INTRODUCTION

In comparison with some other West European countries, the Irish party system has always seemed to stand out as an example of the competitive office-seeking model of party behaviour. In a system of government formation in which the bargaining environment was always constrained to a choice between single-party Fianna Fáil governments or a coalition of almost the entire opposition, it seemed clear that office motivations would tend to prevail over considerations of policy compatibility. Since for most of the period Fianna Fáil was assumed to be centrist on the key socioeconomic policy dimension, any potential coalition was by definition spatially unconnected. Gallagher observes that “Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael had been catch-all parties while the phrase was still a glint in Kirchheimer's eye” (1981: 271), and Farrell sums up the prevailing opportunistic thesis when he says that “in the main, Fine Gael and Labour have at best accepted coalition as a necessary evil, the essential price for replacing Fianna Fáil in government” (1983: 257).

That said, Irish political parties have had to face strategic choices that have had quite dramatic effects on their electoral success, coalition alliances, government incumbency, and, not to forget, the longevity of their leaders as leaders. Since we can only evaluate the choices made in terms of those available, the first section of this chapter sets out in a relatively brief manner the broad strategic context in which Irish political parties have operated. It concentrates on the main institutional and behavioural constraints that are likely to have been important in shaping the parties' trade-offs between votes, office, and policy.