Abstract
An empirical study was conducted to investigate the corporate board variables that are related to the practice of voluntary disclosure in listed companies in the Middle East, with a particular focus on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), given its unique corporate governance environment. A multiple regression analysis was conducted on the whole population of listed companies in the UAE. The empirical results suggest a model of factors that could be of greatest relevance to the determination of the dynamic forces that lie behind the voluntary implementation of best practice in disclosure in emerging markets that have economic characteristics similar to those of the UAE. The empirical results suggest in particular that the main factors that increase the effectiveness of a corporate board in voluntarily promoting good practice in disclosure are its size, its composition and the selection of experienced directors.
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Adawi, M., Rwegasira, K. Corporate boards and voluntary implementation of best disclosure practices in emerging markets: Evidence from the UAE listed companies in the Middle East. Int J Discl Gov 8, 272–293 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1057/jdg.2011.5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/jdg.2011.5