¹ See Shapley, L. S. and Shubik, Martin, “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System,” American Political Science Review, 09 1954 (Vol. 48, No. 3), pp. 787–792CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² See Dahl, Robert A., “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 07 1957 (Vol. 2, No. 3), pp. 201–215Google Scholar; and Matthews, Donald R., “Patterns of Influence in the U. S. Senate: Five Approaches” (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the 1960 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association)Google Scholar, for discussions of this technique.

³ Alker, Hayward A. Jr, and Russett, Bruce M., World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), Chapter 9Google Scholar. Alker and Russett make it clear that they are aware of the limitations of this technique in measuring political influence.

⁴ A preliminary attempt to use this approach can be found in Keohane, Robert, “Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International Conciliation, 03 1966 (No. 557)Google Scholar.

⁵ For example, see the discussion of procedural questions below, p. 233.

⁶ In his comments on an earlier draft of this article Hayward Alker, Jr., proposed simulation as a superior alternative method. I do not deny that simulation may be a valuable approach; however, it seems to me to depend upon, rather than to negate the value of, close empirical analysis. As Karl Deutsch has written, “Simulation at best cannot be much better than our understanding of the processes which we imagine we are simulating.” (“Recent Trends in Research Methods in Political Science,” in A Design for Political Science: Scope, Objectives and Methods [Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 12 1966]Google Scholar.)

⁷ Donald J. Puchala suggested in his comments on this article at the SSRC conference that public opinion polls might constitute a useful analogy for such a set of questions. A case study of an issue in the General Assembly would roughly correspond to an individual respondent in the public opinion polls; that is, a systematic set of questions would be asked with regard to each.

⁸ UN Document A/5934/Add.1, September 22, 1965, p. 2.

⁹ General Assembly Official Records… First Committee (20th session), 1408th meeting, p. 340Google Scholar.

¹⁰ The behavior of African and Asian neutrals in the Article 19 crisis provides another example of this phenomenon; see Keohane, , International Conciliation, No. 557, especially pp. 57–64Google Scholar.

¹¹ Article 18 reads as follows:

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, die election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, die election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph I (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of die trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

¹² A question which the Charter does not expressly answer is whether the General Assembly, once it has determined by a majority vote additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds vote, can reverse its actions by a majority vote. Although categories established by Article 18 (2), cannot be abolished except by the method specified for amending the Charter, it is clear that “additional categories” established under paragraph 3 can be abolished or modified by the Assembly by a majority vote of die members present and voting since a session of the General Assembly cannot bind future sessions.

(Goodrich, Leland M. and Hambro, Edvard, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents [2nd and rev. ed.; Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949], p. 190.Google Scholar)

¹³ This position—that the General Assembly was free to decide in each session what the voting procedure should be on the Chinese representation question—represents a middle ground between the views of the United States and many of its opponents which held that the Assembly was violating the Charter by considering this question of representation “important.”

¹⁴ Froman, Lewis A. Jr, and Ripley, Randall B., “Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats.” American Political Science Review, 03 1965 (Vol. 59, No. 1), pp. 52–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ General Assembly Official Records (20th session), 1399th plenary meeting, 12 17, 1965, p. 16Google Scholar.

¹⁶ General Assembly Resolution 2105 (XX), December 20, 1965.

¹⁷ For a contrasting view on the significance of procedural votes for consensus, see Alker and Russett, p. 158.

¹⁸ Relying primarily on their analyses of votes and other official data, Hayward Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett have used the General Assembly to raise important and interesting questions about world politics. See ibid.; and Russett, Bruce M., Trends in World Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1965), especially Chapters 4–6Google Scholar.