Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-m9kch Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-26T18:27:55.584Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Markets and Motives Trust and Egoism in Welfare Markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 1999

PETER TAYLOR-GOOBY
Affiliation:
Darwin College, University of Kent at Canterbury, CT2 7NY, UK

Abstract

Enthusiasm for the expansion of markets in welfare reflects the currency of assumptions derived from rational choice theory among policy-makers. This article reviews recent evidence from the ESRC's Economic Beliefs and Behaviour programme that calls into question the basic tenet of the rational choice approach – that individual choices are driven by instrumental rationality – and argues that welfare markets require a normative framework in which trust plays an important role. Experimental evidence from recent work in economic psychology indicates that individuals often display a level of trust in market interactions that is hard to explain on the basis of simple rationality, but that such trust is fragile and easily undermined by egoistic action. Lack of attention to the normative issues which the rational choice approach fails to capture may lead to the design of markets which are inefficient in meeting the aims of policy-makers and which deplete the moral legacy on which many welfare markets in practice depend.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)