Abstract
The bias paradox emerges out of a tension between objectivism and relativism.If one rejects a certain the conception objectivity as absolute impartiality and value-neutrality (i.e., if all views are biased), how, then, can one hold that some epistemic perspectives are better than others? This is a problem that has been most explicitly dealt with in feminist epistemology, but it is not unique to feminist perspectives. In this paper, I wish to clearly lay out the nature of the paradox and the various attempts to avoid it. I also intend to show why it is a problem for any epistemological view that rejects absolute objectivity. Finally, I wish to briefly outline a possible solution to the paradox, a solution that requires recognizing that rationality necessarily requires both objective and subjective elements.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Antony, Louise: 1993, 'Quine as Feminist', in Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (eds), A Mind of One's Own, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 185‐225.
Audi, Robert: 2001, The Architecture of Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bernstein, Richard J.: 1988, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.
Bordo, Susan R.: 1987, The Flight to Objectivity, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York.
Campbell, Richmond: 1998, Illusions of Paradox: A Feminist Epistemology Naturalized, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland.
Code, Lorraine: 1993, 'Taking Subjectivity into Account', in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds), Feminist Epistemologies, Routledge, New York, pp.15–48.
Descartes, Rene: 1960, Discourse on Method, Laurence J. Lafleur (trans), Macmillan Publishing Co., New York.
Descartes, Rene: 1979, Meditations on First Philosophy, Donald A. Cress (trans), Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis.
Fricker, Miranda: 1994, 'Knowledge as Construct: Theorizing The Role of Gender in Knowledge', in Kathleen Lennon and Margaret Whitford (eds), Knowing the Difference, Routledge, New York.
Hacking, Ian: 1982, 'Language, Truth and Reason', in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 48‐66.
Hacking, Ian: 1983, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hallberg, Margareta: 1989, 'Feminist Epistemology ‐ An Impossible Project?', Radical Philosophy 53, 3‐7.
Haraway, Donna: 1988, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies 14, 575‐599.
Harding, Sandra: 1992, 'After the Neutrality Ideal: Science, Politics, and “Strong Objectivity”', Social Research 59, 567‐587.
Harding, Sandra: 1993. 'Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: “What Is Strong Objectivity”?', in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds), Feminist Epistemologies, Routledge, New York, pp.49‐82.
Harding, Sandra: 1998, Is Science Multicultural?, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana.
Heikes, Deborah K.: 2001, 'Can Kant's Dialectical Subject Solve the Bias Paradox?', Contemporary Philosophy XXIII, 16‐23.
Henshilwood, Christopher S., et al.: 2001, 'An Early Bone Tool Industry from the Middle Stone Age at Blombos Cave, South Africa', Journal of Human Evolution 41, 631‐678.
Keller, Evelyn Fox: 1985, Reflections on Gender and Science, Yale University Press, New Haven.
Kornblith, Hilary: 1985, 'Introduction: What is Naturalistic Epistemology?', in Hilary Kornblith (ed), Naturalizing Epistemology, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 1‐13.
Longino, Helen: 1993, 'Essential Tensions ‐ Phase Two: Feminist, Philosophical, and Social Studies of Science', in Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (eds), A Mind of One's Own, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 185‐225.
Longino, Helen: 1989, 'Feminist Critiques of Rationality: Critiques of Science or Philosophy of Science?', Women's Studies International Forum 12, 261‐269.
Moser, Paul: 1993, Philosophy After Objectivity: Making Sense in Perspective, Oxford University Press, New York.
Moser, Paul, and J. D. Trout: 1995, 'What is Feminist Epistemology?', Informal Logic 17, 101‐111.
Mosser, Kurt: 1997, 'Kant's Dialectical Subject and the Bias Paradox', Contemporary Philosophy XIX, 15‐21.
Nelson, Lynn: 1990, Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
Nelson, Lynn: 1993, 'Epistemological Communities', in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds), Feminist Epistemologies, Routledge, New York, pp. 121‐53.
Putnam, Hilary: 1981, Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rouse, Joseph: 1987, Knowledge and Power, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Rouse, Joseph: 1996a, Engaging Science, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
Rouse, Joseph: 1996b, 'Feminism and the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge', in Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack Nelson (eds), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Russell, Denise: 1989, 'Feminism and Relativism', Methodology and Science, 149‐158.
Seller, Anne: 1988, 'Realism versus Relativism: Towards a Politically Adequate Epistemology', in Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (eds), Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, pp. 169‐186.
Wagner, Steven J.: 1993, 'Why Realism Can't Be Naturalized', in Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner (eds), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, pp. 211‐254.
Wedgwood, Ralph: 1999, 'The A Priori Rules of Rationality', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX, 113‐131.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Heikes, D.K. The Bias Paradox: Why it's Not Just for Feminists Anymore. Synthese 138, 315–335 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000016424.47883.b9
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000016424.47883.b9