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Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

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Abstract

The relationship between income inequality and economic growth is complex and the evidence mixed. This paper focuses on the connections between income inequality and the fragility of economic growth. We find that longer growth spells—periods of strong, healthy, per capita growth—are robustly associated with more equality in the income distribution, even when controlling for a range of other standard determinants. A key implication is that it would be a gamble to think that distribution will take care of itself provided policy makers steadfastly pursue growth. Over longer horizons, avoiding excessive inequality and sustaining economic growth may be two sides of the same coin.

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Figure 1

Source: Penn World Tables version 6.2.

Figure 2

Sources: Penn World Tables version 6.2, Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012), and authors’ calculations.

Figure 3

Source: Penn World Tables and Wider World Income Inequality Database.

Figure 4

Sources: Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012) and authors’ calculations.

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Notes

  1. This approach is related to the observation of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) that, for many emerging markets, “the cycle is the trend.” Our related perspective, along the lines of Pritchett (2000), Hausman and others (2005, 2006), and Kar and others (2013), is that for most countries breaks in trends drive long-run outcomes. As we discuss below and further in Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012), it is in only a handful of developed countries that there seem to be no such breaks, perhaps in part because the main drivers of such breaks have been weaker than in other countries.

  2. Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012) also look at five-year minimum lengths to gauge the sensitivity of the results—the interested reader may refer to that reference for further details about how the five- versus eight-year results differ (in sum, they are broadly consonant, though of course the number of breaks identified—174 for a minimum interstitiary period of eight years, and 280 breaks when the minimum length of spells is five years—is different).

  3. The methodological appendix provides further details on the identification of growth breaks and spells.

  4. Of course, we also cannot fully rule out reverse causality from growth to inequality. However, as described in more detail in the appendix, we assess the relationship between a set of time-varying variables and expected duration of a spell conditional on its current length (i.e., conditional on being in an ongoing spell). This is similar to treating the right-hand side variables as predetermined (though not strictly exogenous). While this will not eliminate all sources of endogeneity (e.g., endogeneity through expectation that the end of a spell is imminent), it should prevent bias through standard feedback from the end of a spell to potential determinants (e.g., from a growth collapse to higher inflation, rather than the reverse).

  5. The appendix explains the regression methodology in more detail. Many of the spells in the sample have not ended by the end of the sample and their eventual length is unknown. However, the statistical techniques used in this section take these incomplete spells into account. If some factor is common to long incomplete spells but absent in short complete spells, a protective effect on duration can be identified (Woolridge 2002, chapter 20).

  6. Even these “bivariate” estimations include initial income, in addition to the variable of interest, to avoid misattributing to another variable the effects of underdevelopment itself, with which that variable might be correlated. It turns out that low initial income is independently a significant predictor of longer spells. The estimations can also shed some light on whether the length of the spell itself is a risk factor, which it appears to be (the hazard is increasing in the time spent in the spell), even after including the other potential determinants.

  7. To take the Gini as an example, the median in the sample is 40. A 10-percentile improvement takes the Gini to 37, which represents more equality than 60 percent of the Gini observations in the sample. Our source for the inequality data is the WIDER 2a database of worldwide income inequality (June 2005), with year-to-year proxies obtained through linear interpolation. The WIDER database is not fully consistent across countries and time in its treatment of market and disposable income Ginis. Fortunately, in work subsequent to this paper (Ostry and others, 2014) using a different data source, and delving into the issue of redistribution (i.e., the difference between disposable and market Ginis), the results presented here are preserved.

  8. Lack of significance of manufactured exports may reflect the notion that these operate mainly by creating stronger institutions and reform constituencies, as suggested by Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian (2007). Macro-stability variables are also not terribly robust, possibly reflecting the idea that inflation reflects deep distributional conflicts (Taylor, 1991).

  9. Easterly and Levine (1997), for example, attribute differences in a number of important public policy and economic indicators such as low schooling, political instability, and macroeconomic mismanagement to high ethnic fractionalization. However, they do not also control for income distribution.

  10. A full-blown “narrative approach” to identifying spells and assessing determinants could be an interesting alternative methodology, one well beyond the scope of this paper.

  11. This follows Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012), which contains further details and robustness checks.

  12. Given a sample size T, the interstitiary period h will determine the maximum number of breaks, m for each country: m = int(T/h) − 1. For example, if T = 50 and h = 8, then m = int(6.25) − 1 = 5. In practice, we set m = int(T/h) − 2 to avoid occasional anomalies. Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer examines also h = 5. The results do not depend on this choice, particularly for inequality.

  13. Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012) finds that the choice of g does not drive the results. As described in Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012), adding a criterion that requires the break itself to have a minimum size does not affect our results.

  14. In Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2012), we also look at a number of alternative functional forms, including some that allow duration dependence to be non-monotonic. The main results are robust to alternative distributional assumptions. We use the Stata command Streg with the accelerated time-to-failure option. To take account of the fact that a downbreak, by construction, cannot happen until eight years into a spell at the earliest (a consequence of our interstitiary period), we created a dummy variable defining the notional start of the spell as the true start year plus 7 years.

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Correspondence to Jonathan D. Ostry.

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*Andrew Berg is Deputy Director of the IMF’s Institute for Capacity Development. Previously he was chief of the Development Macroeconomics Division in the IMF’s Research Department, chief of the Regional Studies Division the African Department, and mission chief to Malawi. He first joined the IMF in 1993 and spent several years in the Research Department and the Department of Strategy Policy and Review. He has a Ph.D. in Economics from MIT and an undergraduate degree from Harvard. Jonathan D. Ostry is Deputy Director of the Research Department at the IMF. Past positions include leading the division that produces the IMF’s flagship publication, the World Economic Outlook, and leading country teams on Japan, Australia, and Singapore. Mr. Ostry is author/editor of a number of books on international policy issues, and numerous articles in scholarly journals. He earned his BA at Oxford University, his M.Sc. at the London School of Economics and his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago. We thank Olivier Blanchard, Dani Rodrik and Joe Stiglitz for helpful comments and discussions related to this paper.

Appendix: Calculation of Breaks and Spells

Appendix: Calculation of Breaks and Spells

We apply a variant of a procedure proposed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to test for multiple structural breaks in time series when both the total number and the location of breaks are unknown.Footnote 11 Our approach differs from the Bai–Perron approach in that it uses sample-specific critical values that take into account heteroskedasticity and sample size as opposed to asymptotic critical values; and in that it extends Bai–Perron’s algorithm for sequential testing of structural breaks, as described below.

We set the minimum “interstitiary period:” the minimum number of years, h, between breaks to 8.Footnote 12 We next employ an algorithm that sequentially tests for the presence of up to m breaks in the GDP growth series. The first step is to test for the null hypothesis of zero structural breaks against the alternative of one or more structural breaks (up to the preset maximum m). The location of potential breaks is decided by minimizing the sum of squared residuals between the actual data and the average growth rate before and after the break. Critical values are generated through Monte Carlo simulations using bootstrapped residuals that take into account the properties of the actual time series (i.e., sample size and variance). We choose these critical values so as to reject true nulls at the 10 percent level.

We define growth spells as periods of time

  • beginning with a statistical upbreak followed by a period of at least g percent average growth; and

  • ending either with a statistical downbreak followed by a period of less than g percent average growth (“complete” growth spells) or with the end of the sample (“incomplete” growth spells).

Since growth in our definition means per capita income growth, growth of as low as 2 percent might be considered a reasonable threshold; we thus focus on the g = 2 case.Footnote 13

1.1 Specification of the Hazard Model

The analysis of growth spells and their determinants consists of estimating proportional hazard models to relate the probability that a growth spell will end to a set of time-varying covariates. Let \( T \) denote survival time (duration), a random variable with a cumulative distribution function \( F(t) = \Pr (T \le t) \). The survival function \( S(t) \) is the complement of the distribution function \( S(t) = \Pr (T > t) = 1 - F(t) \). Methods for analyzing survival data often focus on modeling the hazard rate which assesses the instantaneous risk of demise at time t, conditional on survival up to that time

$$ h(t) = \mathop {\lim }\limits_{\Delta t \to 0} \frac{\Pr [(t \le T \le t + \Delta t)|T \ge t]}{\Delta t} = \frac{f(t)}{S(t)}. $$
(1)

Duration is modeled by parametrizing the hazard rate and estimating the relevant parameters. Assuming a proportional hazards model and that the relationship between the hazard and covariate vector \( X_{i} \) is log linear, the “benchmark hazard” takes a particular functional form for subject \( i \) with covariate vector as

$$ \lambda (t|X_{i} ) = \lambda_{0} (t)\exp (X_{i} \beta ) $$
(2)

where \( \lambda_{0} (t) \) is the benchmark hazard at time \( t \) and \( \beta \) is a vector of unknown parameters.

One potential problem in estimating (2) arises from the feedback of spell duration to the covariates. For example, a covariate may depend on whether or not a spell has ended or is still ongoing. It is possible to estimate (2) consistently if we assume that the hazard at time t conditional on the covariates at time t depends only on the lagged realizations of those covariates (Wooldridge, Woolridge 2002). Thus, we define the hazard at time t (now in discrete time) as the probability that the spell will end during period t + 1 conditional on time-varying covariates up to and including time t, including some variables measured at the beginning of the spell. This does not rule out all sources of endogeneity (e.g., through expectations that the end of a spell is imminent), but it should prevent bias through standard feedback from the end of a spell to potential determinants.

We assume that \( \lambda_{0} (t) \) follows a Weibull distribution, i.e., \( \lambda_{0} (t) = pt^{p - 1} \). The parameter p, which is estimated, determines whether duration dependence is positive (p > 1) or negative.Footnote 14

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Berg, A.G., Ostry, J.D. Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides of the Same Coin?. IMF Econ Rev 65, 792–815 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41308-017-0030-8

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