Uncertain climate: An investigation into public scepticism about anthropogenic climate change
Highlights
► While impact scepticism is widespread among the general public in Britain, trend and attribution scepticism are far less prevalent. ► Indicators of trend, attribution, and impact scepticism are highly correlated, suggesting that the general public does not distinguish between the different ‘types’ of climate scepticism. ► Attitudinal certainty is mainly concentrated in non-sceptical groups, suggesting that climate sceptical views are not held very firmly. ► Climate scepticism is particularly common among older individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds who are politically conservative and hold traditional values; while it is less common among younger individuals from higher socio-economic backgrounds who hold self-transcendence and environmental values.
Introduction
Climate change is arguably one of the greatest challenges the world is facing in the 21st century. The threats posed by climate change have set the international community the almost impossible dilemma of severely limiting the emissions of greenhouse gases or facing the considerable risks associated with global temperature rises. Many have argued that the targets in greenhouse gas reductions as agreed under the Kyoto protocol are unlikely to be sufficient to avoid dangerous climate change. The UK Government has therefore set itself the ambitious longer-term domestic target of 80% reduction in all greenhouse gases by 2050 in the legally binding Climate Change Act (Defra, 2008). Meeting this target will require major shifts towards low-carbon energy production as well as significant reductions in the demand for energy.
Public perceptions and attitudes are critically important to both the supply and the demand side of the transition to a low-carbon economy. On the supply side, public acceptance of new and innovative energy facilities such as power stations and new grid infrastructure will play a key role. We know from a range of past case-studies that community opposition can lead to delays or even cancellation of plans and construction (Boholm and Löfstedt, 2004, Toke, 2005). In particular in the UK there has been frequent environmental controversy and at times strong public opposition across a number of renewable energy developments, including onshore and offshore wind energy (Devine-Wright, 2005), biomass energy (Upreti, 2004), and tidal power (SDC, 2008). Other low-carbon infrastructure developments such as carbon capture and storage (Shackley et al., 2005) and the proposed renewal of UK nuclear power sector (Pidgeon et al., 2008) are also likely to bring public controversy. Indeed, the UK government sees the reluctance of the public to accept new energy developments in their community as one of the main challenges to the transition to a low carbon economy (DTI, 2003). On the demand side, perceptions of the need to take mitigating action against climate change, and of the ability to act on this, can be key precursors to personal behaviour change and compliance with wider policies aimed to motivate such changes (Spence and Pidgeon, 2009, American Psychological Association, 2010).
Previous research has shown that awareness and self-reported knowledge of climate change has been rising steadily over the last two decades (Defra, 2002, Defra, 2007, Upham et al., 2009), with awareness of the terms ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ being near universal in the UK since the early 2000s (Lorenzoni et al., 2006, Whitmarsh, 2009, Whitmarsh et al., 2011). A survey conducted in 2005 found that an overwhelming majority of the British public thought that the world's climate is changing and that they considered this one of the most pressing environmental threats (Poortinga et al., 2006). However, recent research suggests that scepticism and uncertainty about climate change has increased in both Europe and the US in the last couple of years (Eurobarometer, 2009, Department for Transport, 2010, Leiserowitz et al., 2010a); a development that may have been bolstered by the controversies surrounding leaked emails from scientists working at the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia and errors made in glacial melting forecasts in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; Berkhout, 2010), as well as perhaps the unusually harsh European winter of 2009–2010 (cf. Joireman et al., 2010). It is important to have a detailed understanding of the extent and the reasons why people hold climate sceptical views, as public scepticism and uncertainty about the existence of anthropogenic climate change may become a major barrier to the development of a more sustainable society. It will be a difficult task to convince the public to make sacrifices in terms of their lifestyle and to support renewable energy developments in their community if they do not believe the climate is changing or will have a real impact on their lives.
When exploring sceptical beliefs among the general public, it has to be noted that scepticism is an imprecise term that has multiple meanings given the complex multi-faceted nature of the climate debate. Rahmstorf (2004) makes a useful distinction between trend sceptics, who deny there is such a thing as an upward trend in global temperatures, attribution sceptics, who accept that the world's climate may be changing but do not think that it is caused by human activity, and impact sceptics, who agree that the world's climate is changing as a result of human activity but do not think it will lead to substantial detrimental impacts. Furthermore, differing terms, such as scepticism, cynicism, denial, uncertainty and ambivalence, which are all key characteristics of public responses to the current climate change debate, are often used interchangeably. For example, Dunlap and McCright (2010) use the term ‘denial’ in the same fashion as Rahmstorf uses ‘scepticism’ to describe disbelief in the existence, anthropogenic nature, or seriousness of climate change. Within the literature a lively debate has emerged as to whether ‘unconvinced camps’ should be called ‘climate deniers’, ‘sceptics’, or ‘contrarians’ (O’Neill and Boykoff, 2010, Anderegg et al., 2010a, Anderegg et al., 2010b), all of which seem to refer to a “small coterie of individuals” who are “waiting to pounce on any scientific uncertainty” (Nature Editorial, 2010), whose views and expertise are incongruent with mainstream climate science consensus (Anderegg and Harold, 2009), or who vocally challenge what they see as a false consensus of mainstream climate science through critical attacks on climate science and eminent climate scientists (McCright, 2007).
In terms of public scepticism about climate change, it is important to distinguish between different attitudinal terms such as scepticism, uncertainty, and ambivalence. Whereas the concept of scepticism refers to strongly held disbeliefs in or a rejection of the tenets of mainstream climate science, uncertainty refers to a lower subjective sense of conviction or validity as to whether climate change ‘really’ exists, is caused by human activity, and/or will have major impacts (cf. Petty and Krosnick, 1995). People who express attitudinal uncertainty should therefore not be confused with those who have more active sceptical disbeliefs. Indeed, research by Whitmarsh (2011) suggests that whereas an outright rejection of the notion of anthropogenic climate change is not widespread, the proportion of the public who express some degree of uncertainty about climate change is larger. Attitudinal ambivalence is in the social psychology literature often defined as the degree to which an attitude object is evaluated positively and negatively at the same time (Thompson et al., 1995, Jonas et al., 2000), although in many cases it is used to describe any contradictory ‘evaluations’ someone holds on a particular issue (cf. Breckler, 1994). In other words, people who are ambivalent about climate change possess feelings, attitudes, or beliefs that are in tension with one another (Carolan, 2010). It is, however, difficult to clearly distinguish between the different attitudinal terms in the way they are used by the general public to describe their own personal views, as well as in the way they are measured in attitudinal research. For example, Poortinga and Pidgeon (2006) have shown that measures of attitudinal ambivalence and uncertainty may be compounded into a single dimension. This suggests that certain ‘direct’ ambivalence items (e.g. “I have mixed feelings about …”) may be measuring the same underlying construct as measures of uncertainty.
All types of Rahmstorf's climate scepticism, as well as uncertainty and ambivalence, can be found among the general public in the UK and beyond. Although straightforward trend scepticism does not appear to be too widespread, many express some level of uncertainty about whether climate change is really happening (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, Whitmarsh, 2011), experience some degree of ambivalence or mixed feelings (Poortinga et al., 2006), or feel they need more information to form a clear opinion about it (Whitmarsh, 2009). Also, there is some recent evidence that, at least in the US, the increase in trend scepticism has been leveling off and may indicate a return to higher levels of concern about the existence of climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2010b).
Attribution scepticism appears to be more common among the British public than trend scepticism. However, while a clear majority in the UK still believes that climate change is at least partly caused by human activity (Whitmarsh et al., 2011), there has long been a substantial minority who have been sceptical about the existence of anthropogenic climate change (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2006, Downing and Ballantyne, 2007). A recent Eurobarometer (2009) poll indicated that a majority (55%) of the European public disagreed that emissions of carbon dioxide have only a marginal impact on climate change; but also that a fairly substantial 30% agreed that it was the case. In the UK, the percentage who agreed with this statement was even higher at 44%. Within the US, about one in three believe that global warming is caused mostly by natural changes in the environment while only about half think it is mostly caused by human activity (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, Leiserowitz et al., 2010b).
Finally, with regard to scepticism about the impacts of climate change, the low ranking of climate change as a concern reflects a widespread perception among the public that the issue is a spatially and temporally remote risk (Weber, 2010). While the impacts of climate change are generally considered socially relevant, most individuals do not feel they pose a prominent personal threat (e.g. Bord et al., 2000, Lowe et al., 2006). One English survey conducted in 2003 found that less than half of the respondents thought that they will be personally affected by climate change (Whitmarsh, 2009). A recent Eurobarometer (2009) poll indicated that impact scepticism is higher in the UK than in most other countries, although not as high as in the US (Leiserowitz, 2005, Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, Leiserowitz et al., 2010b). The poll found that in the UK 40% agree that “the seriousness of climate change has been exaggerated”, compared to 27% across Europe. In a representative poll in the US, more than half of the respondents thought that global warming will not or barely harm themselves, their family, or their community (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a, Leiserowitz et al., 2010b). Although many people express mixed feelings about climate change, there is little evidence for ambivalence about the impacts of climate change. Pidgeon et al. (2008) found a consistently negative set of responses, with very few people seeing it as holding benefits and most seeing it as posing risks for people in Britain.
Attitudinal uncertainty and scepticism about the existence, anthropogenic nature, and impacts of climate change seems in part to stem from doubts about the scientific consensus on climate change. This doubt expressed by the general public may partly be a product of the media presentation of climate change as controversial and uncertain, and the human causes of climate change not being self-evident (e.g. Antilla, 2005). A small but well-organised counter-movement that has produced the majority of the sceptical literature (Jacques et al., 2008) may have given the impression that there is considerable disagreement among scientists, augmented by a journalistic norm for balance to present both sides of the argument even if there is widespread consensus among scientists that human activity is contributing to climate change (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, Hargreaves et al., 2003). Indeed, a recent poll has shown that two out of five Americans believe that “there is a lot of disagreement among scientists about whether or not global warming is happening” (Leiserowitz et al., 2010a). In contrast to what many members of the public think, there is almost universal consensus in the scientific community about many aspects of climate change. Anderegg et al., 2010a, Anderegg et al., 2010b showed that 97–98% of climate researchers support the tenets of anthropogenic climate change outlined by the IPCC, and that the relative expertise and scientific prominence of the researchers unconvinced of anthropogenic climate change are substantially below those of convinced researchers (also see Doran and Zimmerman, 2009). Although there is legitimate uncertainty about the exact nature, scale and timing of the impacts of climate change, given the complexity of climate and human systems (Patt and Dessai, 2005, Pidgeon and Butler, 2009), most scientists believe that global temperatures will keep rising and are likely to cause harm to natural and human systems (Anderegg and Harold, 2009). The public also appear to be somewhat aware of the uncertainty about the impacts of climate change, with approximately 40% of the British public supporting the idea that the climate system is too complex and uncertain for scientists to make useful forecasts (Downing and Ballantyne, 2007).
Although the typology of Rahmstorf (2004) is an intuitively appealing framework for describing different forms of scepticism, it is a perspective constructed by climate scientists to describe the arguments of members of an emerging counter-movement that do not accept mainstream climate science consensus, and may therefore be less appropriate to describe public views on climate change. That is, the public may not necessarily distinguish between the different components of the climate debate. Indeed, recent qualitative work suggests that scepticism about the status of climate knowledge forms a coherent view among sections of the general public (Capstick, 2010). Doubts about the evidence base and methodology of climate science often relate to the veracity of scientific claims in general, the validity and importance of an anthropogenic component, as well as the severity of potential impacts. In quantitative work, Whitmarsh (2011) found that a wide range of scepticism and uncertainty items could be combined to form a reliable scepticism scale, suggesting that uncertainties about different aspects of the climate debate are closely interlinked.
Only a limited number of studies have attempted to identify the socio-demographic characteristics of people who express sceptical beliefs about climate change. A review of public attitudes to climate change suggested that older people are more likely to be sceptical (Upham et al., 2009). Yet, there is also evidence of substantial scepticism in younger age groups. In a study among 11–17 year olds, about one in 10 rejected the notion of anthropogenic climate change (COI, 2008). Scepticism is also somewhat higher among men and car owners (Defra, 2002, Defra, 2007, Whitmarsh, 2005). Furthermore, research has highlighted the interaction between personal values and scepticism. People with more pro-environmental values are less likely to be sceptical about the seriousness of climate change; and similarly conservative political values are strongly associated with scepticism (Dunlap and McCright, 2008, Eurobarometer, 2009, Whitmarsh, 2009). Leiserowitz (2005) identified several distinct interpretive communities in the United States, including so-called ‘naysayers’ who express high levels of scepticism and perceive climate change as a very low or non-existent danger. Leiserowitz (2005) found that these climate ‘naysayers’ are predominantly white, male, Republican, politically conservative, holding pro-individualist, pro-hierarchist, and anti-egalitarian worldviews, anti-environmental attitudes, distrustful of most institutions, and highly religious. Dunlap and McCright (2008) have shown that over the last decade climate change beliefs have largely polarised along Democratic and Republican Party lines. Growing scepticism about the news coverage of global warming has gone hand-in-hand with Republicans’ declining belief that the world's climate is changing. Within the UK, Whitmarsh (2011) found that older respondents without a formal education tended to be the most sceptical about climate change. However, the strongest associations were found with political affiliation and environmental values. Those with a conservative voting intention and low environmental values tended to be the most uncertain about the reality and severity of climate change.
Although these studies have provided important information about the individuals who express doubt about climate change, a more detailed and systematic investigation of climate scepticism is needed. Previous studies have generally focused on just a single aspect of climate scepticism, without an explicit theoretical framework or specification of the type of climate scepticism that were considered. No studies have been conducted that have intentionally included indicators of trend, attribution, and impact scepticism at the same time. It is currently not clear how widespread the different types of scepticism are; whether and to what extent they are distinct in the public mind; how they are associated with related attitude aspects, such as uncertainty and ambivalence; and how they are distributed across the general British population.
In this study we undertake a detailed investigation of public scepticism about climate change in Britain, with a number of closely interrelated objectives. First, to explore how widespread climate sceptical beliefs are in Britain using the trend, attribution, and impact scepticism typology of Rahmstorf (2004). Second, to evaluate the robustness of the Rahmstorf (2004) typology to describe public scepticism about climate change. Here we examine whether the British public distinguish between the different types of scepticism. Previous research has suggested that the different types are closely interlinked in the public mind (e.g. Capstick, 2010), and may have common ideological roots (see Objective 4). Third, to explore in what way scepticism is associated with other related attitudinal constructs. Here it is examined how strongly climate sceptical views are held (in terms of attitude certainty), and whether they evoke conflicting perceptions on climate change (cf. attitudinal ambivalence). The fourth and final objective of the study is to provide an in-depth profile of individuals who express sceptical views on climate change. In this study we will explore how climate sceptical views are associated with a range of socio-demographic, personal values, and voting intention variables in Britain, using a nationally representative sample. This is to show how climate sceptical beliefs are distributed across the British population and how strongly they are rooted in people's core values and worldviews (cf. Leiserowitz, 2005, Whitmarsh, 2011).
Section snippets
Procedure and respondents
A nationally representative quota sample of the British population aged 15 years and older (n = 1822) were interviewed face-to-face in their own homes by Ipsos-MORI between 5 January and 26th March, 2010. Computer Assisted Personal Interviews were conducted by fully trained and supervised interviewers and took 30 min on average to complete. Interviews were conducted at 315 sample points, which were selected randomly from a stratified sample of output areas sorted by Government Office Region and
Results
Table 1, Table 2 show how widespread the different forms of climate scepticism are among the British public (Objective 1). Table 1 shows that public belief in climate change has dropped significantly from 91% in 2005 to 78% in 2010, and that the group of individuals who express trend sceptical views, i.e. who do not believe that the world's climate is changing, has grown from 4% in 2005 to 15% in 2010 (χ2(2) = 1.172e2, p < 0.001). Table 2 shows that just under one-third (28%) are uncertain that
Discussion
In this paper we have carried out a comprehensive investigation of public scepticism about climate change in Britain using the framework of Rahmstorf (2004). The study explored how widespread trend, attribution and impact sceptical views are among the British public, to what extent they are interlinked, and in what way they are associated with related attitude aspects, such as uncertainty and ambivalence. It further provided a socio-demographic and ‘ideological’ profile of individuals who
Acknowledgements
This research was jointly funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (Grant RES-062-23-113) and the Leverhulme Trust (F/00 407/AG). AS receives support from Horizon Digital Economy Research, RCUK grant (EP/G065802/1).
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