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Toward a Comparative Economics of Plea Bargaining

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Abstract

We attempt to open a path to the comparative analysis of criminal procedure by superimposing the efficiency principle onto an adversarial system characterized by an aversion to false convictions and an inquisitorial system characterized by a desire to justly punish the guilty. We begin with a general model of plea bargaining, embed it in a larger framework that addresses the costs of adjudication, the value of punishing the guilty and the costs of false convictions, and then link the desirability of plea bargaining and compulsory prosecution to the weights given these costs and benefits in the objective function. We examine the judicial endorsement of plea bargaining in the United States and the debate over European analogs to plea bargaining in light of the model, and conclude that plea bargaining will increase social welfare in adversarial systems but not in inquisitorial ones.

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Adelstein, R., Miceli, T.J. Toward a Comparative Economics of Plea Bargaining. European Journal of Law and Economics 11, 47–67 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008713729015

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