In previous years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology.

Review of the hardback:'Kant and the Ethics of Humility is an excellent book, one that should be taken seriously by Kant scholars, virtue ethicists, and contemporary moral philosophers generally. It offers a compelling example of Kantian virtue ethics in practice, one that can be a model for similar studies in the future.'

Source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews