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Trust in the Tax System: The Problem of Lobbying

from PART II - Trust and morality: tax governance in need of transparency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 September 2018

Allison Christians
Affiliation:
H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Taxation, Faculty of Law, McGill University
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Summary

ABSTRACT

Fairness in the tax system seems unachievable when the well-advised free-ride on the many benefits of an organised global economy paid for by tax revenues extracted from others. While those publicly accused of ‘ tax-dodging ‘ point to their full compliance with all applicable laws, they are substantially less forthcoming about their efforts to influence the shape of the law to their own benefit. All too often, tax policy appears to respond primarily to those with the resources to influence the policy-makers. As the system becomes increasingly unresponsive to legitimate policy goals and increasingly out of touch with justice – perceived and actual – public perceptions about the system understandably trend toward the cynical. In the extreme, taxpayers who lose trust in their elected representatives, their tax administrators, and their fellow taxpayers will feel justified in refusing to cooperate with a system they view as fundamentally unprincipled. This chapter argues that this is a governance problem that cannot be eliminated but must be systemically addressed in order to restore taxpayer trust. It suggests that transparency and accountability in policy-making are necessary, and that governments can move toward achieving these aims by supporting and contributing to global, open-access data resources and independent tax policy research in the public interest.

INTRODUCTION

Tax justice seems clearly under threat when the well-advised free-ride on the many benefits of an organised global economy paid for by tax revenues extracted from others. This motivates media coverage and social protest over ‘ tax-dodging ‘ by wealthy individuals and multinational companies, demonstrating a loss of public trust in the system ‘ s purported fairness. Advocates for change suggest that the choice to engage in tax planning has a moral dimension, but those painted with the tax-dodging brush dismiss any charge of wrongdoing by pointing to their full compliance with all applicable laws. The implication is that the rules are not of their own making: ‘ don ‘ t hate the player, hate the game. ‘ Yet many are not mere players.

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Publisher: Intersentia
Print publication year: 2017

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