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Attention and Reputation: Linking Regulators’ Internal and External Worlds

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Executive Politics in Times of Crisis

Part of the book series: The series ((EXPOLGOV))

Abstract

The responsiveness of regulatory agencies and other bureaucracies to their political environment is a key concern of executive politics research.1 Given the salience of this issue it is surprising how little we know about the informal institutional structures and dynamics that mediate bureaucracies’ responsiveness to external signals and demands. The aim of this chapter is to theorize, and to empirically illustrate, this process of internal mediation. Its particular focus is on the shaping of regulators’ prioritization of tasks as one important indicator of their responsiveness. It asks: how do regulatory agencies prioritize their tasks in the light of external signals?

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Authors
  1. Sharon Gilad
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK

    Martin Lodge (Professor of Political Science and Public Policy) (Professor of Political Science and Public Policy)

  2. Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, Germany

    Kai Wegrich (Professor of Public Policy and Administration) (Professor of Public Policy and Administration)

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© 2012 Sharon Gilad

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Gilad, S. (2012). Attention and Reputation: Linking Regulators’ Internal and External Worlds. In: Lodge, M., Wegrich, K. (eds) Executive Politics in Times of Crisis. The Executive Politics and Governance series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137010261_9

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