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Coordination in Hinterland Transport Chains: A Major Challenge for the Seaport Community

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Abstract

Many different private companies – shipping lines, terminal operating companies, forwarders, hinterland transport providers, and inland terminal operators – are involved in hinterland transport. In addition, different public actors such as the port authority, customs, and infrastructure managers are involved. Creating effective hinterland transport chains requires the coordination between all these actors; coordination does not come about spontaneously. Its development may be hindered by free-riding problems, a lack of contractual relationships, information asymmetry, and a lack of incentives for cooperation. This paper presents analyses of the coordination problems in hinterland chains of seaports and arrangements to resolve these problems. The most relevant coordination problems in hinterland chains are discussed. Based on insights from institutional economics, four main categories of arrangements to improve coordination are identified: the introduction of incentives, the creation of an interfirm alliance, changing the scope of the organisation, and collective action. An analysis is presented of a substantial number of coordination arrangements in hinterland transport to and from the port of Rotterdam, thereby indicating how coordination could be improved.

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Notes

  1. Only a few container truck companies have a truck fleet of more than 50 units. The average truck fleet is 5–7 TEU, which is very small in comparison with other transport companies in the hinterland chain.

  2. The mechanism is related to the concept of property rights. A primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalisation of externalities (Demsetz, 1967).

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Correspondence to Peter W De Langen.

Appendices

APPENDIX A: LIST WITH COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS

Abbreviations mechanisms:

INC: introduction of incentives

IA: creation of an interfirm alliance

SCO: changing scope

CA: creating collective action

Table A1

Table 7

APPENDIX B LIST WITH COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS

Table B1, Table B2

Table 8 Coordination arrangements in container rail transport
Table 9 Coordination arrangements in container trucking

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Van Der Horst, M., De Langen, P. Coordination in Hinterland Transport Chains: A Major Challenge for the Seaport Community. Marit Econ Logist 10, 108–129 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.mel.9100194

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