Tenure security and household investment decisions for urban sanitation: The case of Dakar, Senegal

Abstract

This paper explores the relevance of householders' security of tenure to their willingness to pay the capital and operational costs for sanitation in low-income urban areas. When the sanitation norm is self-managed on-site systems, as is the case in many low-income areas of towns and cities, household investment decisions in sanitation are inherently linked to tenure security. Based on evidence gathered in Dakar, Senegal, it is de facto rather than de jure tenure rights that provide sufficient security for household investment in sanitation. We make a critical distinction between willingness to invest and willingness to pay for the capital investment costs and on-going operational servicing costs of sanitation. Whilst tenants and those with lower tenure security do not invest in capital infrastructure, they are willing to pay for the operational aspects of sanitation services. Current formal policy settings and strategies for urban sanitation tend not to cater for this group; this is a fundamental oversight as these constitute significant and growing segments of the population. Land tenure and sanitation issues need to be considered in an integrated way and the capital and operational costs need to be disaggregated in planning to respond more effectively to the spending decisions of the urban poor.

Introduction

This paper addresses how tenure security affects household investment decisions for urban sanitation. This is achieved through a review of the relevant literature on sanitation for the urban poor and urban land tenure; including peer-reviewed and grey literature which is not case-specific to Dakar. Significant gaps in knowledge are identified and explored through field studies in Dakar, Senegal. The research explores different components of tenure: legal tenure, tenure security and tenure status (i.e. landlord or tenant) and their associated implications for sanitation development. It seeks to answer what the relationships are between tenure issues and sanitation and to what extent they affect investment in on-site sanitation systems (that is, systems in which the disposal of excreta takes place on or near the housing plot in the absence of networked sewerage; pit latrines and septic tanks fall into this category). Throughout the paper an important distinction is drawn between: capital investment costs that are incurred through constructing a new latrine or otherwise improving the quality of a sanitation asset by upgrading; and operating costs which are paid to service the facility, for emptying the pit or tank and subsequent transport and disposal of the contents.

To achieve citywide sanitation, understanding the dynamics of tenure i.e. how residents obtain and keep land and housing, and invest in infrastructure is critical. Furthermore, the paper argues that failing to take these dynamics into account results in inappropriate sanitation strategies for a significant and growing segment of the population of cities in low and middle-income countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa presents some of the most critical challenges for improving sanitation, where population growth exceeds the increase in sanitation coverage. Between 2004 and 2010 the number of people practising open defecation in urban areas rose by 3 million and the number serviced by unimproved sanitation systems rose from 145 to 183 million (WHO/UNICEF, 2012). The projected demographic trends compound these challenges.

Tenure is often described as legal – illegal, or formal – informal. However, the reality is that the majority of housing and land development falls between these extremes (Payne, 2001). Tenure is contextually embedded and layered through the primary rights on the land, legal tenure status and the occupancy status of the land and the dwellings (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2007). Formal land tenure relates to legal tenure rights recognized by the state land authority. Tenure security is a more elusive term generally understood to mean a lack of fear of eviction (UN-HABITAT, 2002). Importantly, and especially in the context of complex land arrangements, tenure security and formal tenure are one and the same (Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002).