Size approval voting

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.002Get rights and content

Abstract

We propose a new class of voting procedures, called Size Approval Voting, according to which, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other candidates that individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved candidates. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all candidates with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting procedures is characterized by a set of natural properties.

References (31)

  • S. Brams

    Game Theory and Politics

    (1975)
  • S. Brams et al.

    Approval voting

    Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.

    (1978)
  • S. Brams et al.

    Does approval voting elect the lowest common denominator

    Polit. Sci. Politics

    (1988)
  • S. Brams et al.

    Going from theory to practice: The mixed success of approval voting

    Soc. Choice Welfare

    (2005)
  • S. Brams et al.

    Voting systems that combine approval and preference

    • Cited by (0)

    1

    Financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, through the Juan de la Cierva program and project SEJ2006-11510, and METEOR is gratefully acknowledged. This work was initiated while the author was working at Universidad Pública de Navarra.

    2

    Financial support through the Ramón y Cajal program of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology is gratefully acknowledged. This work was initiated while the author was working at Maastricht University.

    View full text
    Copyright © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.