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A Dynamic Spatial Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Model and an Algorithm

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to develop a quantitative methodology for the study of dynamic oligopolistic competition among spatially separated firms serving spatially separated markets. The problem is modeled as a N-person nonzero-sum differential game in the open-loop and closed-loop strategy spaces. Optimality conditions are derived and provided with economic interpretations. Iterative algorithms and numerical results are presented for the open-loop and closed-loop models.

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Wie, BW., Tobin, R.L. A Dynamic Spatial Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Model and an Algorithm. Computational Economics 10, 15–45 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008699827999

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