The structure of strategy-proof social choice — Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces

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Abstract

We define a general notion of single-peaked preferences based on abstract betweenness relations. Special cases are the classical example of single-peaked preferences on a line, the separable preferences on the hypercube, the “multi-dimensionally single-peaked” preferences on the product of lines, but also the unrestricted preference domain. Generalizing and unifying the existing literature, we show that a social choice function is strategy-proof on a sufficiently rich domain of generalized single-peaked preferences if and only if it takes the form of voting by issues (“voting by committees”) satisfying a simple condition called the “Intersection Property.”

Based on the Intersection Property, we show that the class of preference domains associated with “median spaces” gives rise to the strongest possibility results; in particular, we show that the existence of strategy-proof social choice rules that are non-dictatorial and neutral requires an underlying median space. A space is a median space if, for every triple of elements, there is a fourth element that is between each pair of the triple; numerous examples are given (some well-known, some novel), and the structure of median spaces and the associated preference domains is analysed.

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