Contingent reliance on the affect heuristic as a function of regulatory focus

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Abstract

Results from four studies show that the reliance on affect as a heuristic of judgment and decision making is more pronounced under a promotion focus than under a prevention focus. Two different manifestations of this phenomenon were observed. Studies 1–3 show that different types of affective inputs are weighted more heavily under promotion than under prevention in person-impression formation, product evaluations, and social recommendations. Study 4 additionally shows that valuations performed under promotion are more scope-insensitive—a characteristic of affect-based valuations—than valuations performed under prevention. The greater reliance on affect as a heuristic under promotion seems to arise because promotion-focused individuals tend to find affective inputs more diagnostic, not because promotion increases the reliance on peripheral information per se.

Section snippets

Affect as an evaluation heuristic

Numerous studies have shown that, even when objective information about the target is held constant, targets are evaluated more favorably and chosen more frequently when they are perceived to elicit pleasant feelings than when they are perceived to elicit unpleasant feelings. This phenomenon has been observed both with feelings that are genuine integral affective responses to the target, such as the emotional feelings elicited by a political candidate (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982) or

Study 1

The purpose of this first study was to examine whether regulatory focus moderates the reliance on affective inputs in a nonpersuasion domain: that of person-impression formation. This domain is particularly interesting because in impression formation, affective attributes of the target (e.g., friendliness, charm, physical attractiveness) are not necessarily less relevant than their more cognitive attributes (e.g., intelligence, competence, hard work) (unlike in typical persuasion settings,

Study 2

One limitation of the first study is that it operationalized affect through attributes that may be more reflective of the targets’ attractiveness than of the subjective affective responses that the targets elicit. One could therefore argue that the effect of regulatory focus is not to moderate the reliance on subjective affect in general, but to moderate the reliance on attractiveness in particular. The purpose of the second study was therefore to replicate the finding of greater reliance on

Study 3

It thus appears that, compared to a prevention focus, a promotion focus increases the judgmental influence of a variety of affective inputs: affective attributes of a person (Study 1), mood states (Study 2), and ad aesthetic (Pham & Avnet, 2004). However, one could argue that these findings do not necessarily indicate that promotion (compared to prevention) increases the reliance on affect, specifically, as a heuristic. Instead, they may indicate that promotion (compared to prevention) simply

Study 4

Although the first three studies provide consistent evidence that people rely more on their subjective affective responses as a heuristic under a promotion focus than under a prevention focus, these studies document only one facet of the greater reliance on affect under promotion, that is, the greater weighting of subjective affective responses in judgments of the target. The purpose of this fourth study was to document a different facet of this reliance on affect, thereby providing converging

General discussion

There is considerable evidence that judgments and decisions are often based on an affect heuristic and that this heuristic represents a qualitatively distinct mode of judgment and decision making. However, we know surprisingly little about what makes people more likely to rely on this heuristic to begin with. Building on recent findings by Pham and Avnet (2004), this research shows that an important determinant of the reliance on affect as a heuristic is the judge’s or decision-maker’s

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