social Research Council (RES-062–23-1134) as well as a Climate Change Leader Fellowship (RES-066–27-0013) and a major grant to the Understanding Risk research group from the Leverhulme Trust (F/00 407/AG).

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