Abstract
Recent research has shown that, in several countries, the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) estimates of party positions do not seem to perform well in terms of face validity and reliability. A fairly typical example of such a deviant case is that of Greece, where for the most part the findings based on this approach seem to suggest that parties’ positions are characterized by extreme discontinuity and leapfrogging. Employing a different coding methodology whose departure point is that party competition is still a matter of direct confrontation between parties, this analysis attempts to measure the positions of Greek parties on three issue dimensions: level of state intervention in the economy, support towards the political integration of the European Union and common European cultural identity. According to its findings, the traditional left–right distinction is still evident in parties’ economic stances whereas the other two issue dimensions indicate that there is an emerging new politics dimension which distinguishes between the centripetal political forces on the one hand and the extreme right and left parties on the other. Importantly, this relatively new coding procedure seems to provide estimates that outperform those stemming from the CMP data both in terms of reliability and face validity.
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Notes
To the extent that the fact that zeros and empty cells are not distinguished in the model seems problematic for the analysis, we engage in sensitivity testing so as to account for possible differences in the results. We use the following formula: S χτ =∑χ=11010−γ χ τ /10 where S is the total score of party τ, χ is the score of the party in each indicator and γ is the number of missing values, that is, the number of indicators where the party appears to hold no position. In this way, a party that has references for all indicators and comes up with a mean score of +4 could be coded as 4, whereas a party which only mentions only four of the issues included in the scale and still has a total score of +4 would be coded as 1.6. Equivalently, were a party to score +1 in all issues, it would be coded as 10. Following this strategy, zeros are explicitly distinguished from missing values by the value of γ. Although the magnitude of the differences between the parties changes when this formula is employed, the final picture remains mainly unaltered, because there is no particular party with many more empty cells than average. Apart from reasons of simplicity, we choose not to report these findings in the main text because we believe that the extent to which this procedure manages to deal with the difference between neutral points and missing values more effectively is still questionable. This is because we still ignore the possibility that silence might indicate neutrality. What we did, however, in order to reduce zeros stemming from no references and to increase the validity of the results, was to code, in addition to party manifestos, a series of other documents that we believe they express the parties’ positions. These included the parties’ manifestos for the parliamentary election of 2004, which took place 2 months earlier, as well as several ‘quasi manifestos’, usually pamphlets, which were published in hard copy a few weeks before the election. The use of parliamentary manifestos for coding party positions vis-à-vis the EU is justified by findings that suggest that national parties’ manifestos are increasingly focusing on EU policy and institutions (Binnema, 2003) as well as with the view of EP elections as ‘second-order’ elections fought over national issues (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In this sense, both types of manifestos (national and European) can be treated as roughly equal in giving us the parties’ policy positions regarding EU-related policy issues.
Given that the coding procedure has only been applied to five parties, it is almost impossible to come up with reliable estimates about the measurement properties of each dimension. To address, at least partially, this issue, we also add cases from the party federations of the European Parliament. Because the coding of European parties’ manifestos is/was the starting point of this ongoing project, we add these cases so as to come up with more meaningful results. It is logical to believe that a dimension aiming to measure the positions of parties in a comparative perspective will not be severely affected by contextual case-specific factors. Having said that, it may very well be the case that some of the items provide measures of the latent dimension with less error in some cases (contexts) rather than others. If this is the case, the fact that the items were initially selected in order to measure parties stances in the three dimensions across Europe rather than in a particular country might bias the results in a favourable direction for the case of Greece. However, without data from other countries this assumption cannot be tested. In general, contextual heterogeneity can be addressed only once there are enough observations to shed light on significant between-country differences. This limitation notwithstanding, the analysis presented here is still valuable in its own right because it constitutes the first attempt to systematically examine the measurement features of this coding scheme. Of course, the results are only indicative and only a future replication of this analysis with more countries or time points can provide further insight into this issue.
These two factors seem to explain all the observable deviations from monotonicity. In effect, with such a small N, the detection of monotone relationships requires only minimal noise. Under this perspective, it is probably encouraging the fact that most of the graphs show that the corresponding items adhere to this rule. Interestingly, with many more cases, a similar analysis of the CMP data for Greece yields much more problematic findings regarding the assumption of homogeneity (Dinas and Gemenis, 2009). This is important because the most common ideological scale constructed with these data is based upon the same summation logic.
These figures, which were calculated with the algorithm for unstandardized variables, are slightly lower than when the standardized formula is used.
As in the case with loess curves, in order to enable the estimation we added six more observations that represent the positions of six of the European parties (or federations) in each item of the three scales.
To see why this is the case consider the following example: given that α=kr/1+r̄(k−1), if we assume that we have a 25-item scale measuring a single dimension, with r̄=0.1, α=0.74.Thus, without being sure about the unidimensionality of the selected items, the summated rating scales might lead to false perceptions about the sources of variation in the chosen variables.
Importantly, the item-specific coefficients, which measure in a more formal way the assumption of monotone homogeneity, point to the same direction as our more informal visual analysis: problematic items (with h-score less than 0.3) are the X10, the Z3 and the Z5.
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Appendices
Appendix A
A ‘Confrontational’ Coding Scheme for Estimating Political Parties’ Policy Positions for the 2004 EP Election
Dimension X: Economic reform
- X1::
-
Privatization/liberalization of the energy market (gas or electricity)
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X2::
-
Privatization/liberalization of public transport
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X3::
-
Deregulation/liberalization of health care
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X4::
-
Aviation: open skies, that is, access of airlines to slots of airports
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X5::
-
Liberalization (flexibility and individuality) of pension (retirement) schemes
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X6::
-
Reduction of the tax burden
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X7::
-
Privatization/liberalization of social security
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X8::
-
Deregulation/liberalization of the labour market (flexibility, wages and so on)
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X9::
-
Deregulation/liberalization of the financial market
contra (−)/pro (+)
- X10::
-
Deregulation of agricultural policy and market orientation
contra (−)/pro (+)
Dimension Y: Political integration
- Y1::
-
EU as a political union
contra/confederal (−)/pro/federal (+)
- Y2::
-
European Constitution
contra (−)/pro (+)
- Y3::
-
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
contra (−)/pro (+)
- Y4::
-
Common Justice and Police Policy
contra (−)/pro (+)
- Y5::
-
EU as an independent (federal) tax authority
contra (−)/pro (+)
- Y6::
-
Veto power of member states
veto decision (−)/majoritarian rule (+)
- Y 7 ::
-
Guarantee the independent status of the European Central Bank
contra (−)/pro (+)
- Y8::
-
Stick to the provision of the Stability (and Growth) Pact
contra (−)/pro (+)
- Y9::
-
European Army
contra (−)/pro (+)
- Y10::
-
One currency (Euro) for all member states
contra (−)/pro (+)
Dimension Z: Cultural identity
- Z1::
-
Enlargement of EU with Turkey
against (−)/pro (+)
- Z2::
-
View on nationalism as an ideology/nationalistic movements
pro (−)/warning against nationalism (+)
- Z3::
-
Media (TV and newspapers): protection of local/regional media
pro (−)/contra (+)
- Z4::
-
European culture: diversity vs unity of Europe
diversity (−)/unity (+)
- Z5::
-
Right of citizens in all other EU countries (European citizenship)
contra (−)/pro (+)
- Z6::
-
History: national history vs common European history
national history (−)/common European history (+)
- Z7::
-
Enlargement of EU (other than Turkey)
against (−)/pro (+)
- Z8::
-
Common values (such as democracy, equality freedom) in Europe
disagree (−)/agree (+)
- Z9::
-
Immigration
National policy (−)/EU policy (+)
- Z10::
-
Christian Judaic Humanist tradition
as national characteristic (−)/as European characteristic (+)
Appendix B
Assessing the Reliability of the Constructed scales with Loess Curves
See Figure A1.
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Gemenis, K., Dinas, E. Confrontation still? Examining parties’ policy positions in Greece. Comp Eur Polit 8, 179–201 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2008.28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2008.28