Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-2pzkn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-18T18:38:16.720Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Special Safeguard Mechanism for Agricultural Imports: what experience with other GATT/WTO safeguards tells us about what might work

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

J. MICHAEL FINGER
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The success of existing GATT/WTO safeguard or flexibility provisions to sustain long-run liberalization stems from their procedural criteria (e.g., transparent and participatory decisions to impose new import restrictions) overcoming their suspect economic criteria (e.g., injury). The proposed SSM includes no procedural and minimal notification requirements. It would expand by arithmetic formulas the bounds within which a Member might unilaterally impose new import restrictions. Simulations indicate that the formulas provide a poor guide for policy – they would (a) allow an import restriction more often in situations when it is not beneficial than when it is, and (b) in situations in which an import restriction would help, they more often ban it than allow it. If procedural requirements are out – i.e., developing Members insist on a ‘usable’ safeguard – then the simple rule ‘bound rates may be exceeded for a maximum of [x] tariff lines at any one time’ is better economics than the proposed price and volume triggers. (No economic criteria are better than bad economic criteria.) Each Member would have the flexibility to change its lists of Special Products and Sensitive Products, there being a limit on the numbers of products on the lists at any one time.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 289 - 318
Copyright
Copyright © J. Michael Finger 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Will Martin suggested the topic of this paper; he and Alan Winters provided constructive comments on earlier drafts. The author acknowledges this help and thanks them for it.

References

Anjaria, Shailendra J. (1987), ‘Balance of Payments and Related Issues in the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations’, World Bank Economic Review, 1(4): 669–688.Google Scholar
Blonigen, Bruce A. and Park, Jee-Hyeong (2004), ‘Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence’, American Economic Review, 94(2): 134–154.Google Scholar
Blonigen, Bruce A. and Bown, Chad (2003), ‘Antidumping and Retaliation Threats’, Journal of International Economics, 60(2): 249–273.Google Scholar
Egger, Peter and Nelson, Douglas (2007), ‘How Bad is Antidumping?: Evidence from Panel Data’, Research Paper 2007/17, Leverhulme Center, University of Nottingham.Google Scholar
Eichengreen, Barry and Ven, Hans Van der (1985), ‘US Antidumping Policies: The Case of Steel’, NBER Working Paper No. W1098, February 1985.Google Scholar
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (2003), ‘Some Trade Policy Issues Relating to Trends in Agricultural Imports in the Context of Food Security’, CCP 03/10, Sixty fourth Session of the Committee on Commodity Problems, 18–21 March 2003.Google Scholar
Finger, J. Michael (2009), ‘A Special Safeguard Mechanism for Agricultural Imports and the Management of Reform’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finger, J. Michael and Nogués, Julio J. (2008), ‘Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4680, July.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finger, J. Michael and Nogués, Julio J. (2006), Safeguards and Antidumping in Latin American Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire, Washington, DC: The World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Finger, J. Michael (2002), Institutions and Trade Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finger, J. Michael and Harrison, Ann (1996), ‘The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade?’, in Krueger, Anne O. (ed.), The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, chapter 4, pp. 197–259.Google Scholar
Finger, J. Michael, Keith Hall, H., and R. Nelson, Douglas (1982), ‘The Political Economy of Administered Protection’, American Economic Review, 72(3): 452–466.Google Scholar
Finger, J. Michael, Ingco, Merlinda D., and Reincke, Ulrich (1996), The Uruguay Round: Statistics on Tariff Concessions Given and Received, Washington, DC: World Bank.Google Scholar
Gallaway, M., Blonigen, B., and Flynn, J. (1999), ‘Welfare Cost of the US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law’, Journal of International Economics, 49(2): 211–244.Google Scholar
G-33, African Group and ACPs (2008), ‘Statement of G-33, African Group, ACP and SVEs on Special Products and Special Safeguards Mechanism’, Geneva, July 27.Google Scholar
GATT (1958), Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, Geneva: GATT.Google Scholar
GATT (1994), Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Geneva: GATT.Google Scholar
GATT (1990), The International Trade Environment, GATT – Report by the Director General 1989–1990, Geneva: GATT.Google Scholar
GATT (1958), Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, Geneva: GATT.Google Scholar
Hudec, Robert E. (1987), Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, London: Gower for the Trade Policy Research Center.Google Scholar
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Ann Elliot, Kimberley (1994), ‘Measuring the Cost of Protection in the United States’, Institute for International Economics, Washingron, DC.Google Scholar
Jales, Mario (2005), ‘Tariff Reduction, Special Products and Special Safeguards: An Analysis of the Agricultural Tariff Structures of G-33 Countries’, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, July.Google Scholar
Little, Ian M. D. (1982), Economic Development: Theory, Policy and International Relations, New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Martin, Will and Mattoo, Aaditya (2008), ‘The Doha Development Agenda: What is on the Table?’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4672, July.Google Scholar
Montemayor, Raul Q. (2008), ‘How Will the May 2008 “Modalities” Text Affect Access to the Special Safeguard Mechanism, and the Effectiveness of Additional Safeguard Duties?’, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development Program on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 15, June.Google Scholar
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1992), Integration of Developing Countries into the International Trading System, Paris: OECD.Google Scholar
Porges, Amelia, Mavroidis, Petros C. and Weiss, Friedl (1994), Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, Geneva: GATT.Google Scholar
Sampson, Gary (1987), ‘Safeguards’, in Finger, J. Michael and Olechowski, Andrej (eds.), The Uruguay Round, A Handbook for the Multilateral Negotiations, Washington, DC: World Bank, chapter 19, pp. 134–152.Google Scholar
Stanwood, Edward (1903), American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century, 2 volumes, Boston: Garland, 1903.Google Scholar
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2002), ‘Special Agricultural Safeguard’, Background Paper by the Secretariat, Revision G/AG/NG/S/9/Rev.1, 19 February 2002.Google Scholar
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2008a), ‘Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture’, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 10 July 2008.Google Scholar
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2008b), ‘Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture’, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 6 December 2008.Google Scholar
Valdés, Alberto and Foster, William (2005), ‘The New SSM: A Floor Price Mechanism for Developing Countries’, International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, July.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zwain, Alix Peterson (2008), ‘Review of Bernard Hoekman and Marcelo Olarreaga (eds.), Global Trade an Poor Nations: The Poverty Impact and Policy Implications of Liberalization, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, New Haven: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2007’, Journal of Economic Literature, 46(3): 728–731.Google Scholar