1. The elastic nature of the phrase ‘balance of power’ contributes to further confusions and disagreements. A. F. Pollard's lecture to the British Institute of International Affairs, and the discussion which followed provide a handy illustration of this. Pollard suggested that the number of uses of the phrase approaches many thousands. Martin Wight's discussion of nine meanings of the concept captures most of the variation in usage. Pollard, , ‘The Balance of Power’, Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, xi (1923), pp. 51–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 81–3; Wight, ‘The Balance of Power’, in H. Butterfield and M. Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations (London, 1966).

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12. Baldwin, op. cit., p. 166, emphasis in original.

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16. Aside from the usual (and essential) works of diplomatic and military history, there are studies such as those in Philip Towle's collection Estimating Foreign Military Strength (London, 1982) which explicitly compare assessments of various ‘balances of power’.

17. Ferris, op. cit., p. 58.

18. Ibid., p. 55.

19. Ibid., pp. 37, 39.

20. Ibid., p. 39.

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26. Ferris, The Power Capabilities of Nation-States, 1973, p. 58.

27. Ferris does not ignore geography in so far as he uses in his analyses a randomly generated list of contiguous pairs of states in which there was no conflict. Ibid., Appendix E.

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36. Ibid., p. 38.

37. Kugler, op. cit.

38. I could not use the GNP values which Organski and Kugler use. Kugler, op. cit., reports index numbers (1913 = 100.0) from the work of Angus Maddison, but I cannot find which absolute values were used to calculate percentage shares of GNP. Given Kugler's concern with the consequences of war for subsequent economic growth rates, such index numbers are sufficient. The references to Maddison's works which I found do not provide the necessary absolute values (Organski and Kugler, op. cit., p. 248). Therefore, I use the more recent estimates found in Maddison's Phases of Capitalist Development. The details of the adjustments for territorial changes can be found there (Appendix A) and in his 1977 article cited in note 33 above. These sources include Austria (which Organski and Kugler, op. cit., exclude) and exclude Russia/USSR (which they include).

39. Organski and Kugler, op. cit., pp. 30–4.

40. This variation cannot be seen in the oft-cited analysis of the perception of national power and GNP by Alcock, N. Z. and Newcombe, A. G., ‘Perception of National Power’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, xiv (1970), pp. 335–343CrossRefGoogle Scholar. That analysis is of a cross-section: perceptions of power by 38 Canadians and GNP at one time. Organski and Kugler, op. cit., p. 34, cite this analysis in support of the contention that GNP ‘reflects the realities of international polities’. Such brief reference does little justice t o Alcock's and Newcombe's carefully worded conclusion ‘that perceived national power is some function of GNP or military expenditure…’ (op. cit., p. 342). A footnote points out that ‘from a simple rank ordering it is impossible to say whether power is proportional to GNP, to GNP ½log GNP, or some intermediate function.’ The results for the Latin American states suggest a relationship more complicated than indicated by simple citation. Organski and Kugler also cite S. Rosen, ‘War Power and the Willingness to Suffer’, in B. M. Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1972), in support of the use of GNP as the measure of power capabilities. Rosen, in turn has cited Organski in support of the use of GNP, but does not use it himself. On the practical grounds that estimates of GNP are not available for most cases prior to 1920, Rosen uses governmental revenue as a measure of wealth/power. This index neglects the variations in government spending: some spent much more on the military than did others, and spent much more on the military at some times than others.

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51. Organski and Kugler, op. cit., p. 38.

52. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, Appendix A, 1982; Maddison, ‘Phases of Capitalist Development’, 1977.

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69. Maoz, op. cit., p. 115.

70. Sources of figure and tables: Figure 1: Maddison, ‘Phases of Capitalist Development’; Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, Appendix A; Correlates of War Project, University of Michigan. Table 1: Ferris, Power Capabilities of Nation-States; Ferris, ‘A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis…’. Tables 2,3 and 4: Maddison, ‘Phases of Capitalist Development’; Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, Appendix A; Correlates of War Project, University of Michigan, Tables 5 and 6: Correlates of War Project, University of Michigan.