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Three Controls are Better than One: A Computational Model of Complex Control Systems

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Abstract

This paper investigates theories that integrate and extend currently accepted agency- and transaction-based approaches to organizational control. We use a computational model to build three forms of control systems (market, bureaucratic, clan) and three forms of control targets (input, behavior, output). Using these models, we examine relationships between control systems and both singular and multiple control targets. Results of this study support the emerging “broader” perspective on organizational control research and suggest that managers can improve organizational performance by focusing attention on multiple control targets. In addition, findings partially support posited relationships between control systems and singular control targets. The authors suggest that results of this study should direct scholars to refocus control research from examinations of singular forms of control to evaluations of more complex control systems.

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Long, C.P., Burton, R.M. & Cardinal, L.B. Three Controls are Better than One: A Computational Model of Complex Control Systems. Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 8, 197–220 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020767513183

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