On the size and structure of group cooperation
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Cited by (22)
Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks
2024, Journal of Economic TheorySelf-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting
2022, Journal of Economic TheoryAsymmetrical expectations of future interaction and cooperation in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
2019, Applied Mathematics and ComputationCitation Excerpt :On the other hand, Haag and Lagunoff [22] concluded that more heterogeneous expectations might lead to less cooperative outcome in the multi-player IPD game. Note that in the above studies [20–22], the IPD game with infinite interactions was addressed, and the player's expectation of future interaction was interpreted as a discount factor, which was applied to discount the possible payoffs for the player in the future interaction and used to reflect how players value future interaction. However, in real-world games, players may leave (i.e., quit) the interaction with their peers under low expectation of future interaction, resulting in finite interactions between the players.
Trust in cohesive communities
2017, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :Theorem 4 relates to results on cooperation and group size. Pecorino (1999) and Haag and Lagunoff (2007) explore how the addition of new players determines cooperation in repeated public good games with perfect monitoring. In contrast, we fix the total number of players and simply assign investors to be part of different components.
Relational contracts and supplier turnover in the global economy
2016, Journal of International EconomicsCitation Excerpt :However, none of them studies the interaction between RCs and supplier re-matching, but they focus on the ownership choice of integration versus outsourcing (from which we abstract) in a repeated game setup with a fixed partner. Finally, this paper is related to a small literature on repeated games with heterogeneous time discount factors (Haag and Lagunoff, 2007; Harrington, 1989; Lehrer and Pauzner, 1999). Our model applies some techniques of this literature to the context of global sourcing, which seems especially relevant since economic environments are usually more volatile in less developed countries, so that suppliers from those economies may be less patient than large domestic headquarter corporations.
Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
2016, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsCitation Excerpt :Many other papers have studied repeated games with unequal discounting, although none has considered the case of zero-sum games with private monitoring. These include Chen (2007) in the case of finitely repeated games, Takahashi (2005), Chen (2008), Salonen and Vartiainen (2008), Fong and Surti (2009), Guéron et al. (2011) and Dasgupta and Ghosh (2013) in the perfect monitoring case, Houba and Wen (2006), Haag and Lagunoff (2007), Acemoglu et al. (2008), Houba and Wen (2008), Houba and Wen (2011), Fainmesser (2012) and Opp (2012) in specific economic applications, and Lehrer and Scarsini (2013) in the case of dynamic cooperative games. In this section we state and prove our main results.