For advice, encouragement, and comments on earlier drafts, I am indebted to Anne-Marie Burley, James Caporaso, David Dessler, Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Gourevitch, Ernst Haas, Peter Hall, Stanley Hoffmann, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Julius Moravcsik, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Joseph Nye, Diane Orentlicher, Paul Pierson, Alec Stone, Helen Wallace, Fareed Zakaria, an anonymous referee, and the participants in colloquiums at Harvard University, Stanford University, the University of Chicago, and the University of California at San Diego. I am grateful to the European Community Visitors' Program and the Center for European Studies, Harvard University, for financial and logistical support. An earlier, more thoroughly documented version of this analysis appeared as Working Paper no. 21, Harvard University Center for European Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 1989.

^1. The best negotiating history of the SEA, written by an intelligent insider who took comprehensive notes, is Ruyt's, Jean DeL'acte unique européen: Commentaire (The Single European Act: Commentary) (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1987).Google Scholar For other useful histories and commentaries, see Ludlow, Peter, Beyond 1992: Europe and Its Western Partners (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 1989)Google Scholar; Calingaert, Michael, The 1992 Challenge from Europe: Development of the European Community's internal Market (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1988)Google Scholar; and Volle, Angelika, Grossbritannien und der europäische Einigungsprozess (Great Britain and the process of European integration) (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 02 1989), pp. 46–76Google Scholar. For a collection of important German articles and documents between 1985 and 1989, see Jochen, Thies and Wolfgang, Wagner, eds., Auf dem Wege zum Binnenmarkt: Europäische Integration und deutscher Föderalismus (On the way to the internal market: European integration and German federalism) (Bonn: Verlag für Internationale Politik, 1989)Google Scholar. For a path-breaking attempt to account for the SEA, an account offered by two political scientists and incorporating nearly all existing hypotheses, see Sandholtz, Wayne and Zysman, John, “1992: Recasting the European Bargain,” World Politics 42 (10 1989), pp. 95–128CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an excellent comparison of the 1992 negotiations and previous negotiations, see Roy, Pryce, ed., The Dynamics of European Union (London: Croom Helm, 1987)Google Scholar. On the provisions of 1992 as a new form of multilateral economic negotiation, see Nicolaïdis, Kalypso, “Mutual Recognition: The New Frontier of Multilateralism?” in Network Politics, Promethée Perspectives no. 10, Paris, 06 1989, pp. 21–34.Google Scholar

^2. Article 8A of the 1985 EC Commission White Paper, as amended by the SEA.

^3. The Luxembourg compromise, which was announced to the world in a press communiqué, has no legal standing. Quite the opposite, it has been interpreted as an attempt to circumvent legal procedures outlined in Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome.

^4. With the exception of a few minor initiatives (such as the inclusion of collaborative research and development programs under the SEA), other potential areas of European integration—including political cooperation, social legislation, monetary policy, further procedural reform, and fundamental constitutional issues such as the enlargement of EC membership—are subject to neither the new approach nor majority voting.

^5. See Robert, Keohane, After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 61–64Google Scholar; and Robert, Keohane, ed., Neo-Realism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 192–95Google Scholar. In After Hegemony, p. 63Google Scholar, Keohane writes that “the concept of international regime is consistent with both the importance of differential power and with a sophisticated view of self-interest.” It is not, however, consistent with a strong view of domestic politics as an independent determinant of interest.

^6. These factors are stressed by Calingaert in The 1992 Challenge from Europe and by Sandholtz and Zysman in “1992.” See also Krause, Axel, “What After European Integration?” European Affairs 2 (Autumn 1988), pp. 46–55Google Scholar; and Peter, Ludlow, “Beyond 1992,” European Affairs 2 (Autumn 1988), pp. 19–21.Google Scholar

^7. For strong claims about the importance of this group in inspiring reform, see Marina, Gazzo, “Introduction,” in Marina, Gazzo, ed., Towards European Union (Brussels: Agence Europe, 1985), vol. 1, pp. 7–10Google Scholar. The advent of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, which endowed the body with democratic legitimacy, gave the activities of the group new impetus.

^8. See Albert, Michel and Ball, James, Toward European Economic Recovery in the 1980s: Report to the European Parliament (New York: Praeger, 1984).Google Scholar

^9. Speech by Dekker, Wisse, Geneva, 25 October 1988.Google Scholar

^10. Schmitter, Philippe and Streeck, Wolfgang, “Organized Interests and the Europe of 1992,” paper presented to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 6–8 March 1990.Google Scholar

^11. Sandholtz, and Zysman, , “1992,” p. 117.Google Scholar

^12. For a discussion of the role of business, see Franko, Lawrence G., “Europe 1992: The Impact on Global Corporate Strategy and Multinational Corporate Strategy,” mimeograph, University of Massachusetts, Boston, September 1989Google Scholar; Sandholtz, and Zysman, , “1992,” pp. 108 and 116–20Google Scholar; Financial Times, 14 February 1984Google Scholar; Axel, Krause, “Many Groups Lobby on Implementation of Market Plan,” Europe Magazine, 07–08 1988, pp. 24–25Google Scholar; Ludlow, , Beyond 1992, pp. 27–30Google Scholar; Calingaert, , The 1992 Challenge from Europe, p. 8Google Scholar; and Helen, Wallace, “Making Multilateralism Work: Negotiations in the European Community,” mimeograph, Chatham House, London, August 1988, p. 7.Google Scholar

^13. For Dekker's, proposals, see Europe 1990: An Agenda for Action (Eindhoven: N.V. Philips, 1984)Google Scholar. The four aspects of the Dekker plan were administrative simplification of border formalities, harmonization of the value-added tax (VAT), standardization of technical norms, and liberalization of government procurement. Dekker outlined the new role of business in “Europe's Economic Power: Potential and Perspectives,” a speech delivered to the Swiss Institute for International Studies, Geneva, 25 Octovber 1988.

^14. See Sandholtz, and Zysman, , “1992,” p. 128.Google Scholar

^15. Jacques, Delors et al. , La France par l'Europe (France through Europe) (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1988), pp. 47 and 50–51Google Scholar. The tone is heroic, as the opening words of the chapter on Delors' initiative (p. 47) illustrate: “January 1985: the winter was harsh. In Brussels, as in Paris, people were shivering. On the top floor of the Berlaymont, in a vast office that didn't yet seem quite lived in, Jacques Delors gathered his closest associates around him.”

^16. Sandholtz, and Zysman, , “1992,” p. 98.Google Scholar

^17. Ibid., pp. 96–97; see also pp. 100, 108–9, and 128 for a discussion of the key role of supranational actors. Sandholtz and Zysman criticize neofunctionalism, but their description of the integration process is in fact compatible with neofunctionalism in all but a few particulars. For other supranational interpretations, see Ludlow, , Beyond 1992, pp. 27–30Google Scholar; Calingaert, , The 1992 Challenge from EuropeGoogle Scholar; and Helen, Wallace, “Europäische Integration” (European integration), in Thies and Wagner, Auf dem Wege zum Binnenmarkt, pp. 127–28.Google Scholar

^18. Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958), pp. xiii–xivGoogle Scholar; see also pp. 389 and 483–84 and chaps. 8–12, in which Haas stressed the federating influence of an active supranational executive and of transnational groups. Haas and Schmitter subsequently stressed “creative personal action” using organizational resources and skills, as seen, for example, when a central integrationist leader is able to promote trade-offs and package deals. See Haas, Ernst B. and Schmitter, Philippe, “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration,” International Organization 18 (Autumn 1964), pp. 736–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This idea was picked up by later theorists. See Nye, Joseph S. Jr., Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in International Organization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 69 and 71–72.Google Scholar

^19. I am grateful to Anne-Marie Burley for suggesting this rubric.

^20. For summaries of the literature on intergovernmentalism, see Taylor, Paul, The Limits of European Integration (Beckenham, U.K.: Croom Helm, 1983)Google Scholar; and Helen, Wallace, William, Wallace, and Carole, Webb, eds., Policy-Making in the European Communities (London: Wiley, 1977).Google Scholar

^21. Wallace, Helen, “Bilateral, Trilateral and Multilateral Negotiations in the European Community,” in Roger, Morgan and Caroline, Bray, eds., Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France and Germany (Aldershot, U.K.: Gower, 1986), pp. 156–74.Google Scholar

^22. See Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 61–64Google Scholar; and Keohane, , Neo-Realism and Its Critics, pp. 192–95.Google Scholar

^23. For a summary of Genscher's comments at the opening session of the intergovernmental conference, see Gazzo, , Towards European Unity, vol. 2, pp. 28–29.Google Scholar

^24. For a summary of Germany's draft proposal on new powers for the Parliament, see Gazzo, , Towards European Unity, vol. 1, pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

^25. For a discussion of German views about the agricultural policy, see Gisela, Hendriks, “Germany and the CAP: National Interests and the European Community,” International Affairs 65 (Winter 1988–1989), pp. 75–87Google Scholar. The German stand against more intensive monetary cooperation softened in 1988–89, once the initial condition of increased capital mobility was being met.

^26. This account of French foreign policy during the first Mitterrand presidency draws heavily on Gabriel, Robin'sLa diplomatie de Mitterrand ou le triomphe des apparences, 1981–1985 (Mitterrand's diplomacy or the triumph of appearances, 1981–1985) (Paris: Editions de la Bièvre, 1985).Google Scholar

^27. Mitterrand and his ministers may have been looking for a way to limit agricultural spending without appearing to be responsible for limiting it. This would account for the attempts to cast Thatcher as a scapegoat and for the fact that although the French government became more accommodating of agricultural reform and the French ministers spoke out occasionally about overgenerous support, France remained one of the staunchest supporters of generous agricultural subsidies as late as the Brussels summit of February 1988. See Paul, Taylor, “The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s,” in Juliet, Lodge, ed. The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter, 1989), p. 6.Google Scholar

^28. The reasoning behind Mitterrand's decision is disputed. The decisive economic argument appears to have been made by the French treasury via Laurent Fabius, who told Mitterrand that leaving the EMS would undermine confidence in the economy and ultimately compel the French government to impose as much austerity as would continued membership. The decisive political condition appears to have been the decline of the French Communist party, which allowed Mitterrand to align himself with the moderate wing of the Socialist party. See David, Cameron, The Colors of a Rose: On the Ambiguous Record of French Socialism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Center for European Studies, 1987)Google Scholar; Peter, Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 193 and 201 ffGoogle Scholar.; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Why Economic Policies Change Course (Paris: OECD, 1988), pp. 56–64Google Scholar; and Philippe, Bauchard, La guerre des deux roses: Du rêve à la realité, 1981–1985 (The war of two roses: From dream to reality, 1981–1985) (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1986).Google Scholar

^29. Mitterrand, speech delivered to the European Parliament, Brussels, 24 May 1984; reprinted in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 1, pp. 82–85.Google Scholar

^30. Robin, , La diplomatie de Mitterrand, p. 145Google Scholar; see also p. 219. For another, equally ironic but more positive assessment, see Philippe, Moreau-Defarges, “‘J'ai fait un rêve …’ Le président François Mitterrand, artisan de l'union européenne” (“I had a dream …” President François Mitterrand, craftsman of European union), Politique Etrangère 50 (Fall 1985), pp. 359–75.Google Scholar

^31. The Conservative government began pushing deregulation of services during the British presidency of the Council in 1981. See Simon, Bulmer and William, Paterson, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 48.Google Scholar

^32. Cheysson, , cited in Financial Times, 26 January 1982Google Scholar. Howe echoed Cheysson's point of view: “The negotiation launched at Stuttgart and continued at Athens in December 1983 is not just about the budget and the CAP. It is about the whole future shape and direction of Europe.” See Geoffrey, Howe, “The Future of the European Community: Britain's Approach to the Negotiations,” International Affairs 60 (Spring 1984), p. 190.Google Scholar

^33. See David, Cameron, “Sovereign States in a Single Market: Integration and Intergovern-mentalism in the European Community,” paper presented at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 29–30 March 1990Google Scholar. Cameron argues that the roots of the SEA can be traced to the 1970s. But no internal market and decision-making initiative prior to 1981 was considered seriously by any of the three major parties.

^34. Chandernagor, cited in Robin, , La diplomatie de Mitterrand, p. 219Google Scholar. See also Gianni Bonvicini, “The Genscher-Columbo Plan and the ‘Solemn Declaration on European Union,’; 1981–1983,” in Pryce, , The Dynamics of European Union, pp. 174–87Google Scholar; and Joseph, Weiler, “The Genscher-Columbo Draft European Act: The Politics of Indecision,” Revue d'Intégration Européenne 6 (Spring 1983), pp. 129–54.Google Scholar

^35. See Robin, , La diplomatic de Mitterrand, p. 219Google Scholar; and De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, pp. 35 and 315–24.Google Scholar

^36. Moreau-Defarges, , “‘J'ai fait un rêve …,’” p. 368.Google Scholar

^37. “Speech of François Mitterrand Before the Netherlands Government, 7 February 1984,” released by the Ambassade de France à Londres (CTL/DISCOM/29/84).

^38. See Heinz, Stadlmann, “Die europäische Gemeinschaft nach der französischen Ratspräsidentschaft” (The European Community after the French presidency of the Council), Europa-Archiv 39 (10 1984), pp. 447–54Google Scholar. The Franco-German agreement on procedure was only partial, since France did not support German efforts to strengthen the Parliament. France preferred to replace Article 235 of the treaty with one that would have sanctioned the creation of a “differentiated Europe,” with different sets of members involved in different programs. The French have traditionally supported diplomatic flexibility to facilitate projects which, like EUREKA, involve only some EC countries and also involve non-EC countries. See De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, p. 99.Google Scholar

^39. See Stadlmann, “Die europäische Gemeinschaft”; De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, pp. 47–49Google Scholar; The Guardian, 25 January 1984; and press conference with Mitterrand, 2 April 1984. For a contemporary critique of Mitterrand's policy changes, see Robin, , La diplomatie de Mitterrand, pp. 69–81, 133–45, and 211–29.Google Scholar

^40. Interview with Michel, Rocard, Intervention, February-April 1984, p. 102.Google Scholar

^41. See Robin, , La diplomatie de Mitterrand, p. 215.Google Scholar

^42. See Ludlow, , Beyond 1992, pp. x–xiGoogle Scholar; and Howe, , “The Future of the European Community,” pp. 188–89Google Scholar. Britain did delay payments of an emergency levy requested by the EC.

^43. This account of the threat of excluding Britain draws heavily on Taylor's insights in “The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s.” For earlier versions of the same thesis, see Richard, Corbett, “The 1985 Intergovernmental Conference and the Single European Act,” in Pryce, The Dynamics of European Union, pp. 268–69Google Scholar; and Françoise de, la Serre, La Grande-Bretagne et la Communauté Européenne (Great Britain and the European Community) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987), pp. 193–94 and 207–9.Google Scholar

^44. For a summary of the debate about a two-track EC, see Helen, Wallace and Adam, Ridley, Europe: The Challenge of Diversity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985)Google Scholar, especially chap. 5; and Eberhard, Grabitz, ed., Abgestufte Integration: Eine Alternative zum heröommlichen Integrationskonzept? (Multi-tiered integration: An alternative to the existing concept of integration?) (Kehl am Rhein: Engel Verlag, 1984).Google Scholar

^45. See The Guardian, 30 May 1984Google Scholar; and Center for Policy Studies, Making It Work: The Future of the European Community (London: Center for Policy Studies, 1984)Google Scholar. See also Le Monde, 18 March 1984 and 5 May 1984; and Kohl, speech delivered to the Bundestag, Bonn, 28 July 1984, and excerpted in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 1, p. 98.Google Scholar

^46. Howe, , quoted in Financial Times, 22 March 1984.Google Scholar

^47. See “Europe: The Future—United Kingdom Memorandum, June 1984”; reprinted in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 1, pp. 86–95.Google Scholar

^48. In “The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s,” p. 7, Taylor argues that the mood of conciliation was due to the fact that during the British and French failure in March at Brussels, they had “looked into the abyss, and were shocked into an awareness of the need to hold themselves back.” According to Taylor, by taking time to confess his personal ideals, Mitterrand was letting Thatcher “see the future.”

^49. See De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, p. 261Google Scholar. The Commission later adopted a standard to measure the burden.

^50. See Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 1, pp. 96–97.Google Scholar

^51. The Benelux countries assented in late October 1984, and a memorandum setting out objectives was approved on 12 December 1984. See Geoffrey, Howe, “Grossbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als europäische Partner” (Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany as European partners), Europa-Archiv 39 (11 1984), p. 637Google Scholar. France reportedly insisted that Italy be excluded, for fear that Italian participation would slow the negotiations. The negotiations were concluded in early 1990.

^52. See “Conclusions of the European Council at Its Meeting in Fontainebleau, 26 June 1984”; reprinted in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 1, pp. 96–97Google Scholar. For a discussion of the Spaak Committee, see Hanns, Jürgen Küsters, “The Treaties of Rome, 1955–1957,” in Pryce, The Dynamics of European Union, pp. 84 ff.Google Scholar

^53. See Financial Times, 30 November 1984. 3 December 1984, 22 March 1985, and 10 May 1985; and Le Monde, 30 March 1985. France, too, accepted that the first priority of the EC must be the creation of an espace économique intérieur homogène. For a discussion of the objections of the Quai d'Orsay, presumably to the renunciation of the Luxembourg compromise, see Corbett, , “1985 Intergovernmental Conference,” p. 269.Google Scholar

^54. See De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, pp. 57–59Google Scholar. The proposals of Britain, as well as those of the Benelux countries, France, Germany, and Italy, are reprinted in Gazzo, Towards European Union, supplement. For commentary, see The Times (London), 21 July 1985.Google Scholar

^55. See Gazzo, , Towards European Union, supplement, pp. 27–32.Google Scholar

^56. See De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, pp. 60–61Google Scholar. In a memorandum written by the Italians prior to the Milan summit, the option of invoking Article 236 (which allows amendment by unanimous consent of the Council) was presented as a possible compromise between a new treaty and the more ad hoc British approach. Nonetheless, the vote taken at the summit does not seem to have been planned in advance by the governments that voted affirmatively. See Gazzo, , Towards European Union, supplement, pp. 3–8.Google Scholar

^57. Taylor, , “The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s,” p. 10.Google Scholar

^58. De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, pp. 67–91.Google Scholar

^59. This account of the conference negotiations follows Corbett's, “1985 Intergovernmental Conference,” pp. 247–48Google Scholar. See also Ludlow, , Beyond 1992, p. viGoogle Scholar; and Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 1, p. 38Google Scholar. Delors' speech and his press conference of 27 November 1985, which offer his characterization of the role of Germany and Britain, are reprinted in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 2, p. 86.Google Scholar

^60. Delors, cited in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 1, p. 8Google Scholar; see also pp. 25–26.

^61. See Corbett, , “1985 Intergovernmental Conference,” p. 249.Google Scholar

^62. Ibid.., pp. 249–50 and 259.

^63. De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, pp. 172 ff.Google Scholar

^64. See Taylor, “The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s.”

^65. For speculation on Franco–German intentions, see De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, p. 272Google Scholar; and Corbett, , “1985 Intergovernmental Conference,” p. 268Google Scholar. The view that the outcome reflected a triumph for British negotiators has been most cogently argued by Taylor in “The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s.”

^66. De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, p. 56.Google Scholar

^67. See the European Parliament's opinion of 9 July 1985 regarding the proposal for an intergovernmental conference; reprinted in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 2, pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

^68. For an account of the debate, see Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 2, pp. 17–20, 27, 30, and 41.Google Scholar

^69. Parliament resolution; cited in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 2, p. 104Google Scholar. See also the programmatic statement of Spinelli and two associates made in the inaugural issue of the “Crocodile” newsletter and reprinted in Gazzo, , Towards European Union, vol. 1, pp. 11–17Google Scholar; and De, Ruyt, L'acte unique européen, p. 85.Google Scholar

^70. For a discussion of the lack of active elite business support for the early European initiatives, see Haas, The Uniting of Europe, chap. 5. Transnationally active business interests may have had an effect at the domestic level, as outlined in a later section of my article.

^71. Krause, , “Many Groups Lobby on Implementation of Market Plan,” p. 24.Google Scholar

^72. Financial Times, 9 October 1989. I am indebted to Peter Ludlow for suggestions that helped sharpen this hypothesis.

^73. See Delors, et al. , La France par l'Europe, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

^74. Interview with Jacques Delors, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 22 September 1989. See also Calingaert, , The 1992 Challenge from Europe, p. 9.Google Scholar

^75. The initial draft amendments submitted by the Commission to the intergovernmental conference went far beyond the final settlement (except on the powers of the Parliament), a fact which hardly lends credence to Delors' claim that he foresaw all in January 1985. But this may underestimate Delors' skill in setting the agenda, where aggressiveness did pay dividends.

^76. See Juliet Lodge, “EC Policymaking: Institutional Considerations.” in Lodge, , The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, p. 28Google Scholar; and Taylor, , The Limits of European Integration, chaps. 3 and 10.Google Scholar

^77. Leon, Lindberg and Stuart, Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).Google Scholar

^78. For a discussion of the role of business groups in the 1950s, see Haas, , The Uniting of Europe, p. 353.Google Scholar

^79. Taylor, , “The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s,” p. 3.Google Scholar

^80. See Wallace, , “Bilateral, Trilateral and Multilateral Negotiations in the European Community,” pp. 158–59Google Scholar. I am indebted to Helen Wallace for discussions on the British negotiating position.

^81. Interview with Delors, 22 September 1989.

^82. See Anne-Marie, Burley, “The Once and Future German Question.” Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1989–90). pp. 65–83Google Scholar. Some have suggested that the 1992 initiative is a response to the threat of a U.S.–Soviet condominium. See, for example, Enrique, Baron. Europe 92: Le rapt du future (Europe 92: The rape of the future) (Paris: Editions Bernard Coutas, 1989)Google Scholar. Sandholtz and Zysman speculate, though with little evidence, that renewed European integration was a response to the decline of the United States, on which the Europeans were dependent for technology. See Sandholtz, and Zysman, , “1992,” p. 96.Google Scholar

^83. Wallace, , “Making Multilateralism Work,” p. 6.Google Scholar

^84. Sandholtz and Zysman, “1992,” p. 109.

^85. I am indebted to conversations with Geoffrey Garrett, who encouraged me to develop this argument more precisely.

^86. Manfred, Wegner, “Preparing the 1990s: A Three-Pronged Strategy,” in Wolfgang, Wessels and Elfriede, Regelsberger. eds., The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Cornmunity (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1988), pp. 115–24.Google Scholar

^87. See Charles, Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977)Google Scholar; and Andrea, Boltho, ed., The European Economy: Growth and Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1982).Google Scholar

^88. EC Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, The Economics of 1992: An Assessment of the Potential Economic Effects of Completing the Internal Market of the European Community (Luxembourg: EC, 03 1988).Google Scholar

^89. This hypothesis should be clearly distinguished from the supranational institutionalist hypothesis that pressure from transnationally organized business interest groups was an essential precondition for the SEA.

^90. Helen, Mimer, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

^91. Keniche, Ohmae, Triad Power: The Coming Shape of Global Competition (Singapore: McKinsey, 1985).Google Scholar

^92. Sandholtz and Zysman attribute the SEA to a wide variety of factors, including economic policy failure and the decline of the European left (which seem the most promising elements of their explanation) as well as the transition from American to Japanese leadership in high-technology development, the changing global security environment, Commission activism, and pan-European interest group pressure. See Sandholtz and Zysman. “1992.”

^93. See Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 6Google Scholar. For a discussion of the relationship between domestic interests and the broader category of “liberal” theories of international relations, see Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberalism in International Life.” chap. 8 in “The Roots of European Economic Cooperation,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, forthcoming; and Robert, Keohane, “International Liberalism Reconsidered,” in John, Dunn, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar. For a discussion of the problems involved in specifying interests by assumption, see Andrew, Moravcsik, “Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit Arrangement,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 441–45.Google Scholar

^94. For this phrase, I am indebted to a seminar presentation by Robert Keohane. For a typology of theoretical approaches that combine international and domestic factors, see Andrew, Moravcsik, “International and Domestic Theories of International Relations: A Theoretical Introduction,” in Peter, Evans, Harold, Jacobson, and Robert, Putnam, eds., Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: Two-Level Games in World Affairs, forthcoming.Google Scholar

^95. For previous work focusing on state-society relations in the world economy, see Hall, Governing the Economy; Peter, Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Peter, Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Peter, Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977).Google Scholar

^96. Robert, Keohane and Stanley, Hoffmann, “European Integration,” unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, 11 1989Google Scholar. See also Roy, Pryce and Wolfgang, Wessels, “The Search for an Ever Closer Union: A Framework for Analysis,” in Pryce, The Dynamics of European Union, pp. 1–34.Google Scholar

^97. Analysts who stress power and interests have traditionally been pessimistic. For a contrast of pessimistic and optimistic views in the 1960s and 1980s, respectively, see the following articles by Stanley, Hoffmann: “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus 95 (Summer 1966), pp. 892–908Google Scholar; and “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today,” Journal of Common Market Studies 21 (September–December 1982), pp. 33–35.Google Scholar