Hedge funds, insiders, and the decoupling of economic and voting ownership: Empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership☆
Introduction
The shareholder vote plays a central role in the theory of corporate governance and capital structure. Most U.S. public firms employ a one common share, one vote structure, which links economic interest to voting rights. Assigning voting rights to common shareholders, in proportion to number of shares held, places the power to oversee company managers in the hands of residual owners, who have an incentive to increase firm value. Linking shares to votes also facilitates the market for corporate control. Yet there can sometimes be advantages to decoupling shares from votes. Decoupling has traditionally been used by insiders to retain voting control. A dual-class common share structure, with one class having voting control, is a familiar example. This structure can let firms pursue growth opportunities which they might forego if doing so required diluting insiders' control, and can make it easier for firms to make long-term, positive NPV investments with unobservable payoffs. Decoupling can also potentially reduce shareholder collective action problems and reduce transaction costs in a contest for corporate control.
The derivatives revolution in finance, especially the growth in equity swaps and other privately negotiated (“over the counter” or “OTC”) equity derivatives, and related growth in the stock lending market, offer new, low-cost, often low-transparency ways for both outside investors and insiders to decouple economic ownership from voting power in public companies. Over the last few years, these decoupling techniques, which we call the “new vote buying,” have been employed worldwide in a variety of ways. This Article explores these new techniques and their potential benefits and costs.
Even if a firm has a one share, one vote capital structure, there are multiple ways to decouple votes from economic ownership. One method relies on share lending. Under standard share loan agreements, the borrower acquires voting rights but no economic ownership, while the lender has economic ownership without voting rights. A second common approach involves holding shares but hedging economic risk by holding a short equity swap position. In a typical cash-settled equity swap, the long equity side acquires the economic return on shares (but not voting rights) from the short side. The combined position (long shares, short equity swaps) conveys voting rights without economic ownership. Conversely, a long equity swap position conveys economic ownership without formal voting rights.
Sometimes, investors use these techniques to hold more votes than shares. We develop the term “empty voting” to describe this pattern, because the votes have been emptied of economic interest. Alternatively, investors can have more economic ownership than formal voting rights. This ownership is often undisclosed because ownership disclosure rules for outside investors generally address voting power rather than economic interest. Often, this economic ownership is combined with de facto ability to acquire voting rights at any time. We develop the term “hidden (morphable) ownership” to refer to undisclosed economic ownership plus informal voting rights. We refer to empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership together as “the new vote buying” or simply “decoupling.”
The theoretical possibility of decoupling is not new. But supply and demand factors have changed in major ways. On the supply side, financial innovations (such as equity swaps and other OTC derivatives), coupled with massive growth in the share lending market, now permit large scale, low-cost decoupling. On the demand side, there is now a trillion dollar-plus pool of sophisticated, lightly regulated, hedge funds, which are largely free from the conflicts of interest and concerns with adverse publicity that may deter other institutional investors from using decoupling strategies.
Current U.S. law leaves the new vote buying largely unregulated and often undisclosed. Lack of disclosure means that we cannot offer quantitative data on its extent. We did, however, search for and compile over 25 recent public examples (see Table 1 below). How many additional instances remain undisclosed, we cannot say.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a taxonomy for the functional elements of empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership, and offers examples. Section 3 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on the benefits and costs of decoupling. Section 4 summarizes current disclosure rules and sketches a disclosure reform proposal. Section 5 concludes. Two companion legal articles (Hu and Black, 2006a, Hu and Black, 2006b) provide additional details on current disclosure rules, develop our disclosure reform proposal, and analyze possible reforms, some of which go beyond disclosure. An informal glossary at the end of this Article explains some commonly used terms. As far as we are aware, this Article and its companions are the first attempt to systematically address the new vote buying.1
Section snippets
The elements of the new vote buying: a taxonomy
We begin by setting out what we believe to be the core functional elements of the new vote buying. We consider publicly traded companies and assume that a company has a one share, one vote capital structure.2
Theory
A number of theoretical strands in the literature address the efficiency of a one share, one vote capital structure, or of vote trading in connection with a takeover bid. As we will see, however, none maps directly onto the new vote buying. We offer here a selective review of this large literature.
Disclosure: current rules and reform proposal
How best to balance the risks posed by the new vote buying against its potential benefits is not clear. However disclosure likely offers a place to start. Disclosure can provide information on the frequency of empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership. Disclosure may also serve to deter some new vote buying. Not everyone will do in the sunshine what they will do in the dark. Moreover, some empty voting strategies may be less effective if disclosed. At the least, other shareholders will
Conclusion and policy implications
Voting rights, coupled to economic ownership, have long been a central way in which corporate governance systems constrain managers' discretion. Yet innovation in equity derivatives and the growth of the share lending market now allow both insiders and outside investors to engage in large scale, low-cost decoupling of voting rights from economic ownership, often without public disclosure. Equity swaps, options, and other derivatives, heretofore largely risk management tools, can be used to
Glossary of selected terms
Trading jargon surrounds many new vote buying transactions, as well as various disclosure rules. This appendix offers informal definitions of selected terms and discusses transaction mechanics, including how the transactions affect voting rights. Our definitions aim for general accuracy, not technical precision.
- Term
- Definition and Mechanics
- Schedule 13D
- SEC Schedule 13D, for reporting beneficial ownership (13D sense) of 5% or more by individuals and active institutional investors (investors whose
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Copyright (c) Henry T. C. Hu 2007. We thank participants at the American Law and Economics Association annual meeting (May 2005), the Conference on Boundaries of SEC Regulation at the Financial Economics Institute of Claremont McKenna College (February 2006), the Stanford Law School Law and Economics workshop (March 2006), the Weil, Gotschal and Manges Roundtable at Yale Law School (April 2006), the Corporate Law Roundtable at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (April 2006), the Council of Institutional Investors Fall 2006 meeting (September 2006), the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals 2006 Joint Regional Fall Conference (October 2006), a John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance (University of Delaware) panel discussion (October 2006), the American Bar Association's Section of Business Law Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities Fall Meeting (December 2006), the West Legalworks Hedge Fund Activism conference (December 2006), Iman Anabtawi, Henry Manne, Dick Craswell, Jeffrey Gordon, Larry Harris, Linda Hayman, Gérard Hertig, Jennifer Hill, Bruce Johnsen, Kate Litvak, Charles McCallum, Harold J. Mulherin, Jeffry Netter, Ian Ramsay, Edward Rock, Roberta Romano, David Skeel, Janet Kiholm Smith, Leo Strine, Jeff Zwiebel, and anonymous peer reviewers for comments and suggestions on this Article and our companion legal articles.