Abstract
A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of “phenomenal opacity” and “phenomenal transparency” are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-representational content, and that their relevance in understanding reflexive, i.e., cognitive subjectivity may have been overlooked in the past.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ahleid, A. 1968. Considerazioni sull'esperienza nichilistica e sulla syndrome die Cotard nelle psicosi organiche e sintomatiche. Il Lavoro neuropsichiatrico 43: 927–945.
Anderson, E. W. 1964. Psychiatry. London: Baillière, Tindall and Cox Ltd.
Anton, G. 1898. Ueber die Herderkrankungen des Gehirns, welche vom Patienten selbst nicht wahrgenommen werden. Wiener klinische Wochenschrift 11 (March 10): 227–229.
Anton, G. 1899. Ñber die Selbstwahrnehmungen der Herderkrankungen des Gehirns durch den Kranken bei Rindenblindheit und Rindentaubheit. Archiv für Psychiatrie und Nervenkrankheiten 32: 86–127.
Baars, B. J. 1988. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baker, L. 1998. The first-person perspective: A test for naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 3: 327–346.
Benson, D. F. and Greenberg, J. P. 1969. Visual form agnosia. Archives of Neurology 20: 82–89.
Berrios, G.A. and Luque, R. 1995. Cotard's syndrome. Analysis of 100 cases. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavia 91: 185–189.
Breen, N., Caine, D., Coltheart, M., Hendy, J., and Roberts, C. 2000. Towards an understanding of delusions of misidentification: Four case studies. In: M. Coltheart and M. Davies (eds), Pathologies of Belief. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bressloff, P. C., Cowan, J. D., Golubitsky, M., Thomas, P. J., and Wiener, M. C. 2001. Geometric visual hallucinations, Euclidean symmetry and the functional architecture of striate cortex. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 356: 299–330.
Campbell, J. 1999. Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor process. The Monist 82: 609–625.
Castañeda, H.N. 1966. “He”: A study on the logic of self-consciousness. Ratio 8: 130–157.
Chalmers, D. J. 1997. Availability: The cognitive basis of experience? In: N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chalmers, D. J. 2000. What is a neural correlate of consciousness? In: T. Metzinger (ed), Neural Correlates of Consciousness - Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Churchland, P. M. 1998. Conceptual similarity across sensory and neural diversity: The Fodor/Lepore challenge answered. Journal of Philosophy 65: 5–32.
Churchland, P. M. (unpublished manuscript). Neurosemantics: On the Mapping of Minds and the Portrayal of Worlds.
Clark, A. 1997. Being There - Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cleeremans, A. (ed) 2003. The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coltheart, M. and Davies, M. (eds) 2000. Pathologies of Belief. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Cotard, J. 1880. Du délire hypocondriaque dans une form grave de la mélancolie anxieuse. Annales Médico-Psychologiques 38: 168–170.
Cotard, J. 1882. Du délire des négations. Archives de Neurologie 4: 152–170/282–295.
Damasio, A. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harcourt Brace & Company.
Dretske, F. 1969. Seeing and Knowing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Enoch, M. D. and Trethowan, W. H. 1991. Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Förstl, H. Almeida, O. P., Owen, A., Burns, A., and Howard, R. 1991. Psychiatric, neurological and medical aspects of misidentifications syndromes: a review of 260 cases. Psychological Medicine 21: 905–910.
Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy 68: 5–20.
Gazzaniga, M. (ed) 1995. The Cognitive Neurosciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gerrans, P. 1999. Delusional misidentification as subpersonal disintegration. The Monist 82: 590–608.
Gerrans, P. 2000. Refining the explanation of Cotard's delusion. In: M. Coltheart and M. Davies (eds), Pathologies of Belief. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Güzeldere, G. 1995. Is consciousness the perception of what passes on one's own mind? In: T. Metzinger (ed), Conscious Experience. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic & Paderborn: mentis.
Halligan, P. W. and Marshall, J. C. (eds). 1996. Method in Madness: Case studies in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Harman, G. 1990. The intrinsic quality of experience. In: J. Tomberlin (ed), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing. Reprinted in and quoted after N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
LaBerge, S. and Gackenbach, J. 2000. Lucid dreaming. In: E. Cardeña, S. J. Lynne and S. Krippner (eds), Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining the Scientific Evidence. Washington, D.C. American Psychological Association.
Leopold, D. A. and Logothetis, N. K. 1999. Multistable phenomena: Changing views in perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3: 254–264.
Metzinger, T. 1999. Subjekt und Selbstmodell. Paderborn: mentis.
Metzinger, T. 2000. The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective. In: T. Metzinger (ed), Neural Correlates of Consciousness - Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. 2003. Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. 2004, forthcoming. The incoherent strawman. Invited commentary for Alva Noë and Evan Thompson: Are there neural correlates of consciousness?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 11.
Metzinger, T. and Walde, B. 2000. Commentary on Jakab's “Ineffability of Qualia.” Consciousness and Cognition 9: 352–362. doi:10.1006/ccog.2000.0463
Metzinger, T. and Gallese, V. (2003). The emergence of a shared action ontology: building blocks for a theory. In: G. Knoblich, B. Elsner, G. von Aschersleben, and T. Metzinger (eds), Grounding Selves in Action. Special issue of Consciousness and Cognition. (in press).
Moore, G. E. 1903. The refutation of idealism. Mind 12: 433–453.
Newen, A. 1997. The logic of indexical thoughts and the metaphysics of the “self”. In: W. Künne, A. Newen, and M. Anduschus (eds), Direct Reference, Indexicality and Propositional Attitudes. Stanford: CSLI.
O'Brien, G. and Opie, J. 2001. Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representation. In: H. Clapin, P. Staines, and P. Slezak (eds), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Greenwood Publishers.
Perry, J. 1979. The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs 13: 3–22.
Pöppel, E. 1988. Mindworks: Time and Conscious Experience. New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Posner, M. I. 1995. Attention in cognitive neuroscience: An overview. In: M. Gazzaniga (ed), The Cognitive Neurosciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Raffman, D. 1995. On the persistence of phenomenology. In: T. Metzinger (ed), Conscious Experience. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic & Paderborn: mentis.
Séglas, J. 1897. Le Délire des Négations: Séméiologie et Diagnostic. Paris: Masson, Gauthier-Villars.
Shoemaker, S. 1968. Self-reference and self-awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65: 555–578.
Shoemaker, S. 1990. Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement): 109–131. Reprinted in S. Shoemaker 1996. The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Siegel, R. K. and West, L. J. (eds) 1975. Hallucinations. Behavior, Experience, and Theory. New York: Wiley.
Tye, M. 1991. The Imagery Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tye, M. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness - A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Tye, M. 1998. Inverted Earth, Swampman, and representationism. In: J. Tomberlin (ed), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology. Malden, MA/Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Van Gulick, R. 1988. A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. The Philosophical Review 47 (2): 149–181.
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. London: Macmillan.
Wittgenstein, L. 1953; 1982. Philosophische Untersuchungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Wittgenstein, L. 1958. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. The English Text of the Third Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Yates, J. 1985. The content of awareness is a model of the world. Psychological Review 92: 249–284.
Young, A. W. and Leafhead, K. M. 1996. Betwixt of life and death: Case studies of the Cotard delusion. In: P. W. Halligan and J. C. Marshall (eds), Method in Madness: Case Studies in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Young, A. W. 1999. Delusions. The Monist 82: 571–590.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Metzinger, T. Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2, 353–393 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007366.42918.eb
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007366.42918.eb