Abstract
Several studies, using analyses that measure the correlation between prices in various markets, have argued that deregulation of natural gas pipeline contracts has reduced the transaction costs between natural gas markets. Correlations approaches, however, have potentially serious problems. Given these problems, this article estimates transactions costs directly. Deregulation is found to have lowered transactions costs to and from the Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas regions, but increased transactions costs from the Rocky Mountain area. Deregulation of pipeline contracts, by lowering the cost of using the market and therefore increasing demand for pipeline capacity, may therefore have differential impacts upon transactions costs between markets. This study implies that the transactions cost approach may be able to overcome several difficulties inherent in the correlations approach.
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Kleit, A.N. Did Open Access Integrate Natural Gas Markets? An Arbitrage Cost Approach. Journal of Regulatory Economics 14, 19–33 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008067504059
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008067504059