Abstract
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle called it βεβαιοτάτη πασὣυᾀpxή , “The firmest of all principles”1 - firmissimum omnium principiorum, the medieval theologians said. They referred to the principle that was to be known as the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). They called it firmissimum, for in the Western philosophical tradition the LNC was regarded as the most fundamental principle of knowledge and science. According to Thomas Reid the Law, in the form: “No proposition is both true and false”, was also a cornerstone of common sense, together with other basic truths that shape our experience (“Every complete sentence must have a verb”, for instance, or “Those things really happened which I distinctly remember”).
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© 2012 Francesco Berto
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Berto, F. (2012). How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of Exclusion. In: Restall, G., Russell, G. (eds) New Waves in Philosophical Logic. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137003720_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137003720_10
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