We gratefully acknowledge valuable comments and suggestions from Hayward Alker, Henry Bienen, George Downs, Michael Doyle, John Lewis Gaddis, Fred Greenstein, Steph Haggard, John Hall, Robert Jervis, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, M. J. Peterson, David Rapkin, John Ruggie, Jack Snyder, and Steve Walt. Research for this article was supported by the Pew Charitable Trusts Program on Integrating Economics and National Security and by the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

1. The groundwork for this article was laid out in an earlier essay that sought to deepen our understanding of the nature of legitimacy in the international system. See Ikenberry, G. John and Kupchan, Charles A., “The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power,” in Rapkin, David, ed., World Leadership and Hegemony, vol. 5 of International Political Economy Yearbook (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming)Google Scholar. Some of the historical material contained in the present article draws on our earlier essay.

2. Some scholars have made general distinctions among political, economic, and ideological aspects of power. See Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), especially pp. 22–28Google Scholar; and Boulding, Kenneth, The Three Faces of Power (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989)Google Scholar.

3. See George, Alexander, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (06 1969), pp. 190–222Google Scholar. George argues that the operational code consists of two levels of beliefs: deep philosophical beliefs and instrumental beliefs. Our notion of norms is similar to George's category of instrumental beliefs. For further discussion of this level of beliefs and how to measure them, see Kupchan, Charles A., “France and the Quandary of Empire, 1870–1939,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1989Google Scholar. To clarify the presentation, we distinguish among norms, value orientations, interests, and preferences in the following way. Norms are general principles upon which a certain vision of international order is based. Value orientations are norm-based attitudes toward specific policy issues and types of behavior. Interests are the broad objectives of policy, such as prosperity, political stability, and security. Preferences are the ordering of alternative courses of action or policy choices.

4. As discussed below in the case studies, the content of norms changes over time. During the nineteenth century, for example, British hegemony in the European system was facilitated by principles of free trade. British domination in certain colonial areas, most notably India, was similarly facilitated by the importation and spread of liberalism. During the post-World War II era, the U.S. hegemonic system has been infused with norms of liberal multilateralism and democratic government.

5. A similar distinction between types of acquiescence (or “acceptance”) is made by Mann: ”pragmatic acceptance, where the individual complies because he perceives no realistic alternative, and normative acceptance, where the individual internalizes the moral expectations of the ruling class and views his own inferior position as legitimate.” See Mann, Michael, “The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy,” American Sociological Review 35 (06 1970), pp. 423–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. For a discussion of the use of international market power, see James, Scott C. and Lake, David A., “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), pp. 1–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7. See Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 32Google Scholar; and Krasner, Stephen D., ”American Policy and Global Economic Stability,” in Avery, William P. and Rapkin, David P., eds., America in a Changing World Political Economy (New York: Longman, 1982), p. 32Google Scholar. The United States after World War II provides the premier case of the coercive potential of a remarkably diversified resource portfolio. “American leaders were able to bring into play a very wide range of resources with few opportunity costs for the United States,” argues Krasner. “American threats were credible because the United States would not lose much if they were carried out. American leaders could usually construct a link that would enable them to compel other actors to alter their policy. Inducements could be offered because the United States had resources that others needed much more than they were needed by the United States.”

8. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 39Google Scholar.

9. Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10. A variety of efforts have been made to develop more sophisticated models of hegemonic power, giving precision to its mechanisms and dynamics. Snidal outlines three forms of hegemony: that which is benign and exercised by persuasion; that which is benign but exercised by coercion; and that which is coercive and exploitative. See Snidal, Duncan, “Hegemonic Stability Theory Revisited,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614Google Scholar. Hirsch and Doyle note three types of hegemonic power: cooperative leadership, hegemonic regime, and imperialism. See Hirsch, Fred and Doyle, Michael, Alternatives to Monetary Disorder (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), p. 27Google Scholar.

11. Cox, Robert W., Production, Power and World Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 172Google Scholar. See also two works by Gill, Stephen: “Hegemony, Consensus, and Trilateralism,” Review of International Studies 12 (07 1986), pp. 205–21Google Scholar; and “American Hegemony: Its Limits and Prospects in the Reagan Era,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies 15 (Winter 1986), pp. 311–36Google Scholar.

12. Weber, Max, Economy and Society, vol. 1, edited by Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 213Google Scholar.

13. Habermas, Jürgen, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 101Google Scholar.

14. Our notion of socialization corresponds closely with that in the literature on political socialization. As Sigel states, “Political socialization refers to the learning process by which political norms and behaviors acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to generation.” See Sigel, R., “Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 361, 1965, p. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15. Our notion of socialization differs from that of Waltz. In Waltz's theory, socialization refers to a process through which actors come to conform to the structural norms of the international system. It is a process that “limits and molds” the behavior of states in ways that accord with the imperatives and constraints of international structures. See Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1979), pp. 74–76Google Scholar. We refer to socialization as a process through which the value orientations of a leading state are transmitted to elites in other nations, regardless of the structural setting.

16. Merelman, Richard, “Learning and Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 60 (09 1966), p. 548Google Scholar. See also George, Alexander L., “Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy,” in Hoist, Ole et al. , eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 233–62Google Scholar; and Trout, Thomas, “Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimacy and the Cold War,” International Studies Quarterly 19 (09 1975), pp. 251–84Google Scholar.

17. Our notion of socialization in the international system has a clear parallel to Durkheim's ”conscience collective”–a body of beliefs and values upon which moral consensus in domestic societies is based. The conscience collective, as Giddens suggests, provides domestic cohesion and conformity through “the emotional and intellectual hold which these beliefs and values exert over the perspectives of the individual.” See Giddens, Anthony, ed., Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 5Google Scholar. We maintain that the emergence of shared norms and beliefs performs a similar role in the international context, facilitating cooperation and cohesion among sovereign states.

18. Merelman, “Learning and Legitimacy.”

19. For an application of this theory to international relations, see Larson, Deborah, The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 42–50Google Scholar.

20. A related process, involving the spread of policy-relevant knowledge, is described by Haas as “consensual knowledge.” See Haas, Ernst, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (04 1980), pp. 357–405Google Scholar. More generally, the literature on regimes addresses how norms and procedures guide state behavior. This literature, however, focuses more on how norms facilitate cooperation than on how norms emerge and take root among relevant states. Our notion of socialization may shed light on the processes through which regimes emerge. For a general review of the literature, see Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth A., “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 491–517Google Scholar.

21. Several considerations informed our selection of case studies. We were concerned primarily with understanding how and when socialization takes place, rather than with assessing the extent to which socialization affects outcomes. Accordingly, we focused on the early stages of interaction between a hegemon and secondary states. We also attempted to select a range historical cases that would allow us to probe the different mechanisms through which socialization takes place. In Britain and France after World War II, socialization occurred through the thick network of political, economic, and military ties that emerged between Western Europe and the United States. In Germany and Japan, the United States resorted to military occupation and explicit reconstruction of domestic institutions. The cases of India and Egypt allowed us to examine examples of colonial penetration. We were also careful to pick instances of both successful and unsuccessful efforts at socialization in order to enhance the analytic value of comparative analysis. Inasmuch as work in this area is relatively underdeveloped, we consider these cases to serve as “plausibility probes” in an effort to formulate and test initial hypotheses about the process of socialization in international relations.

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