The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information
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Signaling, screening, and core stability
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2012, Games and Economic BehaviorNon-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core
2012, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :Serrano and Vohra [23] provide non-cooperative support for the notion of a credible objection as a Bayesian equilibrium of a coalitional voting game. De Clippel [4] considers a competitive screening game in which uninformed intermediaries offer simultaneously contracts to each player, who chooses among them based on private information. The set of all subgame perfect equilibrium allocations coincides with the type-agent core, which is a non-empty refinement of the coarse core and a superset of the fine core.
Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems
2013, International Game Theory ReviewSignaling, Screening, and Core Stability
2022, SSRN
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I wrote this paper while I was at Brown University, as a postdoctoral research associate. Special thanks go to Professors Francoise Forges, Enrico Minelli, Herakles Polemarchakis, Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra for insightful discussions; the usual disclaimer applies.