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Tye, M. The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee?. Philosophical Studies 88, 289–317 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004267709793
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004267709793