The Political Economy of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Africa

Abstract

In the mid-1990s an international consensus in development discourse has emerged: democratisation, public sector down-sizing, and economic deregulation are desirable goals in themselves, but they also reduce the extensive corruption in monopolistic state agencies. This study examines these issues with reference to the politics and practicalities of anti-corruption strategies in several African societies. It is argued that although down-sizing the state and political liberalisation are desirable goals in many African countries, they are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for the reduction of corruption. Extensive public sector corruption can coexist with democratic or quasi-democratic politics (as in Nigeria in the 1980s). Economic liberalisation can also create opportunities for corruption, through the sales of parastatals in dubious circumstances, and the creation of new, corrupt markets, as can the political liberalisation of previously authoritarian regimes such as Kenya in the 1990s. For short-term anti-corruption strategies to be effective in African societies, more attention needs to be devoted to questions of sequencing, the detail of reform and its sustainability in very poor societies, and the exceptional political and managerial commitment necessary to promote and maintain reform.