The return of China, post-Cold War Russia, and the Arctic: Changes on land and at sea
Introduction
The Arctic has received new outside attention for about a decade. Much of this attention – especially popular, but also academic – has focused on local factors in the Arctic. The focus has often been on energy, minerals and shipping lanes made accessible by climate change [3]. There has been a lack of attention to the wider forces of globalization driving this attention to the Arctic. Therefore, the popular and academic discussion of the Arctic benefits from showing the place of the Arctic in the international system before, now and in the future. For the last 25+ years, those systemic changes are the end of the Cold War followed by globalization. The chapter discusses the effects of these international political and economic systemic shifts for the Arctic with focus on China and Russia based on a foundation of how the international systemic changes affect Russia and China: the end of the Cold War and globalization/power transition.
Before turning to the recent international changes of the end of the Cold War and globalization, it is valuable to remember that the North American, North Atlantic and Eurasian Arctic has been economic, military and scientific theatres for European and Western powers since medieval times. For instance, North Atlantic fish fed medieval Europe during Lent. The Royal Navy and the German Kriegsmarine fought each other for primacy of the North Atlantic and Barents Seas in two world wars. During the Cold War, US and Soviet submarine-based strategic nuclear weapons systems and anti-subware warfighting systems were heavily deployed there [9].
Section snippets
China, globalization and the Arctic
China's and Asia's new interest in the Arctic is driven by forces outside the Arctic and not local factors: environmental and political-economic globalization. Environmental globalization is primarily climate change here, which is particularly pronounced in the Arctic (and Antarctic). The rising Asian economic and political powers are vulnerable to climate change, such as sea-level rise threatening major economic and population centers along the coast of China. They have scientific ambitions
Post-Cold War Russia in the Arctic
The long aftermath of the Cold War in the international system has been overshadowed by the power transition driven by the rise of China. This long aftermath of the Cold War has forcefully surfaced in the shape of the Ukraine crisis, which plays a key role for the Arctic today and Sino-Russian relations in the region.
The historical international system context for the current Arctic situation under the Ukraine crisis deserves to be outlined to remind of the systemic embeddedness of the Arctic.
Rising China, Post-Cold War Russia and the Arctic
The confluence of the end of the Cold War and globalization driven by the rise of China are clear in the Arctic, both on land and at sea.1 This paper discusses the Russian Far East and the Bering region concerning the cases of cross-border exchange, trade and
The Pacific Arctic and the circumpolar Arctic under globalization: China in the Arctic council
The dependence of Russia on China driven both by Russia's post-Cold War international position and globalization with the return of China suggests both an increased reliance of Russia on China and role for China in the Arctic. The logic of the “Chinese Dream” of both domestic prosperity and international recognition will push for China being increasingly involved in Russian energy and raw material extraction in Russia and the Russian Far East. It will also increase the role of China in Arctic
Conclusion
The place of the Arctic in the international political and economic system is a central question for understanding the history, present and future of the Arctic. The Arctic has historically been economically integrated into Southern economies, and it has been a major theatre of military operations in geopolitical competition between great and super powers during World War Two and the Cold War. Today, the Arctic is much shaped by the twin international political and economic systemic changes of
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