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Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons

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Abstract

This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, George Mason University, 3401 North Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA, 22201, USA

    Francesco Parisi

  2. University of Wuerzburg, Sanderring 2, Lehrstuhl VWL III, D-97070, Wuerzburg, Germany

    Norbert Schulz

  3. Yale University—Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT, 06520-8215, United States

    Ben Depoorter

Authors
  1. Francesco Parisi
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  2. Norbert Schulz
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  3. Ben Depoorter
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Parisi, F., Schulz, N. & Depoorter, B. Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons. European Journal of Law and Economics 17, 175–190 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EJLE.0000014575.00312.15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EJLE.0000014575.00312.15

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