Skip to main content
Log in

Rational Inefficiencies

  • Published:
Journal of Productivity Analysis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

    We’re sorry, something doesn't seem to be working properly.

    Please try refreshing the page. If that doesn't work, please contact support so we can address the problem.

Abstract

In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity analysis as well as decision making and incentive provisions in organizations.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Afriat, S. (1972).“Efficiency Estimation of Production Functions”International Economic Review 13, 568–598.

    Google Scholar 

  • Banker, R. D. and A. Maindiratta. (1988).“Nonparametric Analysis of Technical and Allocative Efficiencies in Production”Econometrica 56, 1315–1332.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bogetoft, P. (1994a). Non-Cooperative Planning Theory. Springer-Verlag, pp. 1–314.

  • Bogetoft, P. (1994b).“Incentive Efficient Production Frontiers: An Agency Perspective on DEA”Management Science 40, 959–968.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bogetoft, P. (1995).“Incentives and Productivity Measurements”International Journal of Production Economics 39, 67–81.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bogetoft, P. (1997).“DEA-Based Yardstick Competition: The Optimality of Best Practice Regulation”Annals of Operations Research 73, 277–298.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bogetoft, P. (2000).“DEA and Activity Planning under Asymmetric Information”Journal of Productivity Analysis 13, 7–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bogetoft, P. and P. Pruzan. (1991). Planning with Multiple Criteria: Investigation, Communication and Choice. North-Holland.

  • Chavas, J. P. and T. L. Cox. (1990).“A Nonparametric Analysis of Productivity: The Case of U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing”American Economic Review 80, 450–464.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chavas, J. P. and T. L. Cox. (1992).“On Generalized Revealed Preference Analysis”Quarterly Journal of Economics 74, 593–571.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chavas, J. P. and T. L. Cox. (1995).“On Non-Parametric Supply Response Analysis”American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, 80–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cyert, R. M. and J. G. March. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Prentice Hall.

  • Debreu, G. (1951).“The Coefficient of Resource Utilization”Econometrica 19, 273–292.

    Google Scholar 

  • DeAllessi, L. (1974).“An Economic Analysis of Government Ownership and Regulation: Theory and the Evidence from the Electric Power Industry”Public Choice 19, 1–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dirickx, Y. M. I. and L. P. Jennergren. (1979). Systems Analysis by Multilevel Methods. John Wiley & Sons.

  • Farrell, M. J. (1957).“The Measurement of Productive Efficiency”Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A III, 253–290.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fä re, R. (1988). Fundamentals of Production Theory. Springer-Verlag.

  • Fä re, R. and S. Grosskopf. (1995).“Non-Parametric Tests of Regularity, Farrell Efficiency, and Goodness of Fit”Journal of Econometrics 69, 415–425.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. and M. Roubens. (1994). Fuzzy Preference Modelling and Multicriteria Decision Support. Klü wer Academic Publishers.

  • Galbraith, J. R. (1974).“Organizational Design: An Information Processing View”Interfaces 4, 28–36.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grosskopf, S. and K. Hayes. (1993).“Local Public Sector Bureaucrats and Their Input Choices”Journal of Urban Economics 33, 151–166.

    Google Scholar 

  • Halme, M., T. Joro, P. Korhonen, S. Salo and J. Wallenius. (1999).“A Value Efficiency Approach to Incorporating Preference Information in Data Envelopment Analysis”Management Science 45, 103–115.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanoch, G. and M. Rothschild. (1972).“Testing Assumptions of Production Theory: A Nonparametric Approach”Journal of Political Economy 80, 256–275.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haskel, J. and A. Sanchis. (1995).“Privatisation and X-inefficiency: A Bargaining Approach”Journal of Industrial Economics 43, 301–321.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haskel, J. and A. Sanchis. (2000).“A Bargaining Model of Farrell Inefficiency”International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 539–556.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johansen, L. (1977). Lectures on Macroeconomic Planning, Part I: General Aspects. North-Holland.

  • Johansen, L. (1978). Lectures on Macroeconomic Planning, Part II: Centralization, Decentralization, Planning under Uncertainty. North-Holland.

  • Koopmans, T. C. (1951).“Analysis of Production as an Efficient Combination of Activities”In T. C. Koopmans (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindsay, C. (1976).“A Theory of Government Enterprise”Journal of Political Economy 84, 1061–1077.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibenstien, H. (1966).“Allocative efficiency vs. 'X-efficiency'”The American Economic Review 56, 392– 415.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibenstein, H. (1978).“X-inefficiency Xists: Reply to an Xorcist”The American Economic Review 68, 203–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibenstein, H. and S. Maital. (1994).“The Organizational Foundation of X-inefficiency: A Game Theoretic Interpretation of Argyris' Model of Organizational Learning”Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 23, 251–268.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miguè J.L and G. Bèlanger. (1974).“Towards a General Theory of Managerial Discretion”Public Choice 17, 27–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Aldine Press.

  • Parish, R. and Y.-K. Ng. (1972).“Monopoly, X-efficiency and the Measurement of Welfare Loss”Economica 39, 301–308.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters, H. J. M. (1992). Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory.Kluwer Academic Publishers.

  • Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.

  • Samuelson, P. (1947). Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Havard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stabler, U. and J. Sydow. (2002).“Organizational Adaptive Capacity: A Structuration Perspective”Journal of Management Enquiry, 11(4), 408–424.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, G. (1976).“The Xistence of X-efficiency”The American Economic Review 66, 213–216.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shephard, R. W. (1970). Cost and Production Functions.Princeton University Press.

  • Tullock, G. (1967).“The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft”Western Economic Journal 5, 224–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian, H. R. (1984).“The Non-Parametric Approach to Production Analysis”Econometrica 52, 279– 297.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian, H. R. (1985).“Non-Parametric Tests of Optimizing Behavior with Measurement Error”Journal of Econometrics 30, 445–458.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian, H. R. (1988).“Revealed Preference with a Subset of Goods”Journal of Economic Theory 46, 179– 185.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian, H. R. (1990).“Goodness-of-Fit in Optimizing Models”Journal of Econometrics 46, 125–140.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiss, A. (1990). Efficiency Wages: Models of Unemployment, Layoffs and Wage Dispersion. Princeton University Press.

  • Williamson, O. (1964). The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm. Prentice Hall.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bogetoft, P., Hougaard, J.L. Rational Inefficiencies. Journal of Productivity Analysis 20, 243–271 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1027347616038

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1027347616038

Navigation