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Sub-types of Semi-presidentialism and Political Deadlock

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Abstract

This article argues that semi-presidentialism can be classified into five sub-types: (1) president-dominant semi-presidentialism, (2) premier-dominant semi-presidentialism, (3) parliament-dominant semi-presidentialism, (4) cohabitation semi-presidentialism, and (5) balance-of-powers semi-presidentialism. This framework differs from previous frameworks by emphasizing the constitutional powers of parliament in tandem with two more standard variables, namely, the powers of the president and the party situation in parliament. On the basis of this framework, it suggests that when two opposing branches (president and parliament) achieve parity, they are more likely to come into conflict as regards the passage of legislation. In particular, it is hypothesized that balance-of-powers semi-presidentialism is much more likely to generate political conflicts and political deadlock than any other sub-type, even to the point of breaking down a democratic regime.

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Notes

  1. Regarding the dependent variable, the past research on semi-presidentialism stresses political stability or political instability (see Wu, 2000; Roper, 2002; Skach, 2005b). In addition, regime survivial and regime performance are the most common dependent variables in the research of comparative constitutional engineering. Related dicussions can be seen in Elgie (2004).

  2. The definition of political deadlock here is different from Cheibub's definition. He argues that political deadlock occurs when parliament passes bills preferred by the opposition, the president vetoes these bills, and the opposition does not have enough votes to override the presidential veto (Cheibub, 2002, 289).

  3. These semi-presidential countries are Croatia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Poland (see Metcalf, 2000, 679).

  4. Skach (2005b) proposes semi-presidentialism is not a mixed system nor does it combine the features of presidentialism and parliamentarism and indeed is the third type of constitutional system. In this vein, we second Skach's idea. In addition, Shugart and Carey (1992, 23) substitute the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary system for semi-presidentialism. They argue that the term ‘semi-presidential’ implies a regime type that is located midway along some continuum running from presidential to parliamentary. Sartori disagrees with their argument, asserting that the word ‘semi’ does not assume any continuum because it precedes continuum-mania by well over 2,000 years (1997, 137). He also cautions that we should not read the label too literally. However, M. Shugart in a recent paper forgos his previous argument, agrees to use the term of semi-presidentialism, and treats the premier-presidential regime and president-parliamentary regime as the sub-types of semi-presidentialism. Related discussions can be seen in Shugart (2005).

  5. Premier and prime minister will be used interchangeably in this paper.

  6. Precisely, the classification here has to be called taxonomy, since it is based on empirical entities, not logical types. However, the term taxonomy is more generally used in the biological sciences, while typology is used in the social sciences (Bailey, 1994, 6). Accordingly, we still use typology here to refer to the classification.

  7. Suleiman even argues that the French president is the most powerful executive in the Western world or an imperial president, who has more powers than the American president. Related dicussions can bee seen in Suleiman (1980, 103–105) and Suleiman (1994).

  8. This situation only applies to cases in which there is no investiture. Studies of minority governments in Europe have found that the reason why some countries have a high frequency of minority governments is that they usually adopt the negative form of investiture, that is, no vote of investiture is required and a government remains in power until the opposition passes a vote of confidence or the government resigns (Bergman, 1993). One of the semi-presidential countries, Taiwan, has the same design as the formation of government, which does not need the investiture from the parliament. From 2000 to the present, Taiwan has experienced a period of minority governments. The president, Chen Shui-bian, chose to form minority governments and they had to face an opposition controlling a legislative majority in the parliament. Taiwan's case is similar to Portugal's case being discussed here. However, we only analyze Portugal as a case of parliament-dominant semi-presidentialism due to the limitation of the paper's length.

  9. Skach uses the sub-type of divided minority government to also explain the Weimar Republic (2005b). Here, this paper emphasizes parliamentary powers and balance of powers between the president and parliament, which is different from Skach's argument.

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  1. Political Science Department, National Chung Cheng University, 168, University Rd, Min-Hsiung, Chia-Yi, 621, Taiwan, ROC

    Jung-Hsiang Tsai

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Tsai, JH. Sub-types of Semi-presidentialism and Political Deadlock. Fr Polit 6, 63–84 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200140

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