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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2009
The application, or putting into effect, of any legal act presupposes a logically prior stage: its interpretation. Everyone who applies a legal act is interpreting it, and, in doing so, is, consciously or unconsciously, following a certain method. Viewed as an intellectual exercise, legal interpretation presupposes the existence of an act creating or determining rights and obligations, prescribing action or abstention from action: in short, designed to give rise to legal consequences. Every system of law deriving from formal sources necessarily involves some such process. On the other hand, it is difficult to speak of legal interpretation properly so called in the context of a system of moral precepts such as the law of nature, which remain more or less indefinite and which are arrived at by means of conjecture based on pure reason, and do not entail any immediate juridical consequences. Gény put it this way:
“Proceedings on the assumption of the absolute power of human reason to discover the laws of human nature, both in principle and in detail, the natural law school intended to create, by the mere force of thinking, a complete system of absolute, immutable, directly and universally applicable law that the legislature had only to put into words,…”
1. Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif, 2nd ed. vol. II (1954) p. 94.Google Scholar
2. It should be noted in this context that the ius gentium was originally a branch of Roman law first applied as much to the legal relations between Roman citizens and foreigners (peregrini) as to relations between the latter category. Ius gentium, taken in its second sense, the idea of which developped under the influence of stoic philosophy, has come to mean the body of precepts which natural reason has imposed as between all men and which is also observed among all people. “Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur, vocanturque ius gentium, quasi quo omnes gentes utuntur.” Institutiones Iustiniani, lib. I, tit. I.1.
3. In his review of Ernst Reibstein's Völkerrecht. Eine Geschichte seiner Ideen in Lehre und Praxis Paul Guggenheim, wrote of the “durchaus originelle Interpretationslehre [of the natural law jurists] die bis zur gegenwärtigen Stunde ihre Aktualität nicht eingebüsst hat”. See 82 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, (1965) p. 343.Google Scholar
4. “Ius civile, sive Romanum, sive quod cuique patrium est, aut illustrare commentariis aut contractum ob oculos ponere aggressi sunt multi, aut ius illud, quod inter populos plures aut populorum rectores intercedit, sive ab ipsa natura profectum, aut divinis constitutum legibus, sive moribus et pacto tacito introductum, attinguerunt pauci, universum ac certo ordine tractavit hactenus nemo; cum tamen id fieri intersit humani generis.”
5. Lib. I, cap. I, para. X,1.
6. Lib. I, cap. I, paras. X,5 et XVII, 2.
7. Lib. I, cap. I, para. XIII.
8. Lib. I, cap. I, para. XIV,1.
9. Ibid.
10. “Sed sicut cuiusque civitatis iura utihtatem suae civitatis respiciunt, ita inter civitates aut omnes aut plerasque iura quaedam nasci potuerunt … quae utilitatem respiciunt non coetum singulorum, sed magnae illiud universitatis. Et hoc ius est quod gentium dicitur quoties id nomen a iure naturali distinguimus.” Proleg. para. 17.
11. “… aut recta illatio ex naturae principiis procedens, aut communis aliquis consensus. Illa ius naturae indicat, hic ius gentium; quorum discrimen non quidem ex ipsis testimoniis … sed ex materiae qualitate intelligendum est. Quod enim ex certis principiis certa argumentatione deduci non potest, et tamen ubique observatum apparet, sequitur ut ex voluntate libera ortum habent.” Proleg. para. 40.
12. Proleg. para. 41.
13. “…ius proprie capax non est nisi naturae praeceptis utens generalibus.” Lib. I, cap. I, para. XI, 1.
14. “…ius naturale, cui summa imperia subiacent.” Lib. II, cap. IV, para. XIII.
15. Lib. II, cap. II, para. V.
16. Lib. II, cap. III, para. X,3.
17. Lib. III, cap. XIX, para. VI.
18. “…quod iuris veniat ex pacto aut contractu…” Proleg. para. 34.
19. “Publicas ergo conventiones eas intelligit quae nisi iure imperii maioris aut minoris fieri nequeunt, qua nota differunt non tantum a contractibus privatorum, sed a contractibus regum circa negotia privata.” para. I.
20. Following the same intellectual process he distinguishes the acts of kings and those exercising the supreme power in a republic which they perform in the capacity of a king, that is to say in the exercise of their public power, from their private act. Lib. II, cap. XIV, para. I and V. Contracts not entered into “ex iure imperii” do not give rise to any obligation on the part of the people. Ibid. para. XIV.
21. “At nobid accuratius instituenda partitio est, … federa alia idem constituere quod iuris est naturalis, alia aliquid ei adiicere.” para. V,1.
22. para. V,2.
23. “Sub hoc genere comprendo ut federa quibus cavetur ut utrinque ius hospitii, ut ius commercii sit, quatenus ista sub iure naturali veniunt.” para. V,3.
24. “Conventiones qui iuri naturae aliquid addiciunt aut aequales sunt, aut inaequales.” para. VI, 1.
25. “Aequales sunt quae utrinque eodem modo se habent.” ibid.
26. para. VI, 3.
27. “Ex aequalibus qualia sunt inaequalia facile est intelligi. Promittuntut autem inaequalia aut ex parte digniori aut ex minus digna.” “Et haec aut cum imminutione sunt imperii aut sine eius imminutione.” para. VII, 1.
28. Paras. VIII-XII. In fact Grotius did not limit the operation of the “human” law of nations sorely to Christian peoples. On the contrary, he admits of the existence of different regional systems of customary law. He shows how customary international law devines its binding force from the will of all the nations, or of many nations. “I added of many nations”, he says, “because scarcely any law can be found common to all nations except the law of nature, which in itself often called the law of nations. Frequently indeed, in one part of the world, there is a law of nations which does not exist in another.” Lib. I, cap. I, para. XIV. (English translation taken from: Hugo, Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, translation by Loonis, Louise R., Black, Walter J., New York, 1949).Google Scholar
In reality treaty relations did exist, dealing with other subjects as well as truces, since the time of the celebrated treaty of 1535 between Francis I and Suleiman the Magnificent between Christian Nations and Turkey. The research of Charles H. Alexandrovicz provides ample evidence that a considerable number of treaties were concluded between European States and Eastern princes during the seventeenth and eighteen centuries. See: Alexandrovicz, Treaty and diplomatic relations between European and South Asian Powers in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries, Hague Recueil, vol. 100 (1960) pp. 117–214.Google Scholar
29. De republica, (1576) Lib. V, cap. ult.
30. Lib. II, cap. XVI, para XVI,2.
31. “Imo etiamsi status civitatis in regnum mutetur, manebit fedus, quia manet idem corpus, etsi mutato capite … imperium quod per regem exercetur non desinit imperium esse populi.” Lib. II, cap. XVI, para. XVI, 1.
32. para. V.
33. para. VI.
34. Especially in the chapters “De legibus”, Lib. I, tit. III, “De pactis”, Lib. II, tit. XIV and “De verborum significatione”, Lib. L, tit. XVI.
35. Consilia, V. 17.
36. “Illud vero non admittendam quod quibusdam placuit, contractus regum et populorum quantum fieri potest intetpretandos ex iure Romano.” para. XXXI.
37. para. XI. Elsewhere he considered this distinction neither just not accurate: “Sed harum distinctionum pleraeque veniunt ex iure Romano …; quaedam etiam non satis verae aut accuratae sunt.” Lib. II, cap. XI, para. VI.
38. para. XXXI.
39. para. XXII.
40. para. XXI.
41. para. XVI.
42. para. XXIX.
43. para. XXX.
44. “Ipsum qui promissit solum si spectamus, sponte id praestare obligator in quod obligari voluit.” para. I, 1.
45. In this context he is refering to Cicero: De officiis, I, 13.
46. In para. VIII, Similarly in chapter “De promissis” and “De contractibus”. Lib. II, cap. XI et XII.
47. “In conventionibus contrahentium voluntate potius quam verba spectari voluit.” Dig., Lib.L, tit. XVI, 219; “Locatio et conductio, quam naturalis sit et omnium gentium, non verbis sed consensu contrahitur, sicut emptio et venditio.” Lib. XIX, tit. II, 1.
48. “Sed quia interni actus per se spectabiles non sunt, et certi aliquid statuendum est, ne nulla sit obligatio si quidque sensum quem vellet sibi affingendo liberare se posset, ipsa dictante naturali ratione ius est ei, cui quid promissum est promissorem cogerc ad id, quod recta interpretatio suggerit.” para. I,1.
49. “Rectae interpretationis mensura est collectio mentis ex signis maxime probabilibus. Ea signa sunt duum generum, verba et coniecturae aliae,…” para I,2.
50. “Est autem duplex; nam aut voluntas colligitur ex naturali ratione, aut ex alio signo voluntatis.” para. XXVI,1.
51. Cours du droit international, French translation by Gidel (1929) p. 113.Google Scholar
52. “Ea signa sunt duum generum, verba et coniecturae aliae: quae aut seorsim considerantur aut coniuctim” para. I,2.
53. “Coniecturis assumptis opus est ubi verba aut verborum complexio … plures significationes recipiunt.” para. IV,1.
54. L'interprétation des traités. Hague Recueil, t. 24 (1928) p. 96.
55. Annuaire de l'Institut (1950) vol. I, p. 433.Google Scholar
56. Annuaire de l'Institut (1952) vol. I, p. 371.Google Scholar
57. ibid. p. 199.
58. Annuaire de l'Institut (1956) pp. 364–365.Google Scholar
59. International Legal Materials (1969) pp. 728 et ss.Google Scholar
60. Yearbook of the International law Commission (1966) vol. I p. 220Google Scholar. Mc Dougal delivered a violent criticism of the position adopted by the Commission. See: “The International Law Commission's Draft Articles upon interpretation: textuality redivivus.” American Journal of International Law, (1967) pp. 992 et ss.Google Scholar
61. “…verba intelligenda sunt ex proprietate, non grammatica, quae est ex origine, sed populari ex usu” para. II.
62. “Interdum vero ipsae coniecturae ita evidentes sunt, ut sponte se ingerant contra receptiorem verborum significatum” para. IV.2.
63. “In artum autem vocabulis, quae populus vix capit, adhibenda erit artis cuiusque prudentum definitio…” para III.
64. para. IX.
65. For judical terms or concepts see, e.g.,: International Commission of the Oder, PCIJ, Series A, no. 23, p. 27; European Commission of the Danube, PCIJ, Series B, no. 14, p. 38; Oscar Chinn case, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 63, pp. 84–95; Minority Schools in Albania, PCIJ, Series A/B, bo. 64, pp. 25–26; U.S. Nationals in Morocco, ICJ Reports, 1952, pp. 187–188; Barcelona Traction case, ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 34–35 and p. 42; Arbitral Award in the Lanoux case, RIAA vol. XII, p. 304 and 307. For geographical concepts see, e.g.,: Eastern Greenland, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 53, p. 49; Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 1951, p. 127; North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports, 1969, pp. 30–32; Arbitral Award in the Argentina-Chile frontier case, RIAA, vol. XVI, p. 177. For technical notions see: Water from the Meuse, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 70, pp. 21–22.
66. See, e.g.: The Greco-Bulgarian Communities, PCIJ, Series B, p. 21; U.S. Nationals in Morocco, ICJ Reports, 1952, pp. 191–192; Minquiers and Ecrehos case, ICJ Reports, 1953, pp. 62–63; Right of passage over Indian Territory, ICJ Reports, 1960, o. 38.
67. “Similiter coniecturis opus est quoties in pactis est species quaedam repugnantiae.” para. IV,1.
68. “Tunc enim coniecturae quaerenda sunt quae partes alias aliis concilient, si fieri potest. Nam si certa sit pugna, quod posterius intra contrahentes placuit prioribus derogabit.” ibid.,; “…ut quod postremo dictum est vincat.” para. XXIX, 2.
69. “Coniuncta origine sunt quae ex eadem voluntate proficiscuntur, etiamsi alio loco et occasione dicta, unde coniectura nascitur quia in dubio voluntas creditur sibi fuisse consentiens” para. VII; “Diximus alia quoque esse posse signa voluntatis quae ostendant casum eximendum. Inter ea signa nihil validius est quam alio loco posita, non ubi directe pugnant… sed cum velut insperato ex ipso rerum eventu inter se committuntur,…para. XXVIII.
70. The reference is to De inventione, Lib. II, 145.
71. “In hac discrepatione utra pars scripti cum ex casu sit collisio praevalere debeat… quod permittit cedat ei qui iubet.” para. XXIX,1.
72. “Ut quod faciendum est certo tempore ei praeferatur quod quovis tempore fieri potest; unde scquitur ut plerumque pactio vetans vincat iubentem, quia pactio vetans obligat ad quovis tempus, iubens non item.” ibid.
73. “Non possunt omnes articuli singulatim aut legibus aut senatusconsultis comprendi, sed cum aliqua causa sententia eorum manifesta est, iis qui iurisdictioni praeest, ad similia procedere, atque ius dicere debet.” Dig‥, Lib. I, tit. III, 12: “Incivile est nisi tota lege perspecta, una aliqua paiticula eius proposita iudicare vel respondere.” ibid., 24.
74. “Quoties lege aliquid, unum vel alterum introductum est, bona occasio est, cetera quae tendunt ad eadem utilitatem, vel interpretatione, vel certe iurisdictione suppleri.“Dig., Lib. I, tit. III, 13; “Non est novum ut priores leges ad posteriores trahuntur…” ibid., 26; “Sed ex posteriores leges ad priores pertinent, nisi contrariae sint, idque multis argumentis probatur.” ibid., 28.
75. Droit international public, vol. I (1970) p. 275.Google Scholar
76. It was Christian Wolff who introduced into international law doctrine the expression “interpretation in the contexte”. “Theologi dicunt, sensum erui ex contextu, si eorum quae obscurius dicta sunt, sensus inventigatur ex collatione cum antecedentibus et consequentibus aut ex locis parallelis, si quae in uno loco obscurius dicta videntur, explicantur per ea, quae alio loco conspicue de eadem materia dicunter.” Ius naturae, pars VI, explicatio ad para. 487.
77. E.g., see: Polish postal service in Danzig, PCIJ, Series B, no. 11, p. 39; Free Zones of Upper-Savoy (order), PCIJ, Series A, no. 22, p. 17; Free Zones of Upper-Savoy (judgment), PCIJ, Scries A/B, no. 46, p. 140; The Statute of the Memel Territory, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 49, p. 317; Employment of women during the night, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 50, p. 375. Peter Pázmány University, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 61, pp. 247–248; Diversion of water from the Meuse, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 70, p. 23; Corfu Channel case (merits), ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 25–26; Admission to the United Nations, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 8; Maritime Safety Committee, Reports, 1960, pp. 159–160.
78. Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966) vol. II, p. 221.Google Scholar
79. Problémes d'interprétation judiciaire en droit international public (1963) p. 38.
80. Savigny had already taken the view that the use of analogy goes beyond the scope of interpretation of the law but instead makes up for genuine lacunae in legislation: Traité de droit romain, French translation by Guenoux, vol. I (1840) p. 283. For Gény, op. cit., vol. I, p. 313.
81. See: Barcelona Traction case (“only to a limited extent”), ICJ Reports (1970) p. 42; Agreement between the WHO and Egypt (“general indication”), ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 94–95‥ For confirmation of conclusions already reached through other methods of interpretation: Wimbledon case, PCIJ, Series A, no. 1, p. 28; Employment of women during the night, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 50, p. 381. Refusal to give full effect to this method of interpretation: German interests in Polish Upper Silesia, PCIJ, Series A, no. 6, p. 19; The Statute of the Memel territory, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 49, pp. 322–323; Barcelona Traction case, ICJ Reports, 1970, pp. 33–34.
82. “… vim praecipuam habet ratio legis, quam cum mente multi confundunt, cum unum sit ex indiciis quibus mentem venamur. Est tamen inter coniecturas haec validissima, si certo constet aliqua ratione tamquam causa unica voluntatem fuisse motam …” para. VIII.
83. “… ex eo quod contentum in promissione … non considerantus nude, sed quatenus sub ea ratione venit.” para. XXIII.
84. “Ut ergo talis extensio recte fiat, opus est ut constet rationem sub quam venit casus quem volumus comprendere, esse causam unicam et efficacem quae promittentem moverit, eamque rationem ab ea consideratam in sua generalitate, quia alioqui promissio futura fuisset iniqua aut inutilis.” para. XX,2.
85. “Tum vero ut superet quod causas habet aut magis honestas aut magis utiles.” para. XXIX, 1.
86. “Sed ex ratione notandum est sub ea comprehendi saepe quosdam res non secundum existentiam, sed secundum potentiam moraliter consideratam, quae ubi locum habet, restrictio facienda non est.” para. XXV, 1.
87. para. IV,2.
88. para. V.
89. “…in eo quod materia de qua agitur semper intelligenda est observare animo loquentis, ctiamsi verba latius pateant.” para XXIV.
90. “Inter eas pactiones quae supradictis qualitatibus pares sunt, ut praeferentur quod … ad rem proprius accedit; nam solent specialia efficatiora esse generalibus;“ para. XXIX.1.
91. Interpretation of the convention of 1919 concerning employment of women during the night. Dissenting opinion by Judge Anzilotti. PCIJ Series A/B, no 50, p. 383.
92. Interprétation des traités d'après la Convention de Vienne. Hague Recueil, t. 151 (1976) p. 55.
93. American Journal of International Law (1935) Supplement no 4, p. 937.Google Scholar
94. para. IV, 2
95. “Ex effectu, in quo praecipuum est si vox ex usu receptiore sumpta effectum post se traheret ab latione alienum. In ambigua enim voce ea potius accipienda est interpretatio quae vitio caret.” para VI. This rule comes from the Digest: “In ambigua voce legis ea potius accipienda est significatio quae vitio caret, praesentim quum etiam voluntatis legis ex hoc colligi possit.” Lib. I, tit. III, 18; “Quoties in stipulatio ambigua oratio est, commodissimum id accipi quo res de qua agitur in tuto sit.” Lib. XLV, tit. I, 80.
96. “Est autem duplex; nam aut voluntas colligitur ex naturali ratione, aut ex alio signo voluntatis.” para. XXVI.1.
97. “Certissimum indicium est, si quo casu sequi verba illicitum esset, id est pugnans cum naturalibus ac divinis praeceptis” para. XXVI, 2.
98. “Quod vero contra rationem iuris receptum est, non est producendum ad consequentias.” Dig., Lib.I, tit. III, 14; “Pacta quae contra leges constitutionesque vel contra bonos mores fiunt, nullam vim habere indubitati iuris est.” Cod. Iust., Lib. II, tit. III,6.
99. “Non audet lex quod ratio negat naturalis.” In Digesta, 7, 5.
100. “Secundum erit indicium si verba sequi non quidem per se et omnino illicitum sit, sed aeque rem estimanti nimis grave atque intolerabile; sive absolute spectata conditione humanae naturae, sive comparando personam et rem de qua agitur, cum ipso fine actus.” para. XXVII,1.
101. “Semper in coniunctionibus non solum quod liceat considerandum est, sed et quid honestus est.” Lib. II, tit. XVII, 197.
102. “In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in iure aequitate spectanda sit.” Lib. L, tit. XVII, 90.
103. “Defectus voluntatis originarius intelligitur ex absurdo quod alioqui evidenter sequeretur, ex cessatione rationis quae plena et efficaciter movit voluntatem, et ex materae defectu.” para. XXII.
104. “Impossibilia nulla obligatio est.” Lib. L, tit. XVII, 185.
105. “… nemo credendus est velle absurda.” para. XXII.
106. “Benignius leges interpretandae sunt, quo voluntas eorum conservatur.” Dig., Lib. I, tit. III, 18; “Semper in dubiis benigniora praeferendae sunt.” Lib. L, tit. XVII, 56; “Quoties sermo duas scntentias exprimunt, ea potissimum excipiatur, quae gerenda aptior est.” ibid., 57; “In ambigua autem intentio ita accipienda est ut res salva actori sit.” ibid., 180.
107. “Ad significationes plane improprias non recurrendum, nisi alioqui absurdum aliquid, aut pacti inutilitas sequeretur. Ex contraria verba etiam strictius, quam fert proprietas, sumenda erunt, si id necessarium erit ad vitendam iniquitatem vel absurditatem.” para. XII, 2.
108. See, e.g.,: Competence of the International Labour Organization, PCIJ, Series B, no. 13, p. 19; Free zones of Upper-Savoy (order), PCIJ, Series A, no. 22, p. 13; Minority schools in Albania, PCIJ, Series A/B, no. 22, p. 13; Corfu Channel case (merits) ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 23–24; Interpretation of Peace Treaties, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 77; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., ICJ Reports, 1952, p. 105; Aerial Incident (Israel v. Bulgaria), ICJ Reports, 1959, p. 139; Maritime Safety Committee, ICJ Reports, 1960, pp. 160–161, 166 and 171. Awards of the Permanent Court of Arbitrage: North Atlantic Fisheries, RIAA, vol. XI, p. 198; Délimitation des possessions respectives dans I'ile de Timor, RIAA vol. XI, p. 508.
109. Cf. Nair, Lord Mac, The Law of treaties (1961) p. 385.Google Scholar
110. Yearbook of the International law Commission (1964) vol. II, p. 54.Google Scholar
111. Yearbook of the International law Commission (1966) vol. II, p. 219.Google Scholar
112. “… quorum (à savoir: principum) contractus omnes sunt bonae fidei. Est omnis principalis tractatio ex bono et aequo; omnis consuetudinum et institutorium gentium; ut recepta interpretum est sententia … Et foederis nomen ducitur quidam a fide. Et bonam in eo fidcm tenere locum summum debere…De jure belli (1588) Lib. III, cap. XIV.
113. “Non … decet … subtilitates futiles consectari. Principum statuta non sunt per astutam interpretationem subvertenda.” Op. cit., Lib. II, cap. IV.
114. However in the chapter entitled “De obligatione quae ex dominio oritur” he retained the Roman law concept of the possessor bonae fidei and malae fidei. Lib. II, cap. X. But this chapter, like much of Book II, is concerned with questions of civil law.
115. In the first paragraph of the chapter on interpretation he refers to Cicero for the thesis that the intention of the parties prevails over the terms used by them: “In fide quid senseris non quid dixeris cogitandum est.” (De officiis Lib. I, 13, 40). Promises made to an enemy (Lib. III, cap. XIX), as well as peace treaties (Lib. III, cap. XX), truces (Lib. III, cap. XXI) and armistices (Lib. III, cap. XXII) must be carried out in fide.
116. Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966) vol. II, p. 219.Google Scholar
117. Op. cit., p. 21.
118. La bonne foi en droit international public (1977) p. 202.Google Scholar
119. “L'interprétation objectiviste des traitès internationaux”. Annuaire Suisse de Droit international (1960) p. 80.Google Scholar
120. “Est et aliud interpretandi genus ex coniecturis extra significationem verborum, eorum scilicet quibus promissio continentur: idque duplex, vel extendens, vel coarctans. Sed quae extendit interpretationem difficilius procedit, facilius quae arctat. Nam sicut in rebus omnibus ut effectus non sequatur satis est unam deesse causarum, ut nascuntur omnes convenire oportet; ita et in obligatione coniectura extendens obligationem non temere admittenda est; multoque hic difficilius quam in casu … ubi verba largam aliquam significationem, etsi minus receptam admittunt. Nam hic extra verba promittentia coniecturam querimus, …, ut obligationem inducat nec ratio similis sufficit, sed oportet eadem sit; nec id semper satis est … ex ratione faciendam extensionem, quia… saepe ratio ita movet, ut voluntas tamen sit causa per se sufficiens, etiam sine ratione illa.” para. XX,1.
121. This distinction dates back to true work of the Glossator Alciatus. Responsa, V, 17.
122. “Simul notandum est earum quae promittuntur, alia esse favorabilia, alia odiosa, alia mixta aut media. Favorabilia sunt quae aequalitatem inter se habent, et quae communem spectant utilitatem … Odiosa sunt quae partem alteram tantum, aut plus altera onerant… Quod si mixtum sit aliquid … modo favorabile, modo odiosum censebitur, ita tamen ut, caeteris paribus, favor censatur potior.” para. X.
123. “Hic positis tenendae sunt regulae. In non odiosis sumenda verba secundum totam proprietatem usus popularis, et si plures sint, earn quae latisstma est…” para. XII, 1.
124. “In favorabilioribus … verba laxius sumenda, ut etiam includant significationem artis, aut quam lex dedit.” para. XII, 2.
125. “In odiosis vero etiam sermo figuratus aliquantulum admittitur, quo onus vitetur.” para. XII, 3.
126. Lib. III, cap. XX, para. XI,1.
127. ibid., para. XXI.
128. ibid., para. LV.
129. Lib. III, cap. XXI, para. IV, 2.
130. Dig., Lib.L, tit. XVII, 9.
131. Interpretation in favour of the integrity of sovereignty: e.g., see: Wimbledon case, PCIJ, series A, no. 1 p. 24; Lotus case, PCIJ, series A, no. 10, p. 18; Frontier between Turkey and Iraq, PCIJ, series B, no. 12, p. 25; International Commission of the Oder, PCIJ, series A, no. 23, p. 26; Free zones of Upper Savoy (second phase), PCIJ, series A, no. 24, p. 12; Acces to the port of Danzig, PCIJ, series A/B, no. 43, p. 142; Free zones of Upper Savoy (judgment), PCIJ, series A/B, no. 46, p. 107; Statute of the Memel territory, PCIJ series A/B, no. 49, pp. 313–314; Minority schools in Albania, PCIJ, series A/B, no. 64, p. 22; Status of South-West Afrika, ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 140; Asylum case. ICJ Reports, 1950, p. 286. Concerning the competence of international jurisdiction: Chorzow factory (jurisdiction), PCIJ, series A, no. 9. p. 22; Free zones of Upper Savoy (judgment), PCIJ, series A/B, no. 46, p. 138; Phosphates in Morocco, PCIJ, series A/B, no 74, p. 22; Electricity Company of Sofia, PCIJ, series A/B, no. 77, p. 81; Ambatielos case, ICJ Reports, 1952, p. 39; Monetary gold, ICJ Reports, 1954, pp. 32–33; Norvegian Loans, ICJ Reports, 1957, pp. 23–24; Temple of Preah Vihear (preliminary objections), ICJ Reports, 1961, p. 25.
One should note that Grotius touches implicity on this principle in connection with the resolution of disputes by means of arbitration. In his view, if there is doubt as to the scope of the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, in a case where the parties to the dispute each exercise supreme power in their respective countries, and are consequently not subject to the same judge “(summum potestatem obtinentes, qui cum iudicem communem non habeant)”, restrictive interpretation must be chosen. Lib. III, cap. XX, para XLVII,2.
132. The appearance in international law of rules having an imperative character is relatively recent. It is the direct consequence of the advance to the forefront of contemporary international law of the collaboration of states to achieve certain humanitarian goals, as well as peaceful and orderly co-extence on a worldwide scale. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressly recognized the existence of an international ius cogens.
In the words of this provision: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion it conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international communtity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same character”. There exists, however, widerspread uncertainty as to the content of the jud cogens. In the view of such an authority as Charles de Visscher, the norms which enjoy general consensus and which constitute general international law par excelence are customary norms.” Seules ces normes indérogeables, valables en dehors de tout lien conventionnel, représentent le jus cogens”. Positivisme et ius cogens. Revue générale de Droit international public, 1971, p. 9.Google Scholar
It is clear from the debates of the International Law Commission on the preparation of the article refered to of the Vienna Convention that some members of the Commission felt that there might be advantage in specifying, by way of illustration, some of the most obvious and best settled rules of jus cogens in order to indicate by these examples the general nature and scope of the rule contained in the article. Examples suggested included (a) a treaty contemplating an unlawful use of force contrary to the principles of the Charter, (b) a treaty contemplating the performance of any other act criminal under international law, and (c) a treaty contemplating or conniving at the commission of acts, such as trade in slaves, piracy or genocide, in the suppression of which every State is called upon to co-operate. Other members expressed the view that, if examples were given, it would be undesirable to appear to limit the scope of the article to cases involving acts which constitute crimes under international law: treaties violating human rights, the equality of States or the principle of self-determination were mentioned as other possible examples. The Commission decided against including any examples of rules of jus cogens in the article for two reasons. First, the mention of some cases of treaties void for conflict with a rule of jus cogens might, even with the most careful drafting, lead to misunderstanding as to the position concerning other cases not mentioned in the article. Secondly, if the Commission were to attempt to draw up, even on a selective basis, a list of the rules of.international law which are to be regarded as having the character of jus cogens, it might find itself engaged in a prolonged study of matters which fall outside the scope of the present articles. See: Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, p. 248.Google Scholar
133. “Solet et hoc disputari, an promissa in se habeant tacitam conditionem, si res maneant quo sunt loco; quod negandum est nisi apertissime pateat statum rerum praesentem in unica illa … ratione inclusum esse”. para XXV,2.
134. Op. cit., p. 225.
135. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, p. 221.Google Scholar
136. Dig., Lib. I, tit. III, 37.
