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2017 | Buch

Europe as a Stronger Global Actor

Challenges and Strategic Responses

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Über dieses Buch

This book considers the principal challenges facing the European Union, which has been buffeted by a series of profound crises, both internal and external. These range from the future of Ukraine, the Union’s reactions to China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, how to help stabilize countries to its south, and relations with the United States. The core argument is that the EU lacks a meta-narrative that could indicate priorities and linkages between the various continental, regional, national and thematic strategies. As a result, the EU often appears to be a confusing and even contradictory actor to many international partners. In response to these challenges the EU needs to develop a deeper sense of strategic awareness and confidence so that it may give a more convincing response to fundamental questions about the Union’s role, purpose and identity in a changing world.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
Europe as a Stronger Global Actor was the name given to one of Jean-Claude Juncker’s early initiaitves as the incoming President of the European Commission. The title was bestowed upon one of the several project teams, with the emphasis upon coherence across the EU’s external actions with the objective of strengthening the Union as a global actor. The phrase was also coined at a time of enormous global change, as well as change within the EU itself, which made it not only a statement of ambition but also a reflection of some fundamental questions about how and whether the Union can be a stronger global actor.
Simon Duke
Chapter 2. The EU’s Strategic Unconsciousness and Normative Hubris
Abstract
The period from the end of the Cold War to the onset of the financial crisis and the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 can be thought of as one of strategic unconsciousness. This was also a period in which the EU was guided by the belief in its normative power and post-modern attractiveness. The popular assumptions underlying The End of History only encouraged the assumption the liberal democracy had triumphed and that for the EU it was sufficient to rely upon itself as exemplar to drive its external actions. The Union’s flagship external policy towards its neighbourhood to the east and to the south was an expression of triumphalism, not strategy. The combination of strategic unconsciousness and normative hubris not only contributed to an existential crisis in the Union’s external actions, but also raised broader questions about the role and purpose of integration.
Simon Duke
Chapter 3. Existential Doubts and Strategic Dilemmas
Abstract
The EU was jolted awake from its period of strategic consciousness as the result of a combination of internal challenges (such as the sovereign debt crisis and later the challenges emerging from irregular migration) as well as external changes in the international system. In spite of the Union’s dawning consciousness, precious years were lost in introversion stemming from the financial crisis as well as the implementation of institutional and structural changes within the EU stemming from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The continuing lack of any convincing overarching strategy to guide the EU in the world, or meta-narrative, led to reliance upon process-led diplomacy and an audit culture. Efforts were made to link together the various tools and instruments of the Union’s external actions in the form of a comprehensive approach, but at risk that this would became a qua strategy in its own right.
Simon Duke
Chapter 4. In Search of Strategy
Abstract
The EU has been generally content to view itself, and to let others view it, as a normative power. But, it has always had difficulty defining its interests. In response to this the EU and its members have normally contented themselves with the explanation that values are synonymous with interests and vice versa. This is, however, insufficient, especially in an international system where illiberal powers offer alternative ways of engaging states and organizations. The insistence on the EU’s normative character also exposed the creeping moral relativism in the Union’s external actions. A second, often uncontested, element of the EU’s external engagement lies in effective multilateralism and the rule of law. However, this too showed evidence of relativism in terms of the over-representation of the EU’s members in many international organizations and hazy conceptions of how international law should guide external actions in an increasingly contested and illiberal international system.
Simon Duke
Chapter 5. The Return of Geopolitics and Relations to the East
Abstract
Geopolitics is often associated with realism and for this reason not readily associated with the EU. The notion is, however, often associated with ideas of exclusion. This chapter argues that geopolitical perspectives are relevant to the EU if Richard Youngs’ notion of the ‘geopolitics of inclusion’ and Luis Simons’ idea of ‘middle spaces’ are embraced. This chapter argues that the EU and its members have become default geopolitical actors since they are perceived to be such, most notably by President Putin. The development of the EU’s Eastern Partnership from 2004 onwards coincided with a period of strategic unconsciousness, when there was a general failure to think through the impact of the Union’s economic, political and even security engagement with Russia’s ‘near abroad’. This was a major contributory factor to the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea and the parlous state of the Donbass region. Engagement with Russia will be difficult, but also necessary. This will require a keener awareness of the EU’s interests in the neighbourhood and how these relate to Russia.
Simon Duke
Chapter 6. Geopolitics in the Post–Arab Spring
Abstract
The Arab Spring quickly turned into winters of discontent. Although the events that led up to and followed the Arab Spring cannot be laid directly at the EU’s doorstep, they nevertheless exposed the underpinning dualism behind the EU’s policies towards the region. Prior to the Arab Spring, the EU and its members had engaged in trade with the southern Mediterranean with relatively little comment on the autocratic nature of the regimes, in return for retaining order in the countries and stemming potential migratory flows. Not only did this informal compact unravel in 2011, it also marked a fundamental challenge to the EU in a region where it was supposed to be able to exert considerable attraction. The rise of Islamic State and other forms of Salafist jihadism pose fundamental challenges to stability in the region and beyond. The EU’s ability to help provide stability to the region in association with the Member States and other international partners will require a keener sense of the EU’s strategic interests and stakes. It will also be a litmus test for the Union’s pretentions to be a major actor shaping the international system.
Simon Duke
Chapter 7. Transatlantic Relations and Europe’s Missing Asia Pivot
Abstract
The largest geopolitical revolution of the current age is the end of almost two centuries of Western dominance and the rise of Asia. Although there are multiple opportunities for EU engagement with China and the USA at different levels, there are also clear risks, since engaging with one will send out clear signals to the other. A level of autonomy is clearly desirable so that the EU is not seen as an American proxy in the more sensitive areas of engagement with Asia, especially on security questions. It is also equally important to coax China towards normative agendas that promote multilateral approaches and the rule of law. This will imply pro-active engagement with China in the Silk Roads projects in particular. Both will be delicate balancing acts and ones that will require a good deal of strategic insight and diplomatic finesse.
Simon Duke
Chapter 8. Europe’s Harder Edges: Security and Defence
Abstract
Serious reflection upon the Union’s global strategy must include a strong security dimension. This would not only underline what has long been evident, that the EU is no longer just a civilian power; it must also explicitly endorse the assumption of ‘hard’ security roles. The EU is simply unable to defend its wider interests solely by the use of soft-power tools. Moreover, the EU will not escape the effects of conflict in the future. The EU suffers from a profound rhetoric–resources dichotomy with, on the one hand, apparent support for the development of CSDP and, on the other, unwillingness on the part of most EU members to adequately finance and resource collective security efforts. This not only makes the EU a potentially unreliable partner to the USA and NATO, but also poses broader questions about the necessary will on the part of the Member States to help develop the EU into a full-fledged actor.
Simon Duke
Chapter 9. Putting Effectiveness into Multilateralism
Abstract
Multilateralism is something of a mantra for the EU’s external actions; in fact it has been called a defining principle. The ambitions of the EU to uphold this principle are being challenged on multiple levels. The Member States often have strong incentives to protect their representation in international organizations that reflects the post–Second World War status quo and not that of the twenty-first century. It is also under pressure from the emergence of informal meeting venues that more suitably reflect the role and status of the emerging powers. Multilateralism deserves to remain at the core of the EU’s external actions, since the ability to apply and enforce multilateral rules on a broad array of global issues is vital for international order, security and prosperity. But this must be done in a manner that reflects the shifts in power and influence in the international system. This will be inherently more challenging in a complex multipolar international system, but it is one in which the EU should continue to seek support from like-minded partners, as well as press for more rights to be accorded to individuals, rather than to nation states.
Simon Duke
Chapter 10. Strategy, Implementation and Means
Abstract
Strategy risks being, literally, academic unless it is related to means. An overambitious strategic agenda that pays little heed to whether or not it can be implemented will lead to further frustration. Three components are essential for the implementation of any overarching strategy for the EU’s external actions—coherence, effectiveness and visibility. There are reasons for cautious optimism in the case of all three following the introduction of new positions and structures in the Lisbon Treaty. The introductions of the High Representative/Vice-President and the European External Action Service are worthy of particular note. Coherence, effectiveness and visibility are all important to the implementation of strategy, but a strategy that is overly cautious and framed around current constraints risks being uninspiring. One that takes little notice of means risks being unrealistic. It will be difficult to find a middle ground.
Simon Duke
Chapter 11. Reconceptualizing the World and the Liberal Delusion
Abstract
The stakes have seldom been so high. The (in) ability to shape strategy and to inculcate a strategic culture at the European level will say much about the EU’s role, purpose and identity on the global stage for the forthcoming years. Successive external strategies will say at least as much about the internal state of the Union as it does about the world around it. The EU’s own inter-institutional examination of the world in 2030 suggested, ‘The EU will need to gather all of its strength and resilience to preserve its values, its prosperity and security, and perhaps its very survival in its present form’. The High Representative has even referred to the use of strategy as a tool to ‘forge a new social contract with European citizens’ through foreign policy. This, in essence, is the challenge for the EU’s external strategy, now and into the near future. It is one that must be met with not a strategy, but the adoption of a habit of regular strategic review based upon sound analytical capacities and the necessary political will. Muddling through is no longer an option, or as the Commission’s 2016 work plan put it in its subtitle, this is ‘No time for business as usual’.
Simon Duke
Erratum to: Europe as a Stronger Global Actor
Simon Duke
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Europe as a Stronger Global Actor
verfasst von
Prof. Simon Duke
Copyright-Jahr
2017
Electronic ISBN
978-1-349-94945-8
Print ISBN
978-1-349-94944-1
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94945-8