Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, the State and OTC Derivatives Market Reform

  • Articles
  • Published:
European Business Organization Law Review Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

It has frequently been claimed that over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were, by and large, not directly regulated in the largest markets immediately prior to the global financial crisis (GFC). While there is an element of truth in this contention, it betrays the more complex interactions between public legislators and influential transnational private trade associations, most notably the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), both prior to the GFC and in the wake of it. ISDA, its members and national governments interact on the basis of legal and policy tradeoffs which are ostensibly related to OTC derivatives’ regulatory treatment but which, in reality, extend beyond this. The fact of these interactions between ISDA and nation states may raise less regulatory legitimacy challenges than some of the norms which are communicated. A prime example is the public transposition of ‘safe harbours’ which insulate OTC derivatives, including ‘purely speculative’ contracts, from the full force of gambling law. It is thus suggested that while the regulatory role and expertise of ISDA should be formally recognised and appropriately harnessed by public actors in the creation of a new public-private regulatory détente in the OTC derivatives markets, a review of the appropriateness of the current legal treatment of purely speculative derivatives should be a priority for any such regulatory regime.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. F. Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (New York, PublicAffairs 2009), at p. 293.

    Google Scholar 

  2. C. Scott, F. Cafaggi and L. Senden, ‘The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation’, 38 Journal of Law and Society (2011) p. 1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. E. Helleiner and S. Pagliari, ‘The End of Self-Regulation? Hedge Funds and Derivatives in Global Financial Governance’, in E. Helleiner, S. Pagliari and H. Zimmermann, eds., Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change (London, Routledge 2009); B.J.M. Quinn, ‘The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008’, 5 New York University Journal of Law & Business (2009) p. 549.

    Google Scholar 

  4. T. Büthe and W. Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (New Jersey, Princeton University Press 2011).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  5. See: <http://www2.isda.org>.

  6. A. Gelpern, ‘Commentary: Public Promises and Organizational Agendas’, 51 Arizona Law Review (2009) p. 57; G. Morgan, ‘Market Formation and Governance in International Financial Markets: The Case of OTC Derivatives’, 61 Human Relations (2008) p. 637.

    Google Scholar 

  7. For further discussion of boilerplate contracts, see M. Kahan and M. Klausner, ‘Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”)’, 4 Virginia Law Review (1997) p. 713.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. T.E. Lynch, ‘Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding’, 43 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal (2011) p. 1, at p. 14 (hereinafter Lynch (2011a)).

    Google Scholar 

  9. L.A. Stout, ‘Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis’, 1 Harvard Business Law Review (2011) p. 301, at p. 304 (hereinafter Stout (2011)).

    Google Scholar 

  10. See L.L. Jacques, Global Derivative Debacles: From Theory to Malpractice (Singapore, World Scientific 2010); D.M. Chance, Essays in Derivatives (Pennsylvania, New Hope 1998), at pp. 16–17.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  11. D. Bryan and M. Rafferty, Capitalism with Derivatives: A Political Economy of Financial Derivatives, Capital and Class (New York, Palgrave MacMillan 2006).

    Google Scholar 

  12. D. Bryan and M. Rafferty, ‘Financial Derivatives: The New Gold?’, 10 Competition and Change (2006) p. 265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. N.M. Feder, ‘Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives’, 3 Columbia Business Law Review (2002) p. 677, at pp. 681–716; J.L. Motes III, ‘A Primer on the Trade and Regulation of Derivative Instruments’, 49 SMU Law Review (1996) p. 579, at pp. 583–599.

    Google Scholar 

  14. E.F. Gerding, ‘Credit Derivatives, Leverage and Financial Regulation’s Missing Macroeconomic Dimension’, 8 Berkeley Business Law Journal (2011) p. 101, at pp. 113–115.

    Google Scholar 

  15. T.E. Lynch, ‘Gambling by Another Name? The Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives’, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 188 (2011), at p. 10 (hereinafter Lynch (2011b)), available at: <http://ssm.com/abstract=1788219>.

  16. See, e.g., S.M. Bartram, G.W. Brown and J. Conrad, ‘The Effects of Derivatives on Firm Risk and Value’, 46 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (2011) p. 967; Y. Jin and P. Jorion, ‘Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas Producers’, 2 The Journal of Finance (2006) p. 893; R.M. Stulz, ‘Should We Fear Derivatives?’, 18 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2004) p. 173, at p. 182; G. Allayannis and J.P. Weston, ‘The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm Market Value’, 14 Review of Financial Studies (2001) p. 243.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Lynch (2011b), supra n. 15, at pp. 11–13.

  18. D. Eppel, ‘Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises’, 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2002) p. 677, at pp. 683–684.

    Google Scholar 

  19. See, e.g., K. Arrow and G. Debreu, ‘Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy’, 22 Econometrica (1954) p. 265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  20. P. Huang, ‘A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered Derivatives’, 73 Southern California Law Review (2000) p. 471, at pp. 479–480.

    Google Scholar 

  21. V. Acharya, et al., ‘Derivatives — The Ultimate Financial Innovation’, in V. Acharya and M. Richardson, eds., Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System (New Jersey, Wiley 2009).

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. E.A. Posner and E.G. Weyl, ‘An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets’, University of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 589 (2012), at pp. 8–10, available at: <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010606>.

  23. Lynch (2011b), supra n. 15, at pp. 15–16.

  24. V. Fleischer, ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’, 89 Texas Law Review (2011) p. 227, at p. 229.

    Google Scholar 

  25. B. Clarke, ‘Where Was the Market for Corporate Control When We Needed It?’, in W. Sun, et al., eds., Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2011); see also F. Partnoy, ‘Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage’, 22 Journal of Corporation Law (1997) p. 211.

    Google Scholar 

  26. Such as Eurex and NYMEX, see: <http://www.eurexchange.com/index.html>; <http://www.cmegroup.com/company/nymex.html>.

  27. See, e.g., G. Poitras, ‘From Antwerp to Chicago: The History of Exchange-Traded Derivative Security Contracts’ (2009) (on file with authors); P.G. Mahoney, ‘The Exchange as Regulator’, 83 Virginia Law Review (1997) p. 1453; S.C. Pirrong, ‘The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation’, 38 Journal of Law and Economics (1995) p. 141.

  28. S.G. Ceccheti, J. Gyntelberg and M. Hollanders, ‘Central Counterparties for Over-the-Counter Derivatives’, Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review (September 2009) p. 45, at p. 47; see also F.R. Edwards, ‘The Clearing Association in Futures Markets: Guarantor and Regulator’, 3 Journal of Futures Markets (1983) p. 369.

  29. For a description of CCPs, see, e.g., C. Pirrong, ‘The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice’, ISDA Discussion Papers No. 1 (May 2011), available at: <http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/discussion-papers>.

  30. R. Romano, ‘A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation’, 55 Maryland Law Review (1996) p. 1, at pp. 16–21.

    Google Scholar 

  31. D. Duffie and H. Zhu, ‘Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?’, 1 Review of Asset Pricing Studies (2011) p. 1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  32. S.L. Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’, 97 Georgetown Law Journal (2008) p. 194, at p. 204.

    Google Scholar 

  33. See, e.g., Stulz, supra n. 16, at p. 182.

  34. ISDA, OTC Derivatives Data Sources, available at: <http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/data-sources>.

  35. H.T.C. Hu, ‘Too Complex to Depict?: Innovation, “Pure Information”, and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm’, 90 Texas Law Review (2012) p. 1061; R.P. Bartlett III, ‘Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivatives Disclosure During the Financial Crisis’, 36 Journal of Corporation Law (2010) p. 1; S.L. Schwarcz, ‘Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets’, 87 Washington University Law Review (2009) p. 211.

    Google Scholar 

  36. See, e.g., S. Listokin, ‘MetaRegulation of OTC Derivatives Post Reform’, George Mason University School of Public Policy Working Paper (2009), available at: <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1499964>; K. Raisler, ‘How ISDA Took on the Confirmations Backlog’, 25 International Financial Law Review (2006) p. 43.

  37. See, e.g., P. Conti-Brown, ‘A Proposed Fat-Tail Risk Metric: Disclosures, Derivatives and the Measuring of Financial Risk’, 87 Washington University Law Review (2010) p. 1461.

    Google Scholar 

  38. S. Carswell, Anglo Republic: Inside the Bank That Broke Ireland (Dublin, Penguin 2011), at pp. 108–115.

    Google Scholar 

  39. F. Partnoy, F.I.A.S.C.O: Blood in the Water on Wall Street (New York, W.W. Norton & Co 1997).

    Google Scholar 

  40. Promontory Financial Group and Watchtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz, Report to the Boards of Directors of Allied Irish Banks P.L.C. and Allfirst Bank Concerning Currency Trading Losses (March 2002) (on file with authors).

  41. R.J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 2nd edn. (New Jersey, Princeton University Press 2005).

    Google Scholar 

  42. Previously the G14. At time of writing, the G16 consists of Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Nomura Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, Sociéte Générale, Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) and Wells Fargo.

  43. A.P. Waldman, ‘OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or Dance into the Abyss?’, 43 American University Law Review (1994) p. 1023, at p. 1036 and fn. 84.

    Google Scholar 

  44. Ibid., at p. 1037.

  45. For geographical breakdowns on market size see, e.g., TheCityUK, Derivatives 2010, available at: <http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/derivatives-2010>.

  46. See Cunningham v. National Bank of Augusta, 71 Ga. 400, at 403–404, and State v. Stripling, 113 Ala. 120, at 124, cited in L.A. Stout, ‘Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives’, 48 Duke Law Journal (1999) p. 701. at p. 716, fnn. 51–53 (hereinafter Stout (1999)).

  47. Ibid., at pp. 713–720.

  48. L.A. Stout, ‘Why Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-regulating Them Can Prevent Another’, 1 Lombard Street (2009) p. 6.

    Google Scholar 

  49. L.A. Stout, ‘Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them’, Regulation (2009) p. 30, at pp. 31–32.

  50. Stout (1999), supra n. 46, at pp. 718–719.

  51. Gaming Act 1845 (c. 109) (UK); Gaming Act 1892 (c. 9) (UK).

  52. T.L. Hazen, ‘Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling? — Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets’, 86 Northwestern University Law Review (1992) p. 987, at p. 1014.

    Google Scholar 

  53. B. Sapien, ‘Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Bucket Shops to Credit Default Swaps’, 19 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal (2010) p. 411.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (as amended) (US).

  55. W.L. Stein, ‘The Exchange-Trading Requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act’, 41 Vanderbilt Law Review (1988) p. 473, at pp. 477–478.

    Google Scholar 

  56. R. Hodgson, ‘The Birth of the Swap’, Financial Analysts Journal (2009) p. 1.

  57. (c. 60) (UK).

  58. (c. 8) (UK).

  59. D. Awrey, ‘The FSA, Integrated Regulation and the Curious Case of OTC Derivatives’, 13 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law (2010) p. 1; J.W. Markham, ‘Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan’, 28 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2003) p. 319.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Awrey, supra n. 59, at p. 46.

  61. R. Romano, ‘The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation’, 14 Yale Journal on Regulation (1997) p. 279.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Though other federal agencies, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), have also had a role. There has been discussion about merging the CFTC and SEC at various junctures. See, e.g., J.W. Markham, ‘Merging the SEC and CFTC — A Clash of Cultures’, 78 University of Cincinnati Law Review (2009) p. 537.

  63. W.P. Albrecht, ‘Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives: The Need for a Comparative Institution Approach’, 21 Journal of Corporation Law (1995) p. 111, at pp. 123–126.

    Google Scholar 

  64. B. Becker and J. Yoon, ‘Derivative Financial Losses’, 21 Journal of Corporation Law (1995) p. 215.

    Google Scholar 

  65. W.E. Gibson, ‘Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures? The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions’, 24 Journal of Corporation Law (1999) p. 379.

    Google Scholar 

  66. CFTC, Over-the-Counter Derivatives Concept Release (7 May 1998), available at: <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm>.

  67. L. Summers, Testimony Before the US Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry on the CFTC Concept Release (30 July 1998), available at: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2616.aspx>; US Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt (7 May 1998), available at: <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2426.aspx>.

  68. Pub. Law No. 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (US).

  69. M. Greenberger, ‘Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight’, 6 Journal of Business and Technology Law (2011) p. 127, at pp. 142–143.

    Google Scholar 

  70. F.R. Edwards and E.R. Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?’, 22 Yale Journal on Regulation (2005) p. 91; see also J.C. Lipson, ‘The Shadow Bankruptcy System’, 89 Boston University Law Review (2009) p. 1609.

    Google Scholar 

  71. G.S. Shea, ‘Understanding Financial Derivatives During the South Sea Bubble: The Case of the South Sea Subscription Shares’, 59 Oxford Economic Papers (2007) i.73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  72. F.R. Edwards, ‘Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management’, 13 Journal of Economic Perspectives (1999) p. 189.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  73. See, e.g., D.C. Langevoort, ‘Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street’, 96 Cornell Law Review (2011) p. 1209; G.P. Miller and G. Rosenfeld, ‘Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008’, 33 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy (2010) p. 807; E.K. Gerding, ‘Code, Crash and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis’, 84 Washington Law Review (2009) p. 127; R.G. Rajan, ‘Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?’, NBER Working Paper 11728 (2005), available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11728.pdf?new_window=1>.

    Google Scholar 

  74. R.E. Mendales, ‘Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It’, 5 University of Illinois Law Review (2009) p. 1359.

    Google Scholar 

  75. Stout (2011), supra n. 9, at pp. 328–329.

  76. J. Crotty, ‘Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the New Financial Architecture’, 33 Cambridge Journal of Economics (2009) p. 563; R.M. Stulz, ‘Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis’, 24 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2010) p. 73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  77. See, e.g., V. Reinhart, ‘A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008’, 25 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2011) p. 71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  78. W.K. Sjostrum Jr, ‘The AIG Bailout’, 66 Washington and Lee Law Review (2009) p. 943.

    Google Scholar 

  79. G.B. Gorton, ‘Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007’, Yale School of Management and National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper (May 2009), available at: <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401882>.

  80. H. Song Shin, ‘Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run That Heralded the Global Financial Crisis’, 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2009) p. 101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  81. See, e.g., UK FSA, The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland (December 2011), available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/rbs.pdf>.

  82. See, e.g., A. Mody and D. Sandri, ‘The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and Sovereigns Came to Be Joined at the Hip’, International Monetary Fund Working Paper 11/269 (2011), available at: <http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11269.pdf>.

  83. See, e.g., N. Dunbar and E. Martinuzzi, ‘Goldman Secret Loan Shows Two Sinners as Client Unravels’, Bloomberg (6 March 2012), available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-06/goldman-secret-greece-loan-shows-two-sinners-as-client-unravels.html>; L. Story, et al., ‘Wall Street Helped to Mask Debt Fuelling Europe’s Crisis’, New York Times, 13 February 2010, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/business/global/14debt.html?pagewant ed=all.

  84. UK FSA, ‘FSA Agrees Settlement with Four Banks over Interest Rate Hedging Products’ (29 June 2012), available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/071.shtml>.

  85. J. Kim, ‘Can Risks Be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? Lessons from the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles’, 6 DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal (2007) p. 29; A. Tickle, ‘Creative Finance and the Local State: The Hammersmith and Fulham Swaps Affair’, 17 Political Geography (1998) p. 865.

    Google Scholar 

  86. US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, ‘Examining Bank Supervision and Risk Management in Light of JPMorgan’s Trading Loss’ (19 June 2012), available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=299359>.

  87. UK FSA, ‘Barclays Fined £59.5 Million for Significant Failings in Relation to LIBOR and EURIBOR’ (27 June 2012), available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/070.shtml>.

  88. For an excellent discussion of ISDA and other influential ‘transnational financial associations’ (TFAs), see, e.g., H. McKeen-Edwards and T. Porter, Transnational Financial Associations and the Governance of Global Finance: Assembling Power and Wealth (London and New York, Routledge, forthcoming).

  89. S.M. Flanagan, ‘The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’, 6 Harvard Negotiation Law Review (2001) p. 211, at pp. 240–243.

    Google Scholar 

  90. Partnoy, supra n. 1, at p. 45.

  91. On a similar theme in the context of collective action clauses (CACs), see A. Gelpern and M. Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study’, 84 Washington University Law Review (2006) p. 1627.

    Google Scholar 

  92. M.C. Suchman, ‘The Contract as Social Artefact’, 37 Law and Society Review (2003) p. 91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  93. R. Pickel, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry (Washington D.C., 14 October 2008), available at: <http://www.isda.org/press/pdf/Testimony-of-Robert-Pickel.pdf>.

  94. See: <http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/join-isda/primary-members>.

  95. See: <http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/join-isda/subscriber-members>.

  96. See: <http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/join-isda/associate-members>.

  97. R.E. Litan, The Derivatives Dealers’ Club and Derivatives Markets Reform: A Guide for Policy Makers, Citizens and Other Interested Parties, Initiative on Business and Public Policy (Brookings, 7 April 2010), available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0407_derivatives_litan/0407_derivatives_litan.pdf>.

  98. See: <http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/board-of-directors>.

  99. ISDA, By-Laws of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (as amended through January 2011), available at: <http://www.isda.org/membership/bylaws.pdf>.

  100. On producer influence in TPR, see D. Mügge, ‘Private-Public Puzzles: Inter-firm Competition and Transnational Private Regulation’, 11 New Political Economy (2006) p. 177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  101. ISDA, Members List (28 June 2012), available at: <http://www.isda.org/membership/institutionallist.pdf>.

  102. S. Choi and G.M. Gulati, ‘Contract as Statute’, 104 Michigan Law Review (2006) p. 1129, at pp. 1139–1140.

    Google Scholar 

  103. ISDA Master Agreement 2002 (on file with authors).

  104. Choi and Gulati, supra n. 102, at p. 1140.

  105. Collateral or ‘collateral security’ can be defined as ‘a separate obligation, as the negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note of a third person, or document of title, or other representative of value, endorsed where necessary, and delivered by a debtor to his creditor, to secure the payment of his own obligation, represented by an independent instrument. Such collateral security stands by the side of the principal promise as an additional or cumulative means for securing the payment of the debt … “Collateral”, in the commercial sense of the word, is a security given in addition to a principal obligation, and subsidiary thereto’, W. Colebrooke, A Treatise on the Law of Collateral Securities: As Applied to Negotiable, Quasi-negotiable, and Non-negotiable Choices in Action (Chicago, Callaghan 1883), cited in A. Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets (Chicago, Chicago University Press 2011), at pp. 1–2.

  106. ISDA, ISDA Margin Survey 2012 (1 May 2012), see: <http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys>.

  107. Riles, supra n. 105.

  108. New York and Japanese versions of this exist, while a Credit Support Deed prevails in a case where English law is elected. In the latter case, the Credit Support Deed is not actually added as an annex to the main agreement, instead it is incorporated into the confirmations. See C. Johnson, A Guide to Using and Negotiating OTC Derivatives Documentation, 2nd edn. (New York, Institutional Investor 2005).

    Google Scholar 

  109. See: <http://www.isda.org/companies/auctionhardwiring/auctionhardwiring.html>.

  110. See: <http://www.isda.org/smallbang>.

  111. For further discussion on this, see, e.g., A. Gelpern and M. Gulati, ‘CDS Zombies’, 13 European Business Organization Law Review (2012), p. 347.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  112. ISDA, User’s Guide to the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement (2003) (on file with authors).

  113. ISDA, Settlements Best Practice, available at: <http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/market-infrastructure/settlements>.

  114. See: <http://www.iifm.net>.

  115. ISDA and International Islamic Financial Markets, ‘IIFM and ISDA Launch Tahawuut (Hedging) Master Agreement’ (1 March 2010), available at: <http://www.isda.org/media/press/2010/press030110.html>.

  116. See: <http://www.futuresindustry.org>.

  117. Futures Industry Association and ISDA, ‘FIA and ISDA Publish Documentation for Cleared Swaps’ (16 June 2011), available at: <http://www.futuresindustry.org/fia-and-isda-publish-documentation-for-cleared-swaps.asp>.

  118. For an overview, see P. Paech, The Need for an International Instrument on the Enforceability of Close-Out Netting in General and in the Context of Bank Resolution, Preliminary Draft Report, UNIDRIOT Study Group on Principles and Rules on the Netting of Financial Instruments (March 2011), available at: <http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2011/study78c/s-78c-02-e.pdf>.

  119. F. Partnoy, ‘ISDA, NASD, CFMA and SDNY: The Four Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation?’, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services (2002), at p. 220 (on file with authors).

  120. R. Wai, ‘Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization’, 40 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2002) p. 209.

    Google Scholar 

  121. See: <http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/amicus-briefs>.

  122. This is discussed in further detail in J. Biggins, ‘Targeted Touchdown and Partial Liftoff: TPR Effectiveness and Efficiency Implications of the Enforcement Role of Public Courts in the OTC Derivatives Markets’, paper presented at the 5th CLPE Workshop on Transnational Private Regulatory Regimes, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 1–2 March 2012 (on file with authors).

  123. See: <http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/opinions>.

  124. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (Basel II) (June 2006), at pp. 35 and 45, available at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf>.

  125. J. Black, ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Processes: Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation’, Public Law (2003) p. 62.

  126. Such as repurchase agreements (repos).

  127. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group (March 2010), available at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (New York, 2005), available at: <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf>.

  128. D. Mengle, ‘The Importance of Close-Out-Netting’, ISDA Research Notes No 1 (2010), available at: <http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/Netting-ISDAResearchNotes-1-2010.pdf>.

  129. See, e.g., P. Jorion and G. Zhang, ‘Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk’, 64 Journal of Finance (2009) p. 253.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  130. See, e.g., D. Duffie, ‘The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks’, 24 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2010) p. 51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  131. A.E. Wilmarth, ‘Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem’, 35 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2010) p. 707; UK FSA, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (London, March 2009), at pp. 93–103, available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/tumer_review.pdf>.

    Google Scholar 

  132. See: <http://www2.isda.org/search?keyword=netting>.

  133. ISDA, Memorandum on the Implementation of Netting Legislation: A Guide for Legislators and Other Policy Makers (March 2006), available at: <http://www.isda.org/docproj/pdf/Memo-Model-Netting-Act.pdf>.

  134. See, ISDA, 2006 Model Netting Act — Version 2 (October 2007), available at: <http://www.isda.org/docproj/model_netting.html>.

  135. Directive 96/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 March 1996 amending Directive 89/647/EEC as regards recognition of contractual netting by the competent authorities, OJ 1996 L 085; see also, Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements, OJ 2002 L 168.

  136. Netting of Financial Contracts Act 1995 (No 25 of 1995) (Ireland).

  137. See: <http://www.isda.org/docproj/model_netting.html>.

  138. Our emphasis.

  139. Dáil Debates, Volume 455 — 07 July 1995 — Netting of Financial Contracts Bill, 1995: Second Stage (7 July 1995), available at <http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/0455/D.0455.199507070007.html> (hereinafter Dáil Debates).

  140. Ibid.

  141. It is not the case that no OTC derivative contract could ever fall foul of Irish gambling law following the enactment of the legislation. Rather, the legislation sought to shield the most common OTC derivative contracts from Irish gambling law, with a possibility for additional contract types to be included within the safe harbour over time. For further discussion of the scope of section 4(4) of the 1995 Act, see K. Blizzard, The Law of Financial Derivatives in Ireland (Dublin, Round Hall 2011), at p. 286.

    Google Scholar 

  142. Gaming and Lotteries Acts 1956–1986 (Ireland).

  143. Section 4(4) of the 1995 Act reads: ‘For the avoidance of doubt a financial contract shall not be and shall be deemed never to have been void or unenforceable by reason of the Gaming and Lotteries Acts, 1956 to 1986.’ The ISDA Model Netting Act reads: ‘A qualified financial contract shall not be and shall be deemed never to have been void or unenforceable by reason of [insert the applicable law] relating to games, gaming and lotteries.’

  144. No 16 of 1989 (Ireland).

  145. Section 98 of the 1989 Act reads: ‘For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no contract or option to which this Chapter relates shall be void or unenforceable by reason of the Gaming and Lotteries Acts, 1956 to 1986.’

  146. Dáil Debates, supra n. 139.

  147. Ibid.

  148. Ibid.

  149. Ibid.

  150. Partnoy, supra n. 1, at p. 293, noting that ‘[a]nyone who imagined that members of Congress, or their staffs, drafted laws regarding derivatives would have been surprised to peek inside the offices of the House Agriculture Committee during the time Congress was considering the CFMA. Instead of seeing members of Congress at work, you would have seen Mark Brickell, the lobbyist from ISDA, writing important pieces of the legislation’.

  151. A. Riles, ‘The Transnational Appeal of Formalism: The Case of Japan’s Netting Law’, Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum Research Paper 00-03 (2000), at pp. 29–30, available at: <http://ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=162588>.

  152. Ibid., at p. 30.

  153. S.L. Schwarcz, ‘Private Ordering’, 97 Northwestern University Law Review (2002) p. 319, at pp. 324–329.

    Google Scholar 

  154. F. Cafaggi, ‘Rethinking Private Regulation in the European Regulatory Space’, European University Institute Working Paper LAW No. 2006/13 (paper on file with authors).

  155. For discussion, see, e.g., R. Michaels, ‘The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State’, 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2007) p. 447.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  156. L. Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions’, 99 Michigan Law Review (2001) p. 1724, at p. 1745; K. Clay, ‘Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California’, 13 Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations (1997) p. 202; L. Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’, 21 Journal of Legal Studies (1992) p. 115; R.C. Ellickson, ‘Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbours in Shasta County’, 38 Stanford Law Review (1986) p. 624.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  157. D. Snyder, ‘Private Lawmaking’, 64 Ohio State Law Journal (2003) p. 371, at p. 403.

    Google Scholar 

  158. Ibid., at p. 405.

  159. C. Scott, ‘Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance’, 29 Journal of Law and Society (2002) p. 56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  160. C. Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design’, Public Law (2001) p. 329. See also S. Picciotto, ‘Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism’, 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (1996–1997) p. 1014.

  161. See, e.g., ISDA, ISDA Margin Survey 2012, supra n. 106, indicating that, of the 137,869 collateral agreements in place in the OTC derivatives markets at end-2011, approximately 85 per cent were ISDA Agreements.

  162. F. Partnoy, ‘Second Order Benefits from Standards’, 48 Boston College Law Review (2007) p. 169, at p. 187.

    Google Scholar 

  163. Scott, et al., supra n. 2, at p. 14.

  164. Schwarcz, supra n. 153, at p. 325.

  165. J. Freeman, ‘The Private Role in Public Governance’, 75 New York University Law Review (2000) p. 543, at p. 666.

    Google Scholar 

  166. Ibid., at p. 547.

  167. Ibid., at p. 548.

  168. Ibid., at p. 549.

  169. R. Wai, ‘The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law’, 71 Law and Contemporary Problems (2008) p. 107, at p. 116.

    Google Scholar 

  170. See, e.g., R. Michaels, ‘The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law and the Challenge of Global Legal Pluralism’, 51 Wayne Law Review (2005) p. 1209 [emphasis added in title].

    Google Scholar 

  171. D.J. Bederman, ‘Diversity and Permeability in Transnational Governance’, 57 Emory Law Journal (2007) p. 171, at pp. 174–175.

    Google Scholar 

  172. Michaels, supra n. 170, at pp. 1235–1237.

  173. For discussion on this, see, e.g., E. Kadens, ‘Order Within Law, Variety Within Custom: The Character of Medieval Merchant Law’, 5 Chicago Journal of International Law (2004) p. 39.

    Google Scholar 

  174. Michaels, supra n. 170, at p. 1233.

  175. Morgan, supra n. 6, at pp. 649–650.

  176. E. Benvenisti, ‘Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization’, 98 Michigan Law Review (1999) p. 167, at pp. 200–201.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  177. J. Black and D. Rouch, ‘The Development of the Global Market as Rule-Makers: Engagement and Legitimacy’, 2 Law and Financial Markets Review (2008) p. 218, at p. 224.

    Google Scholar 

  178. G20, Pittsburgh Summit Declaration (24–25 September 2009), available at: <http://www.g20.org/images/stories/docs/eng/pittsburgh.pdf>.

  179. See G. Morgan, ‘Reforming OTC Markets: The Politics and Economics of Technical Fixes’, 13 European Business Organization Law Review (2012) p. 391.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  180. BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group (March 2010), available at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf>; FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (October 2011), available at: <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf>.

  181. See, e.g., M.J. Roe, ‘The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator’, 63 Stanford Law Review (2011) p. 539; S.J. Lubben, ‘Repeal the Safe Harbours’, 18 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review (2010) p. 319; M. Simkovic, ‘Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008’, 83 American Bankruptcy Law Journal (2009) p. 253.

    Google Scholar 

  182. See, e.g., IOSCO, Report on Trading of OTC Derivatives (February 2011), available at: <https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD345.pdf>.

  183. Such as Singapore, Brazil and China.

  184. T. Rixen, ‘Offshore Financial Centres, Shadow Banking and Jurisdictional Competition: Why Reregulation After the Crisis Is So Feeble’, paper presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, 25–27 August 2011 (on file with authors).

  185. FSB, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Third Progress Report on Implementation (15 June 2012), see: <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120615.pdf>.

  186. European Parliament, Legislative Resolution of 29 March 2012 on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR), available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-106>.

  187. Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, OJ 2012 L 86/1.

  188. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EMIR) on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (20 October 2011), see: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0652:FIN:EN:PDF>.

  189. Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, OJ 2011 L 174/1.

  190. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (recast), OJ 2009 L 302/32.

  191. European Commission, Proposal for a Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax (28 September 2011), available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/com%282011%29594_en.pdf>.

  192. European Commission, Green Paper on Shadow Banking (19 March 2012), available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/intemal_market/bank/docs/shadow/green-paper_en.pdf>.

  193. European Commission, Crisis Management, see: <http://ec.europa.eu/intemal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm>.

  194. European Commission, Mandate of the High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector (22 February 2012), available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/mandate_en.pdf>.

  195. Pub. L. 111-203, H.R. 4173 (US).

  196. For a useful comparison see, e.g., CFTC and SEC, Joint Report on International Swap Regulation (31 January 2012), available at: <http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/dfstudy_isr_013112.pdf>.

  197. R.S. Bloink, ‘Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Rein in Credit Default Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis’, 89 Nebraska Law Review (2011) p. 587.

    Google Scholar 

  198. See US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Hearing on International Harmonization of Wall Street Reform: Orderly Liquidation, Derivatives and the Volcker Rule, 22 March 2012, available at: <http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse Action=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=28e89835-8053-4928-b948-582b1f0c310b>.

  199. Primarily the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), but also the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).

  200. OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, see: <http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html>.

  201. ISDA, Supporting G20 Objectives, see: <http://www2.isda.org/G20objectives>.

  202. ISDA, Dodd-Frank Documentation Initiative, available at: <http://www2.isda.org/dodd-frank-documentation-initiative>.

  203. International Swaps and Derivatives Association v. US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, No. 11-02146, US District Court, District of Columbia (Washington).

  204. US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Amendment to the Committee Print H.R. 1838 (15 February 2012), available at: <http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/BILLS-112-HR1838-H001047-Amdt-1.pdf>; US House Committee on Agriculture, ‘Ag Committee Advances Legislation to Bring Balance to Financial Regulatory Reform’ (25 January 2012), available at: <http://agriculture.house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1517>.

  205. See: <http://clerk.house.gov/floorsummary/floor.aspx?day=20120326&today=20120429>.

  206. J.P. Braithwaite, ‘The Inherent Limits of “Legal Devices”: Lessons for the Public Sector’s Central Counterparty Prescription for the OTC Derivatives Markets’, 12 European Business Organization Law Review (2011) p. 87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  207. European Supervisory Authorities, Joint Discussion Paper on Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Risk Mitigation Techniques for OTC Derivatives Not Cleared by a CCP under the Regulation on OTC Derivatives, CCPs and Trade Repositories (6 March 2012), available at: <http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/aboutus/News%20and%20Communications/JC-DP-2012-01-ver1-Draft-discussion-paper-on-RTS-on-Article-6-3-EMIR-.pdf>.

  208. Bank of England, ‘Thoughts on Determining Central Clearing Eligibility of OTC Derivatives’, Financial Stability Paper No. 14 (March 2012), available at: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/fs_paper14.pdf>; see also C.M. Baker, ‘Charting a Course in Clearing’, Bulletin of the Notre Dame Centre for the Study of Financial Regulation (18 April 2011), available at: <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1810835>.

  209. See, e.g., Lynch (2011b), supra n. 15, at pp. 3–4 and fn. 12, describing a purely speculative synthetic collateralised debt obligation (CDO) transaction in 2007 between IKB Deutsche Industriebank and hedge fund Paulson & Co, intermediated by Goldman Sachs, which itself did not perfectly hedge on the transaction either.

  210. Ibid., at p. 14.

  211. Stout (2011), supra n. 9, at p. 307.

  212. Stout (1999), supra n. 46, at pp. 741–762. Lynn Stout’s analysis draws upon a framework propounded by economist Jack Hirschleifer, see, e.g., J. Hirschleifer, ‘The Theory of Speculation Under Alternative Regimes of Markets’, 32 Journal of Finance (1977) p. 975; J. Hirschleifer, ‘Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk and Markets’, 89 Quarterly Journal of Economics (1975) p. 689.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  213. Lynch (2011b), supra n. 15, at pp. 16–17.

  214. Stout (1999), supra n. 46, at pp. 760–762.

  215. Ibid., at p. 748 and fn. 182, citing P. Milgrom and N. Stokey, ‘Information, Trade and Common Knowledge’, 26 Journal of Economic Theory (1982) p. 17; J.D. Geanakopolos and J.M. Polmarchakis, ‘We Can’t Disagree Forever’, 28 Journal of Economic Theory (1982) p. 192; E. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’, 25 Journal of Finance (1970) p. 383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  216. J. Bradford DeLong, et al., ‘Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets’, 98 Journal of Political Economy (1990) p. 703; F. Black, ‘Noise’, 41 Journal of Finance (1986) p. 529, at pp. 530–534.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  217. See, e.g., M. Coates and J. Herbert, ‘Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a London Trading Floor’, 105 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2008) p. 6167; C.L. Apicella, et al., ‘Testosterone and Financial Risk Preferences’, 29 Evolution and Human Behaviour (2008) p. 384; A.W. Lo, D.V. Repin and B.N. Steenbarger, ‘Fear and Greed in Financial Markets: A Clinical Study of Day-Traders’, 95 Cognitive Neuroscientific Foundations of Behavior (2005) p. 352; A.W. Lo and D.V. Repin, ‘The Psychophysiology of Real-Time Financial Risk Processing’, 14 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (2002) p. 323.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  218. D. Malhotra, G. Ku and J.K. Murnighan, ‘When Winning Is Everything’, 86 Harvard Business Review (2008) p. 78; R.H. Thaler and E.J. Johnson, ‘Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice’, 36 Management Science (1990) p. 643; S. Rosen, ‘The Economics of Superstars’, 71 American Economic Review (1981) p. 845.

    Google Scholar 

  219. Stout (1999), supra n. 46, at p. 772.

  220. H.P. Minsky, ‘The Financial Instability Hypothesis’, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 74 (1992), available at: <http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf>.

  221. See, e.g., Feder, supra n. 13, at p. 718.

  222. L.A. Stout, Testimony Before the United States Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Nutrition (4 June 2010), at p. 6 and fn. 5, available at: <http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2009/06/testimony3.pdf>.

  223. Stout (2011), supra n. 9, at p. 331.

  224. Lynch (2011b), supra n. 15, at pp. 49–50.

  225. See, e.g., C. Hurt, ‘Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox’, 86 Boston University Law Review (2006) p. 371, at pp. 381–384; N.N. Taleb, Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in the Markets and in Life (New York, Texere 2001); S. Borna and J. Lowry, ‘Gambling and Speculation’, 6 Journal of Business Ethics (1987) p. 219.

  226. D.E. Allen and E.G. McGoun, ‘Hedonic Investment’, 9 Financial Services Review (2000) p. 389, at p. 396.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  227. T.A. Gabaldon, ‘John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions’, 26 Journal of Corporation Law (2001) p. 225.

    Google Scholar 

  228. Lynch (2011b), supra n. 15, at p. 50.

  229. E. Tsingou, ‘Transnational Policy Communities and Financial Governance: The Role of Private Actors in Derivatives Regulation’, CGSR Working Paper No. 111/03 (January 2003), at p. 20, available at: <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2003/wp11103.pdf>.

  230. Hurt, supra n. 225, at pp. 404–405.

  231. T.L. Hazen, ‘It Is Time to Regulate Over-the-Counter Derivatives’, 13 North Carolina Banking Institute (2011) p. 123, at pp. 133–135.

    Google Scholar 

  232. S.T. Omarova, ‘License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products’, 90 Washington University Law Review (2012, forthcoming)

  233. R. Kreitner, ‘Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk’, 100 Columbia Law Review (2000) p. 1096; see also J.P. Raines and C.G. Leathers, ‘Financial Derivative Instruments and Social Ethics’, 13 Journal of Business Ethics (1994) p. 197.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  234. D. Awrey, ‘The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-Private Divide’, 11 European Business Organization Law Review (2010) p. 155, at p. 189; C.M. Baker, ‘Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives’, 85 Notre Dame Law Review (2010) p. 1287, at pp. 1371–1374; K.N. Johnson, ‘Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons’, 82 University of Colorado Law Review (2011) p. 167.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University College Dublin, Ireland

    Colin Scott (Professor of EU Regulation and Governance and Dean of Law)

Authors
  1. John Biggins BA (Hons), LLM
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Colin Scott
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Colin Scott.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Biggins, J., Scott, C. Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, the State and OTC Derivatives Market Reform. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 13, 309–346 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752912000262

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752912000262

Keywords

Search

Navigation