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Taxing the multinational enterprise: On the forced redesign of global value chains and other inefficiencies

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Abstract

The taxation of the multinational enterprise (MNE) has been a continuing concern for policymakers. We argue that the changing nature of the mobile MNE (e.g., its improved ability to fine-slice the value chain and disperse it geographically) makes it increasingly important to rethink current tax policies. First, there should be more focus on the inefficiencies that arise when taxation leads to the inefficient location of MNE activities. Thus, MNEs may shift activities to low-tax jurisdictions that offer lucrative pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives, but do not enable their investments to maximize their contribution to global value creation. Second, international tax regimes should ensure that MNEs pay for their consumption of local public goods, and public finance scholars have long known that the taxation-based distortions are minimized when the tax objects are immobile. However, the bulk of current tax policies are aimed at corporate profits that are both poor proxies for the consumption of local public goods as well as extremely mobile. Integrating theory from international business, public finance and economic geography, our analysis demonstrates that moving the incidence of taxation from corporate profits to dividends and consumption would unambiguously improve both wealth creation and efficiency.

Résumé

La fiscalité de l’entreprise multinationale (EMN) a été une préoccupation constante pour les décideurs politiques. Nous soutenons que la nature changeante de la multinationale mobile (par exemple, sa capacité améliorée à découper la chaîne de valeur et à la disperser géographiquement) rend de plus en plus important de repenser les politiques fiscales actuelles. Premièrement, il faudrait mettre davantage l’accent sur les inefficacités qui se produisent lorsque la fiscalité conduit à une localisation inefficace des activités des multinationales. Ainsi, les EMN peuvent déplacer leurs activités vers des juridictions à faible taux d’imposition qui offrent des incitations pécuniaires et non pécuniaires lucratives, mais qui ne permettent pas à leurs investissements de maximiser leur contribution à la création de valeur globale. Deuxièmement, les régimes fiscaux internationaux devraient garantir que les EMN paient pour leur consommation de biens publics locaux, et les spécialistes des finances publiques savent depuis longtemps que les distorsions fondées sur la fiscalité sont minimisées lorsque les objets fiscaux sont immobiles. Cependant, la majeure partie des politiques fiscales actuelles visent les bénéfices des entreprises qui sont à la fois de mauvais indicateurs pour la consommation de biens publics locaux et extrêmement mobiles. Intégrant la théorie de l’international business, des finances publiques et de la géographie économique, notre analyse démontre que faire passer l’imposition des bénéfices des sociétés aux dividendes et à la consommation améliorerait sans ambiguïté à la fois la création de richesse et l’efficience.

Resumen

La imposición de impuestos a la empresa multinacional (EMN) ha sido una preocupación constante para los formuladores de políticas. Sostenemos que la naturaleza cambiante de la EMN ambulante (por ejemplo, su capacidad mejorada de cortar finamente la cadena de valor y dispersarla geográficamente) hace que sea cada vez más importante repensar las políticas de impuestos actuales. En primer lugar, debería centrarse más en las ineficiencias que surgen cuando los impuestos conducen a la ubicación ineficiente de las actividades de las EMN. Por lo tanto, las empresas multinacionales pueden cambiar las actividades a jurisdicciones de bajos impuestos que ofrecen incentivos lucrativos fiscales y no fiscales, pero no permiten que sus inversiones maximicen su contribución a la creación de valor global. En segundo lugar, los regímenes fiscales internacionales deberían garantizar que las EMN paguen por el consumo de bienes públicos locales, y los expertos en finanzas públicas saben desde hace tiempo que las distorsiones basadas en los impuestos se minimizan cuando los objetos impositivos son inmóviles. Sin embargo, la mayor parte de las políticas impositivas de impuestos actuales están dirigidas a las ganancias corporativas que son a la vez pobres proxies para el consumo de bienes públicos locales y extremadamente móviles. Integrando la teoría de los negocios internacionales, las finanzas públicas y la geografía económica, nuestro análisis demuestra que al mover la incidencia de los impuestos de las ganancias corporativas a los dividendos y el consumo mejoraría inequívocamente tanto la creación de riqueza como la eficiencia.

Resumo

A tributação da empresa multinacional (MNE) tem sido uma preocupação constante para os formuladores de políticas. Argumentamos que a natureza mutante da MNE móvel (por exemplo, sua capacidade aprimorada de segmentar a cadeia de valor e dispersá-la geograficamente) torna cada vez mais importante repensar as atuais políticas tributárias. Primeiro, deve haver mais foco nas ineficiências que surgem quando a tributação leva à localização ineficiente das atividades da MNE. Assim, MNEs podem transferir atividades para jurisdições com baixa tributação que oferecem lucrativos incentivos pecuniários e não pecuniários, mas não permitem que seus investimentos maximizem sua contribuição para a global criação de valor. Segundo, regimes tributários internacionais devem garantir que MNEs paguem pelo consumo de bens públicos locais, e os acadêmicos em finanças públicas sabem há muito tempo que as distorções baseadas em tributação são minimizadas quando os objetos fiscais são imóveis. No entanto, a maior parte das políticas fiscais atuais são voltadas para lucros corporativos que são ao mesmo tempo proxies ruins para o consumo de bens públicos locais, bem como extremamente móveis. Integrando a teoria dos negócios internacionais, finanças públicas e geografia econômica, nossa análise demonstra que mover a incidência da tributação dos lucros corporativos para dividendos e consumo melhoraria inequivocamente a geração de riqueza e a eficiência.

摘要

跨国企业(MNE)的税收一直是决策者持续关注的问题。我们认为, 移动跨国企业变化的本性(例如, 对价值链进行细分并使其在地理上分散的能力的提高)使重新考虑当前的税收政策变得越来越重要。首先, 应该更加关注当税收导致跨国企业活动位置效率低下时出现的低效率问题。因此, 跨国企业可能会将活动转移到提供丰厚的金钱和非金钱激励措施的低税率管辖区, 但不能使其投资最大限度地为全球价值创造做出贡献。其次, 国际税收制度应确保跨国企业支付其当地公共产品的消费, 而公共财政学者们早就知道, 当税收对象不移动时税收扭曲的程度是最小化的。然而, 大部分现行税收政策都用来针对公司利润,这些利润既不是当地公共产品消费的好代表, 也非常具有流动性。整合国际商业、 公共财政和经济地理的理论, 我们的分析表明, 将税收发生率从公司利润转移到股息和消费将明显地改进财富的创造和效率。

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Correspondence to Ram Mudambi.

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Accepted by Alan Verbeke, Editor-in-Chief, 15 April 2018. This paper has been with the authors for three revisions.

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Foss, N.J., Mudambi, R. & Murtinu, S. Taxing the multinational enterprise: On the forced redesign of global value chains and other inefficiencies. J Int Bus Stud 50, 1644–1655 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-018-0159-3

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