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Subjectivism — a reply in defence of classical actuarial methods

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2012

J. M. Ryder
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Extract

The work of science is to substitute facts for appearances and demonstrations for impressions.

1.1 .This paper is an attempt to describe the extent of ‘Subjectivist’ infiltration into theories of actuarial concern, and to present counter arguments defending the objective ‘classical’ actuarial position. The principal entry point for subjectivist ideas has been the ‘latter day rediscovery of the basically statistical nature of actuarial work’ (F. A. Menzler) which has introduced us to Bayesian Statistical Theory and the concept of Insurance Theory as a Theory of Risk. Classical actuarial theory, however, regards this use of Bayesian theory as fallacious, and the Theory of Risk as of relatively minor interest.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of the Institute of Actuaries , Volume 103 , Issue 1 , June 1976 , pp. 59 - 112
Copyright
Copyright © Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 1976

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