Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy

Germany and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan

verfasst von: Carolin Hilpert

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK

Buchreihe : New Security Challenges

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Einloggen, um Zugang zu erhalten

Über dieses Buch

For more than a decade, international troops have been deployed to Afghanistan. Out of all NATO members, this mission was the most difficult for Germany that had thus far never engaged in combat and offensive military activities. This book analyses how Germany's experiences in Afghanistan have changed the country's strategic culture.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Introduction

Abstract

One of the main questions dominating the international community’s security agenda over the past decade has been what to do in Afghanistan. Billions of dollars and euros have been spent, and many lives have been sacrificed, to keep the wartorn country from again turning into a safe haven for international terrorists and to enable Afghanistan to be responsible for its own security. After 9/11, the United States sent its troops to Afghanistan with the objective, we were told, of defeating the Taliban regime and ousting Al Qaeda. Over time, however, the terrorist hunt turned into an ambitious nation-building endeavor with an uncertain outcome. There are dozens of books, studies, analyses, reports, and newspaper articles which speculate on the future of Afghanistan, the effectiveness of her security forces, or the fate of her fragile democratic elements.

Carolin Hilpert

1. On the Cultural Foundations of Warfare

Abstract

The notion that national or tribal cultures have an influence on warfare has a long history in human thought. One of the oldest studies in which cultural ways of war play a role are the writings of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, written in 431 BCE, he describes the differing backgrounds of the adversaries Sparta and Athens in order to describe how they battled each other; their cultures had a direct impact on the ways in which they led their respective forces. Much later, in 1932, the British army officer and military historian Basil Liddell Hart put forward the claim that there existed such a thing as a national way of war; in The British Way in Warfare, he observed that Britain avoided sending large armies to fight on the Continent, but instead utilized its navy to put economic pressure on its enemies. In this way Britain used an indirect approach.¹

Carolin Hilpert

2. Setting the Scene: The US War on Terrorism

Abstract

Two things came together after 9/11 which both play a major role in this book: Germany’s post-war history, and US and international policies in Afghanistan. In the more than forty years preceding the terrorist attacks, Germany’s security policy had witnessed an extraordinary evolution — starting as an almost demilitarized society after the Second World War, Germany eventually came to send its forces to bombard Serbia without a UN mandate.¹

Carolin Hilpert

3. Alliance Solidarity after 9/11

Abstract

The 9/11 terrorist attacks led NATO — for the first time in its history, and after its original raison d’être, the Cold War, had ended — to invoke Article 5 of its founding treaty in less than 24 hours after the attacks. Article 5 meant that Germany had to participate in the response to the attacks — otherwise it would have seriously violated its treaty obligations and thus isolated itself diplomatically.

Carolin Hilpert

4. Escalation in Afghanistan

Abstract

During the sixth renewal of the ISAF mandate, discussed on September 21 and 28, 2006, the concerned voices became significantly louder. Several warnings were given; for instance, regarding the nature of the conflict out of sixteen speakers supporting the deployment, fourteen expressed their concern over the security situation or the lack of progress in the country. MP Hoyer, for example, warned: ‘Also in the north of the country, the ISAF mission has turned into a veritable combat mission [Kampfeinsatz].’¹ Ernst-Reinhard Beck added that the German bases would regularly be under rocket and rifle fire.² Eckart von Klaeden (CDU) was the first MP to speak about the consequences of failure in Afghanistan, and warned that in such a case NATO would lose its credibility,³ a concern shared by MP Klose.⁴

Carolin Hilpert

5. The Stabilization Narrative Explodes

Abstract

Afghanistan presented a new operational reality to the Bundeswehr, one it had never before experienced, in the organized resistance to its troops. In the Balkans, the Bundeswehr had essentially been a peacekeeping force. It did not have to engage in offensive operations in order to counter an enemy that was systematically trying to disrupt the existing structure. The Bundeswehr had been an impartial peacekeeping force supported by a great part of the population. In Afghanistan, however, it became party to the conflict; German soldiers became ‘accidental combatants.’

Carolin Hilpert

6. German Forms of Counterinsurgency

Abstract

As it became increasingly clear to the NATO partners that the mission in Afghanistan was about to fail spectacularly, the international community under President Obama’s leadership came to reconsider its policies and strategy in Afghanistan. The incoming president announced a review of the US AfPak strategy in January 2009. He thus put his main focus on the war which had been neglected under the Bush administration, and initiated a thorough strategy-finding process, as advised by General McChrystal who took over the command of the ISAF forces in mid-2009. In February 2009, Obama announced an increase of 17,000 troops. In summer, however, General McChrystal argued that successful COIN in Afghanistan would demand a further increase in troops, of up to 40,000. In a previously classified report, later partially published by The Washington Post, McChrystal warned:

‘The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans — in both their government and the international community — that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents….

Carolin Hilpert

7. Afghanistan’s Legacy?

Abstract

One of the most controversial recent episodes in Germany’s security policy is the country’s 2011 abstention from the UN Security Council vote on Libya. This section looks at the discussion in Germany, the prevalent explanations and whether Afghanistan played a role in that decision. Given that these discussions did not lead to a German participation in Operation Unified Protector in Libya, this section will not analyze practices or symbols, but only the discourse part of Germany’s strategic culture.

Carolin Hilpert

Conclusion

Abstract

This book has made an original contribution to the academic subject of strategic culture, especially how it changes. Based on an analysis of the Federal Republic and the military mission in Afghanistan, it has highlighted the factors and mechanisms of change while also showing the resilience of strategic cultures. Overall, external factors have always been needed to induce change; those were the moments when traditional strategies and policy means failed. And they were effective with the presence of leadership, political entrepreneurs who took on the challenge and discursively forged a new reality.

Carolin Hilpert

Backmatter

Titel: Strategic Cultural Change and the Challenge for Security Policy
verfasst von: Carolin Hilpert
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Electronic ISBN: 978-1-137-38379-2
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-48066-1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137383792