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The Investor Model Underlying the EU’s Investor Protection Regime: Consumers or Investors?

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Abstract

This article considers the impact of the financial crisis reform agenda on EU investor protection regulation. It argues that retail market regulation is becoming associated with a consumer protection agenda and that a more interventionist approach to the retail markets is following. The influences which are shaping this ‘consumerisation’ of EU investor protection regulation, and the benefits and risks of the new approach, which are particularly apparent in the product intervention sphere, are considered.

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  111. As the MiFID II Impact Assessment acknowledges. The limited impact in practice of the MiFID II distribution reforms has been highlighted by EuroFinuse, Response to the MiFID Review Consultation (18 February 2011).

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  120. FCA, Approach to Regulation (2011).

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  122. Under which the AFM would monitor whether new products are cost-efficient, what well-grounded purpose they would serve, whether they would function as intended, and whether they were intelligible for the intended investor.

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  1. Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

    Niamh Moloney (Professor of Financial Markets Law)

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Moloney, N. The Investor Model Underlying the EU’s Investor Protection Regime: Consumers or Investors?. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 13, 169–193 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752912000134

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