Abstract
Seaports can be meaningfully analysed with a cluster perspective. In this perspective, seaports are regarded as concentrations of economic activity related to the arrival and service of ships and cargoes at ports. This perspective has two main advantages: first, it draws attention to forces of agglomeration and disagglomeration in seaports. Some seaports are able to become concentrations of logistics activities, commercial centres, ‘information hubs’ and ‘shipping hubs’, while others do not attract such activities. The cluster perspective allows for an analysis of such processes of agglomeration. Second, the cluster perspective enriches existing theories on governance in seaports. The analysis of governance in seaports has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports (port clusters), we argue that a port authority is one ‘arrangement’ to improve the governance in clusters, but not the only ‘arrangement’. Other arrangements include the formation of associations, the development of public-private partnerships and the use of networks. The literature on governance in clusters provides a broad analytical framework. This framework has implications for analysing the important and complex issue of the role of port authorities in seaports. In this paper, we deal in depth with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach to cluster governance with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam.
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Notes
For these reasons, we claim that the performance of a port cannot be understood when a port is analysed as a transport node, or an element of a logistics chain. Such a perspective neglects the interdependence of various economic activities that cluster together in seaports.
Given the presence of regulations that prevent collusion.
The presence of intermediaries in a cluster offers advantages because the costs of using a local intermediary are lower than the costs of using an intermediary outside the cluster. Furthermore, intermediaries are likely to have a dense local network and client base.
The above-mentioned reasons are the ‘raison d’être’ of many intermediaries. However, their presence in an industry is a different issue than their presence in a (regional) cluster.
For each specific cluster, different issues are relevant, issues such as an education regime and an innovation regime are widely regarded as relevant for the performance of clusters.
Campbell et al (1991) argue that ‘When actors have already established associations (…) and thus the capacity for selecting far sighted cooperative strategies, they can more easily devise new multilateral governance mechanisms than actors from a sector, where short sighted bilateral mechanisms dominate the governance regime (Campbell et al, 1991, p. 331). This shows the path-dependence of regimes.
Instead of investing in the quality of regimes firms can also leave the cluster when regimes are not efficient or ‘free-ride’ on the investments of others.
The coordination mechanisms markets, hierarchies and interfirm alliances are used in clusters, but are used for transactions within a firm or between a limited number of firms. These coordination mechanisms are not suited for solving CAPs. Other kinds of institutions, such as discussion platforms and informal are not truly elements of an infrastructure for solving CAPs.
Public–private organisations and public organisations can be regarded as elements of the infrastructure for collective action (of a cluster) if they are established to generate cluster-specific collective benefits.
Hirschman (1970) discusses three possible reactions when confronted with an unsatisfactory situation (in his case working conditions): exit, voice and as a third possibility, ‘silence’. The first two are sources of pressure, the third is not. When applied to association members, exit means that firms do not use services of associations. Exit does not directly contribute to the quality of a regime.
Campbell and Lingberg write with regard to changing a regime that ‘actors eventually select a new governance regime as streams of action intermingle in complex ways. Trial and error learning as the result of spontaneous interaction may predominate in some instances (…). In this sense, selection is very much a process of muddling through. In other cases, deliberate coordinations among organisations will take the place of, or supplement, trial and error’ (Campbell and Lingberg, 1991, p. 331). This illustrates that adaptation of regimes is far from spontaneous.
Four of these five issues are relevant for clusters in general, hinterland accessibility is a port-specific governance issue. These five issues are important but not the only five issues. Other relevant issues include the relation between port and city and port expansion.
Cooke (1998) uses the term ‘regional system of innovation’, Brackzyk et al (1998) the term ‘regional innovation systems’.
Since labour is mobile, all firms in a cluster benefit indirectly from investments in training and education.
Albertini (1999) argues that internationalisation is indeed to some extent a ‘collective process’: ‘the main transformation process can be identified in the evolution of the district from closed contextual ‘community networks’ to ‘semantic’ and ‘market’ networks –that are open and integrated with the global economy’ (Albertini, 1999, p. 113).
Public authorities are generally deeply involved in safeguarding the quality of accessibility, through investing in infrastructure, infrastructure utilisation, and spatial planning.
These experts are selected on the basis of three criteria: job position, years experience in the port industry and involvement in cluster governance. A first selection of about 38 was made in cooperation with Professor Welters, former director of the port association. This list with experts was supplemented based on the suggestions of the port experts. Overall, 43 of the 49 experts on the list were interviewed and filled out a questionnaire.
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Langen, P. Governance in Seaport Clusters. Marit Econ Logist 6, 141–156 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.mel.9100100
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.mel.9100100