Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?☆
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2022, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :This is an example in which our Theorem 4 also applies, since the universal set of strict preferences is partially knit (see Proposition 2) and dictatorships are ex post group incentive compatible, but we use it here as a warning sign that the implications of Theorem 4, as already explained may or may not be of interest depending on the environments. This result that applies to private values provides a complementary view of our unifying results in Barberà et al. (2010, 2016), because partial knitness is not the same domain condition that those that we invoked there, nor is the proof of equivalence the same. Justifying the use of our conditions on environments is clearly needed, since they are certainly involved and abstract.
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We are grateful to three anonymous referees and many colleagues for their useful comments in different congresses and workshops where the paper was presented. Salvador Barberà gratefully acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant “Consolidated Group-C” ECO2008-04756, and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació through the Distinció per a la Promoció de la Recerca Universitària, grant SGR2009-0419 and the Barcelona GSE Research Network. Dolors Berga acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant SEJ2007-60671 and of Generalitat de Catalunya, through grant SGR2009-0189. She also acknowledges the Research Recognition Programme of the Barcelona GSE. Bernardo Moreno acknowledges financial support from Junta de Andalucía through Proyecto de Excelencia 522 and the ECO2008-03674 from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation.